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Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 1/4] certs: Add EFI_CERT_X509_GUID support for dbx
 entries
To:     Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Cc:     David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, dwmw2@infradead.org,
        Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
        James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com, masahiroy@kernel.org,
        michal.lkml@markovi.net, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com,
        ardb@kernel.org, zohar@linux.ibm.com, lszubowi@redhat.com,
        javierm@redhat.com, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
References: <20210122181054.32635-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
 <20210122181054.32635-2-eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
 <399024a1-59fb-12b8-9ea9-9bbee843dbc8@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
 <13EE0575-2F90-4C49-AF5D-365B63D2CB64@oracle.com>
From:   Nayna <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Message-ID: <8f0c3b88-872a-bbae-eaa2-1467b6f386a0@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date:   Thu, 28 Jan 2021 10:35:09 -0500
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On 1/27/21 11:11 PM, Eric Snowberg wrote:
>> On Jan 27, 2021, at 8:54 PM, Nayna <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 1/22/21 1:10 PM, Eric Snowberg wrote:
>>> This fixes CVE-2020-26541.
>>>
>>> The Secure Boot Forbidden Signature Database, dbx, contains a list of now
>>> revoked signatures and keys previously approved to boot with UEFI Secure
>>> Boot enabled.  The dbx is capable of containing any number of
>>> EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID, EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, and EFI_CERT_X509_GUID
>>> entries.
>>>
>>> Currently when EFI_CERT_X509_GUID are contained in the dbx, the entries are
>>> skipped.
>>>
>>> Add support for EFI_CERT_X509_GUID dbx entries. When a EFI_CERT_X509_GUID
>>> is found, it is added as an asymmetrical key to the .blacklist keyring.
>>> Anytime the .platform keyring is used, the keys in the .blacklist keyring
>>> are referenced, if a matching key is found, the key will be rejected.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
>>> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
>>> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
>>> ---
>>> v5: Function name changes done by David Howells
>>> ---
>>>   certs/blacklist.c                             | 32 +++++++++++++++++++
>>>   certs/blacklist.h                             | 12 +++++++
>>>   certs/system_keyring.c                        |  6 ++++
>>>   include/keys/system_keyring.h                 | 11 +++++++
>>>   .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c          | 11 +++++++
>>>   5 files changed, 72 insertions(+)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/certs/blacklist.c b/certs/blacklist.c
>>> index 6514f9ebc943..a7f021878a4b 100644
>>> --- a/certs/blacklist.c
>>> +++ b/certs/blacklist.c
>>> @@ -100,6 +100,38 @@ int mark_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash)
>>>   	return 0;
>>>   }
>>>
>>> +int add_key_to_revocation_list(const char *data, size_t size)
>>> +{
>>> +	key_ref_t key;
>>> +
>>> +	key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(blacklist_keyring, true),
>>> +				   "asymmetric",
>>> +				   NULL,
>>> +				   data,
>>> +				   size,
>>> +				   ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW),
>>> +				   KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN);
>>> +
>>> +	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
>>> +		pr_err("Problem with revocation key (%ld)\n", PTR_ERR(key));
>>> +		return PTR_ERR(key);
>>> +	}
>>> +
>>> +	return 0;
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +int is_key_on_revocation_list(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
>>> +{
>>> +	int ret;
>>> +
>>> +	ret = validate_trust(pkcs7, blacklist_keyring);
>>> +
>>> +	if (ret == 0)
>>> +		return -EKEYREJECTED;
>>> +
>>> +	return -ENOKEY;
>>> +}
>>> +
>>>   /**
>>>    * is_hash_blacklisted - Determine if a hash is blacklisted
>>>    * @hash: The hash to be checked as a binary blob
>>> diff --git a/certs/blacklist.h b/certs/blacklist.h
>>> index 1efd6fa0dc60..420bb7c86e07 100644
>>> --- a/certs/blacklist.h
>>> +++ b/certs/blacklist.h
>>> @@ -1,3 +1,15 @@
>>>   #include <linux/kernel.h>
>>> +#include <linux/errno.h>
>>> +#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
>>>
>>>   extern const char __initconst *const blacklist_hashes[];
>>> +
>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
>>> +#define validate_trust pkcs7_validate_trust
>>> +#else
>>> +static inline int validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
>>> +				 struct key *trust_keyring)
>>> +{
>>> +	return -ENOKEY;
>>> +}
>>> +#endif
>>> diff --git a/certs/system_keyring.c b/certs/system_keyring.c
>>> index 798291177186..cc165b359ea3 100644
>>> --- a/certs/system_keyring.c
>>> +++ b/certs/system_keyring.c
>>> @@ -241,6 +241,12 @@ int verify_pkcs7_message_sig(const void *data, size_t len,
>>>   			pr_devel("PKCS#7 platform keyring is not available\n");
>>>   			goto error;
>>>   		}
>>> +
>>> +		ret = is_key_on_revocation_list(pkcs7);
>>> +		if (ret != -ENOKEY) {
>>> +			pr_devel("PKCS#7 platform key is on revocation list\n");
>>> +			goto error;
>>> +		}
>>>   	}
>>>   	ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, trusted_keys);
>>>   	if (ret < 0) {
>>> diff --git a/include/keys/system_keyring.h b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
>>> index fb8b07daa9d1..61f98739e8b1 100644
>>> --- a/include/keys/system_keyring.h
>>> +++ b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
>>> @@ -31,11 +31,14 @@ extern int restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted(
>>>   #define restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted
>>>   #endif
>>>
>>> +extern struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
>>>   #ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
>>>   extern int mark_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash);
>>> +extern int add_key_to_revocation_list(const char *data, size_t size);
>>>   extern int is_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len,
>>>   			       const char *type);
>>>   extern int is_binary_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len);
>>> +extern int is_key_on_revocation_list(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7);
>>>   #else
>>>   static inline int is_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len,
>>>   				      const char *type)
>>> @@ -47,6 +50,14 @@ static inline int is_binary_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len)
>>>   {
>>>   	return 0;
>>>   }
>>> +static inline int add_key_to_revocation_list(const char *data, size_t size)
>>> +{
>>> +	return 0;
>>> +}
>>> +static inline int is_key_on_revocation_list(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
>>> +{
>>> +	return -ENOKEY;
>>> +}
>>>   #endif
>>>
>>>   #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
>>> diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
>>> index c5ba695c10e3..5604bd57c990 100644
>>> --- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
>>> +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
>>> @@ -55,6 +55,15 @@ static __init void uefi_blacklist_binary(const char *source,
>>>   	uefi_blacklist_hash(source, data, len, "bin:", 4);
>>>   }
>>>
>>> +/*
>>> + * Add an X509 cert to the revocation list.
>>> + */
>>> +static __init void uefi_revocation_list_x509(const char *source,
>>> +					     const void *data, size_t len)
>>> +{
>>> +	add_key_to_revocation_list(data, len);
>>> +}
>> In keeping the naming convention with other functions that blacklist hashes, why can't we call these functions:
>>
>> * uefi_revocation_list_x509() -> uefi_blacklist_x509_cert()
>> * add_key_to_revocation_list() -> uefi_blacklist_cert()
>> * is_key_on_revocation_list() -> is_cert_blacklisted()
> The word revocation was used do to the updated Linux coding style:
>
> https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/7/4/229
>
>
Thanks Eric for clarifying. I was confusing it with with the broader 
meaning of revocation i.e. certificate revocation list. To avoid similar 
confusion in the future, I wonder if we should call it as 'blocklist' or 
'denylist' as suggested in the document. This is to avoid conflicts with 
actual CRL support if added in the future. I also wonder if we should 
add the clarification in the patch description.

Thanks & Regards,

        - Nayna