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[23.128.96.18]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id t8si2518649ejr.334.2021.02.03.19.33.24; Wed, 03 Feb 2021 19:33:50 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S234193AbhBDDbt (ORCPT + 99 others); Wed, 3 Feb 2021 22:31:49 -0500 Received: from mail.hallyn.com ([178.63.66.53]:60636 "EHLO mail.hallyn.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S233516AbhBDDbp (ORCPT ); Wed, 3 Feb 2021 22:31:45 -0500 Received: by mail.hallyn.com (Postfix, from userid 1001) id 56FEF22D; Wed, 3 Feb 2021 21:30:57 -0600 (CST) Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2021 21:30:57 -0600 From: "Serge E. Hallyn" To: =?iso-8859-1?Q?Micka=EBl_Sala=FCn?= Cc: James Morris , Jann Horn , "Serge E . Hallyn" , Al Viro , Andrew Morton , Andy Lutomirski , Anton Ivanov , Arnd Bergmann , Casey Schaufler , Jeff Dike , Jonathan Corbet , Kees Cook , Michael Kerrisk , Richard Weinberger , Shuah Khan , Vincent Dagonneau , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, =?iso-8859-1?Q?Micka=EBl_Sala=FCn?= Subject: Re: [PATCH v28 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management Message-ID: <20210204033057.GB29022@mail.hallyn.com> References: <20210202162710.657398-1-mic@digikod.net> <20210202162710.657398-3-mic@digikod.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: <20210202162710.657398-3-mic@digikod.net> User-Agent: Mutt/1.9.4 (2018-02-28) Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Tue, Feb 02, 2021 at 05:27:00PM +0100, Micka?l Sala?n wrote: > From: Micka?l Sala?n > > A Landlock ruleset is mainly a red-black tree with Landlock rules as > nodes. This enables quick update and lookup to match a requested > access, e.g. to a file. A ruleset is usable through a dedicated file > descriptor (cf. following commit implementing syscalls) which enables a > process to create and populate a ruleset with new rules. > > A domain is a ruleset tied to a set of processes. This group of rules > defines the security policy enforced on these processes and their future > children. A domain can transition to a new domain which is the > intersection of all its constraints and those of a ruleset provided by > the current process. This modification only impact the current process. > This means that a process can only gain more constraints (i.e. lose > accesses) over time. > > Cc: James Morris > Cc: Jann Horn > Cc: Kees Cook > Cc: Serge E. Hallyn Acked-by: Serge Hallyn > Signed-off-by: Micka?l Sala?n > --- > > Changes since v27: > * Fix domains with layers of non-overlapping access rights. > * Add stricter limit checks (same semantic). > * Change the grow direction of a rule layer stack to make it the same as > the new ruleset fs_access_masks stack (cosmetic change). > * Cosmetic fix for a comment block. > > Changes since v26: > * Fix spelling. > > Changes since v25: > * Add build-time checks for the num_layers and num_rules variables > according to LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS and LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_RULES, and > move these limits to a dedicated file. > * Cosmetic variable renames. > > Changes since v24: > * Update struct landlock_rule with a layer stack. This reverts "Always > intersect access rights" from v24 and also adds the ability to tie > access rights with their policy layer. As noted by Jann Horn, always > intersecting access rights made some use cases uselessly more > difficult to handle in user space. Thanks to this new stack, we still > have a deterministic policy behavior whatever their level in the stack > of policies, while using a "union" of accesses when building a > ruleset. The implementation use a FAM to keep the access checks quick > and memory efficient (4 bytes per layer per inode). Update > insert_rule() accordingly. > > Changes since v23: > * Always intersect access rights. Following the filesystem change > logic, make ruleset updates more consistent by always intersecting > access rights (boolean AND) instead of combining them (boolean OR) for > the same layer. This defensive approach could also help avoid user > space to inadvertently allow multiple access rights for the same > object (e.g. write and execute access on a path hierarchy) instead of > dealing with such inconsistency. This can happen when there is no > deduplication of objects (e.g. paths and underlying inodes) whereas > they get different access rights with landlock_add_rule(2). > * Add extra checks to make sure that: > - there is always an (allocated) object in each used rules; > - when updating a ruleset with a new rule (i.e. not merging two > rulesets), the ruleset doesn't contain multiple layers. > * Hide merge parameter from the public landlock_insert_rule() API. This > helps avoid misuse of this function. > * Replace a remaining hardcoded 1 with SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING. > > Changes since v22: > * Explicitely use RB_ROOT and SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING (suggested by Jann > Horn). > * Improve comments and fix spelling (suggested by Jann Horn). > > Changes since v21: > * Add and clean up comments. > > Changes since v18: > * Account rulesets to kmemcg. > * Remove struct holes. > * Cosmetic changes. > > Changes since v17: > * Move include/uapi/linux/landlock.h and _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_* to a > following patch. > > Changes since v16: > * Allow enforcement of empty ruleset, which enables deny-all policies. > > Changes since v15: > * Replace layer_levels and layer_depth with a bitfield of layers, cf. > filesystem commit. > * Rename the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_{UNLINK,RMDIR} with > LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_{FILE,DIR} because it makes sense to use > them for the action of renaming a file or a directory, which may lead > to the removal of the source file or directory. Removes the > LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_{LINK_TO,RENAME_FROM,RENAME_TO} which are now > replaced with LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_{FILE,DIR} and > LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_* . > * Update the documentation accordingly and highlight how the access > rights are taken into account. > * Change nb_rules from atomic_t to u32 because it is not use anymore by > show_fdinfo(). > * Add safeguard for level variables types. > * Check max number of rules. > * Replace struct landlock_access (self and beneath bitfields) with one > bitfield. > * Remove useless variable. > * Add comments. > > Changes since v14: > * Simplify the object, rule and ruleset management at the expense of a > less aggressive memory freeing (contributed by Jann Horn, with > additional modifications): > - Make a domain immutable (remove the opportunistic cleaning). > - Remove RCU pointers. > - Merge struct landlock_ref and struct landlock_ruleset_elem into > landlock_rule: get ride of rule's RCU. > - Adjust union. > - Remove the landlock_insert_rule() check about a new object with the > same address as a previously disabled one, because it is not > possible to disable a rule anymore. > Cf. https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez21bEn0wL1bbmTiiu8j9jP5iEWtHOwz4tURUJ+ki0ydYw@mail.gmail.com/ > * Fix nested domains by implementing a notion of layer level and depth: > - Update landlock_insert_rule() to manage such layers. > - Add an inherit_ruleset() helper to properly create a new domain. > - Rename landlock_find_access() to landlock_find_rule() and return a > full rule reference. > - Add a layer_level and a layer_depth fields to struct landlock_rule. > - Add a top_layer_level field to struct landlock_ruleset. > * Remove access rights that may be required for FD-only requests: > truncate, getattr, lock, chmod, chown, chgrp, ioctl. This will be > handle in a future evolution of Landlock, but right now the goal is to > lighten the code to ease review. > * Remove LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPEN and rename > LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_{READ,WRITE} with a FILE suffix. > * Rename LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READDIR to match the *_FILE pattern. > * Remove LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAP which was useless. > * Fix memory leak in put_hierarchy() (reported by Jann Horn). > * Fix user-after-free and rename free_ruleset() (reported by Jann Horn). > * Replace the for loops with rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(). > * Constify variables. > * Only use refcount_inc() through getter helpers. > * Change Landlock_insert_ruleset_access() to > Landlock_insert_ruleset_rule(). > * Rename landlock_put_ruleset_enqueue() to landlock_put_ruleset_deferred(). > * Improve kernel documentation and add a warning about the unhandled > access/syscall families. > * Move ABI check to syscall.c . > > Changes since v13: > * New implementation, inspired by the previous inode eBPF map, but > agnostic to the underlying kernel object. > > Previous changes: > https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190721213116.23476-7-mic@digikod.net/ > --- > security/landlock/Makefile | 2 +- > security/landlock/limits.h | 17 ++ > security/landlock/ruleset.c | 469 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > security/landlock/ruleset.h | 165 +++++++++++++ > 4 files changed, 652 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > create mode 100644 security/landlock/limits.h > create mode 100644 security/landlock/ruleset.c > create mode 100644 security/landlock/ruleset.h > > diff --git a/security/landlock/Makefile b/security/landlock/Makefile > index cb6deefbf4c0..d846eba445bb 100644 > --- a/security/landlock/Makefile > +++ b/security/landlock/Makefile > @@ -1,3 +1,3 @@ > obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) := landlock.o > > -landlock-y := object.o > +landlock-y := object.o ruleset.o > diff --git a/security/landlock/limits.h b/security/landlock/limits.h > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000000..b734f597bb0e > --- /dev/null > +++ b/security/landlock/limits.h > @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ > +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ > +/* > + * Landlock LSM - Limits for different components > + * > + * Copyright ? 2016-2020 Micka?l Sala?n > + * Copyright ? 2018-2020 ANSSI > + */ > + > +#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LIMITS_H > +#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LIMITS_H > + > +#include > + > +#define LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS 64 > +#define LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_RULES U32_MAX > + > +#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LIMITS_H */ > diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.c b/security/landlock/ruleset.c > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000000..59c86126ea1c > --- /dev/null > +++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.c > @@ -0,0 +1,469 @@ > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only > +/* > + * Landlock LSM - Ruleset management > + * > + * Copyright ? 2016-2020 Micka?l Sala?n > + * Copyright ? 2018-2020 ANSSI > + */ > + > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > + > +#include "limits.h" > +#include "object.h" > +#include "ruleset.h" > + > +static struct landlock_ruleset *create_ruleset(const u32 num_layers) > +{ > + struct landlock_ruleset *new_ruleset; > + > + new_ruleset = kzalloc(struct_size(new_ruleset, fs_access_masks, > + num_layers), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); > + if (!new_ruleset) > + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); > + refcount_set(&new_ruleset->usage, 1); > + mutex_init(&new_ruleset->lock); > + new_ruleset->root = RB_ROOT; > + new_ruleset->num_layers = num_layers; > + /* > + * hierarchy = NULL > + * num_rules = 0 > + * fs_access_masks[] = 0 > + */ > + return new_ruleset; > +} > + > +struct landlock_ruleset *landlock_create_ruleset(const u32 fs_access_mask) > +{ > + struct landlock_ruleset *new_ruleset; > + > + /* Informs about useless ruleset. */ > + if (!fs_access_mask) > + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMSG); > + new_ruleset = create_ruleset(1); > + if (!IS_ERR(new_ruleset)) > + new_ruleset->fs_access_masks[0] = fs_access_mask; > + return new_ruleset; > +} > + > +static void build_check_rule(void) > +{ > + const struct landlock_rule rule = { > + .num_layers = ~0, > + }; > + > + BUILD_BUG_ON(rule.num_layers < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS); > +} > + > +static struct landlock_rule *create_rule( > + struct landlock_object *const object, > + const struct landlock_layer (*const layers)[], > + const u32 num_layers, > + const struct landlock_layer *const new_layer) > +{ > + struct landlock_rule *new_rule; > + u32 new_num_layers; > + > + build_check_rule(); > + if (new_layer) { > + /* Should already be checked by landlock_merge_ruleset(). */ > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(num_layers >= LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS)) > + return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG); > + new_num_layers = num_layers + 1; > + } else { > + new_num_layers = num_layers; > + } > + new_rule = kzalloc(struct_size(new_rule, layers, new_num_layers), > + GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); > + if (!new_rule) > + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); > + RB_CLEAR_NODE(&new_rule->node); > + landlock_get_object(object); > + new_rule->object = object; > + new_rule->num_layers = new_num_layers; > + /* Copies the original layer stack. */ > + memcpy(new_rule->layers, layers, > + flex_array_size(new_rule, layers, num_layers)); > + if (new_layer) > + /* Adds a copy of @new_layer on the layer stack. */ > + new_rule->layers[new_rule->num_layers - 1] = *new_layer; > + return new_rule; > +} > + > +static void put_rule(struct landlock_rule *const rule) > +{ > + might_sleep(); > + if (!rule) > + return; > + landlock_put_object(rule->object); > + kfree(rule); > +} > + > +static void build_check_ruleset(void) > +{ > + const struct landlock_ruleset ruleset = { > + .num_rules = ~0, > + .num_layers = ~0, > + }; > + > + BUILD_BUG_ON(ruleset.num_rules < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_RULES); > + BUILD_BUG_ON(ruleset.num_layers < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS); > +} > + > +/** > + * insert_rule - Create and insert a rule in a ruleset > + * > + * @ruleset: The ruleset to be updated. > + * @object: The object to build the new rule with. The underlying kernel > + * object must be held by the caller. > + * @layers: One or multiple layers to be copied into the new rule. > + * @num_layers: The number of @layers entries. > + * > + * When user space requests to add a new rule to a ruleset, @layers only > + * contains one entry and this entry is not assigned to any level. In this > + * case, the new rule will extend @ruleset, similarly to a boolean OR between > + * access rights. > + * > + * When merging a ruleset in a domain, or copying a domain, @layers will be > + * added to @ruleset as new constraints, similarly to a boolean AND between > + * access rights. > + */ > +static int insert_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, > + struct landlock_object *const object, > + const struct landlock_layer (*const layers)[], > + size_t num_layers) > +{ > + struct rb_node **walker_node; > + struct rb_node *parent_node = NULL; > + struct landlock_rule *new_rule; > + > + might_sleep(); > + lockdep_assert_held(&ruleset->lock); > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!object || !layers)) > + return -ENOENT; > + walker_node = &(ruleset->root.rb_node); > + while (*walker_node) { > + struct landlock_rule *const this = rb_entry(*walker_node, > + struct landlock_rule, node); > + > + if (this->object != object) { > + parent_node = *walker_node; > + if (this->object < object) > + walker_node = &((*walker_node)->rb_right); > + else > + walker_node = &((*walker_node)->rb_left); > + continue; > + } > + > + /* Only a single-level layer should match an existing rule. */ > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(num_layers != 1)) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + /* If there is a matching rule, updates it. */ > + if ((*layers)[0].level == 0) { > + /* > + * Extends access rights when the request comes from > + * landlock_add_rule(2), i.e. @ruleset is not a domain. > + */ > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(this->num_layers != 1)) > + return -EINVAL; > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(this->layers[0].level != 0)) > + return -EINVAL; > + this->layers[0].access |= (*layers)[0].access; > + return 0; > + } > + > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(this->layers[0].level == 0)) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + /* > + * Intersects access rights when it is a merge between a > + * ruleset and a domain. > + */ > + new_rule = create_rule(object, &this->layers, this->num_layers, > + &(*layers)[0]); > + if (IS_ERR(new_rule)) > + return PTR_ERR(new_rule); > + rb_replace_node(&this->node, &new_rule->node, &ruleset->root); > + put_rule(this); > + return 0; > + } > + > + /* There is no match for @object. */ > + build_check_ruleset(); > + if (ruleset->num_rules >= LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_RULES) > + return -E2BIG; > + new_rule = create_rule(object, layers, num_layers, NULL); > + if (IS_ERR(new_rule)) > + return PTR_ERR(new_rule); > + rb_link_node(&new_rule->node, parent_node, walker_node); > + rb_insert_color(&new_rule->node, &ruleset->root); > + ruleset->num_rules++; > + return 0; > +} > + > +static void build_check_layer(void) > +{ > + const struct landlock_layer layer = { > + .level = ~0, > + }; > + > + BUILD_BUG_ON(layer.level < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS); > +} > + > +/* @ruleset must be locked by the caller. */ > +int landlock_insert_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, > + struct landlock_object *const object, const u32 access) > +{ > + struct landlock_layer layers[] = {{ > + .access = access, > + /* When @level is zero, insert_rule() extends @ruleset. */ > + .level = 0, > + }}; > + > + build_check_layer(); > + return insert_rule(ruleset, object, &layers, ARRAY_SIZE(layers)); > +} > + > +static inline void get_hierarchy(struct landlock_hierarchy *const hierarchy) > +{ > + if (hierarchy) > + refcount_inc(&hierarchy->usage); > +} > + > +static void put_hierarchy(struct landlock_hierarchy *hierarchy) > +{ > + while (hierarchy && refcount_dec_and_test(&hierarchy->usage)) { > + const struct landlock_hierarchy *const freeme = hierarchy; > + > + hierarchy = hierarchy->parent; > + kfree(freeme); > + } > +} > + > +static int merge_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const dst, > + struct landlock_ruleset *const src) > +{ > + struct landlock_rule *walker_rule, *next_rule; > + int err = 0; > + > + might_sleep(); > + /* Should already be checked by landlock_merge_ruleset() */ > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!src)) > + return 0; > + /* Only merge into a domain. */ > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!dst || !dst->hierarchy)) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + /* Locks @dst first because we are its only owner. */ > + mutex_lock(&dst->lock); > + mutex_lock_nested(&src->lock, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING); > + > + /* Stacks the new layer. */ > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(src->num_layers != 1 || dst->num_layers < 1)) { > + err = -EINVAL; > + goto out_unlock; > + } > + dst->fs_access_masks[dst->num_layers - 1] = src->fs_access_masks[0]; > + > + /* Merges the @src tree. */ > + rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(walker_rule, next_rule, > + &src->root, node) { > + struct landlock_layer layers[] = {{ > + .level = dst->num_layers, > + }}; > + > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(walker_rule->num_layers != 1)) { > + err = -EINVAL; > + goto out_unlock; > + } > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(walker_rule->layers[0].level != 0)) { > + err = -EINVAL; > + goto out_unlock; > + } > + layers[0].access = walker_rule->layers[0].access; > + err = insert_rule(dst, walker_rule->object, &layers, > + ARRAY_SIZE(layers)); > + if (err) > + goto out_unlock; > + } > + > +out_unlock: > + mutex_unlock(&src->lock); > + mutex_unlock(&dst->lock); > + return err; > +} > + > +static int inherit_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const parent, > + struct landlock_ruleset *const child) > +{ > + struct landlock_rule *walker_rule, *next_rule; > + int err = 0; > + > + might_sleep(); > + if (!parent) > + return 0; > + > + /* Locks @child first because we are its only owner. */ > + mutex_lock(&child->lock); > + mutex_lock_nested(&parent->lock, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING); > + > + /* Copies the @parent tree. */ > + rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(walker_rule, next_rule, > + &parent->root, node) { > + err = insert_rule(child, walker_rule->object, > + &walker_rule->layers, walker_rule->num_layers); > + if (err) > + goto out_unlock; > + } > + > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(child->num_layers <= parent->num_layers)) { > + err = -EINVAL; > + goto out_unlock; > + } > + /* Copies the parent layer stack and leaves a space for the new layer. */ > + memcpy(child->fs_access_masks, parent->fs_access_masks, > + flex_array_size(parent, fs_access_masks, parent->num_layers)); > + > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!parent->hierarchy)) { > + err = -EINVAL; > + goto out_unlock; > + } > + get_hierarchy(parent->hierarchy); > + child->hierarchy->parent = parent->hierarchy; > + > +out_unlock: > + mutex_unlock(&parent->lock); > + mutex_unlock(&child->lock); > + return err; > +} > + > +static void free_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset) > +{ > + struct landlock_rule *freeme, *next; > + > + might_sleep(); > + rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(freeme, next, &ruleset->root, > + node) > + put_rule(freeme); > + put_hierarchy(ruleset->hierarchy); > + kfree(ruleset); > +} > + > +void landlock_put_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset) > +{ > + might_sleep(); > + if (ruleset && refcount_dec_and_test(&ruleset->usage)) > + free_ruleset(ruleset); > +} > + > +static void free_ruleset_work(struct work_struct *const work) > +{ > + struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset; > + > + ruleset = container_of(work, struct landlock_ruleset, work_free); > + free_ruleset(ruleset); > +} > + > +void landlock_put_ruleset_deferred(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset) > +{ > + if (ruleset && refcount_dec_and_test(&ruleset->usage)) { > + INIT_WORK(&ruleset->work_free, free_ruleset_work); > + schedule_work(&ruleset->work_free); > + } > +} > + > +/** > + * landlock_merge_ruleset - Merge a ruleset with a domain > + * > + * @parent: Parent domain. > + * @ruleset: New ruleset to be merged. > + * > + * Returns the intersection of @parent and @ruleset, or returns @parent if > + * @ruleset is empty, or returns a duplicate of @ruleset if @parent is empty. > + */ > +struct landlock_ruleset *landlock_merge_ruleset( > + struct landlock_ruleset *const parent, > + struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset) > +{ > + struct landlock_ruleset *new_dom; > + u32 num_layers; > + int err; > + > + might_sleep(); > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!ruleset || parent == ruleset)) > + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); > + > + if (parent) { > + if (parent->num_layers >= LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS) > + return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG); > + num_layers = parent->num_layers + 1; > + } else { > + num_layers = 1; > + } > + > + /* Creates a new domain... */ > + new_dom = create_ruleset(num_layers); > + if (IS_ERR(new_dom)) > + return new_dom; > + new_dom->hierarchy = kzalloc(sizeof(*new_dom->hierarchy), > + GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); > + if (!new_dom->hierarchy) { > + err = -ENOMEM; > + goto out_put_dom; > + } > + refcount_set(&new_dom->hierarchy->usage, 1); > + > + /* ...as a child of @parent... */ > + err = inherit_ruleset(parent, new_dom); > + if (err) > + goto out_put_dom; > + > + /* ...and including @ruleset. */ > + err = merge_ruleset(new_dom, ruleset); > + if (err) > + goto out_put_dom; > + > + return new_dom; > + > +out_put_dom: > + landlock_put_ruleset(new_dom); > + return ERR_PTR(err); > +} > + > +/* > + * The returned access has the same lifetime as @ruleset. > + */ > +const struct landlock_rule *landlock_find_rule( > + const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, > + const struct landlock_object *const object) > +{ > + const struct rb_node *node; > + > + if (!object) > + return NULL; > + node = ruleset->root.rb_node; > + while (node) { > + struct landlock_rule *this = rb_entry(node, > + struct landlock_rule, node); > + > + if (this->object == object) > + return this; > + if (this->object < object) > + node = node->rb_right; > + else > + node = node->rb_left; > + } > + return NULL; > +} > diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.h b/security/landlock/ruleset.h > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000000..6b1198458b37 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.h > @@ -0,0 +1,165 @@ > +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ > +/* > + * Landlock LSM - Ruleset management > + * > + * Copyright ? 2016-2020 Micka?l Sala?n > + * Copyright ? 2018-2020 ANSSI > + */ > + > +#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_RULESET_H > +#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_RULESET_H > + > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > + > +#include "object.h" > + > +/** > + * struct landlock_layer - Access rights for a given layer > + */ > +struct landlock_layer { > + /** > + * @level: Position of this layer in the layer stack. > + */ > + u16 level; > + /** > + * @access: Bitfield of allowed actions on the kernel object. They are > + * relative to the object type (e.g. %LANDLOCK_ACTION_FS_READ). > + */ > + u16 access; > +}; > + > +/** > + * struct landlock_rule - Access rights tied to an object > + */ > +struct landlock_rule { > + /** > + * @node: Node in the ruleset's red-black tree. > + */ > + struct rb_node node; > + /** > + * @object: Pointer to identify a kernel object (e.g. an inode). This > + * is used as a key for this ruleset element. This pointer is set once > + * and never modified. It always points to an allocated object because > + * each rule increments the refcount of its object. > + */ > + struct landlock_object *object; > + /** > + * @num_layers: Number of entries in @layers. > + */ > + u32 num_layers; > + /** > + * @layers: Stack of layers, from the latest to the newest, implemented > + * as a flexible array member (FAM). > + */ > + struct landlock_layer layers[]; > +}; > + > +/** > + * struct landlock_hierarchy - Node in a ruleset hierarchy > + */ > +struct landlock_hierarchy { > + /** > + * @parent: Pointer to the parent node, or NULL if it is a root > + * Landlock domain. > + */ > + struct landlock_hierarchy *parent; > + /** > + * @usage: Number of potential children domains plus their parent > + * domain. > + */ > + refcount_t usage; > +}; > + > +/** > + * struct landlock_ruleset - Landlock ruleset > + * > + * This data structure must contain unique entries, be updatable, and quick to > + * match an object. > + */ > +struct landlock_ruleset { > + /** > + * @root: Root of a red-black tree containing &struct landlock_rule > + * nodes. Once a ruleset is tied to a process (i.e. as a domain), this > + * tree is immutable until @usage reaches zero. > + */ > + struct rb_root root; > + /** > + * @hierarchy: Enables hierarchy identification even when a parent > + * domain vanishes. This is needed for the ptrace protection. > + */ > + struct landlock_hierarchy *hierarchy; > + union { > + /** > + * @work_free: Enables to free a ruleset within a lockless > + * section. This is only used by > + * landlock_put_ruleset_deferred() when @usage reaches zero. > + * The fields @lock, @usage, @num_rules, @num_layers and > + * @fs_access_masks are then unused. > + */ > + struct work_struct work_free; > + struct { > + /** > + * @lock: Guards against concurrent modifications of > + * @root, if @usage is greater than zero. > + */ > + struct mutex lock; > + /** > + * @usage: Number of processes (i.e. domains) or file > + * descriptors referencing this ruleset. > + */ > + refcount_t usage; > + /** > + * @num_rules: Number of non-overlapping (i.e. not for > + * the same object) rules in this ruleset. > + */ > + u32 num_rules; > + /** > + * @num_layers: Number of layers that are used in this > + * ruleset. This enables to check that all the layers > + * allow an access request. A value of 0 identifies a > + * non-merged ruleset (i.e. not a domain). > + */ > + u32 num_layers; > + /** > + * @fs_access_masks: Contains the subset of filesystem > + * actions that are restricted by a ruleset. A domain > + * saves all layers of merged rulesets in a stack > + * (FAM), starting from the first layer to the last > + * one. These layers are used when merging rulesets, > + * for user space backward compatibility (i.e. > + * future-proof), and to properly handle merged > + * rulesets without overlapping access rights. These > + * layers are set once and never changed for the > + * lifetime of the ruleset. > + */ > + u16 fs_access_masks[]; > + }; > + }; > +}; > + > +struct landlock_ruleset *landlock_create_ruleset(const u32 fs_access_mask); > + > +void landlock_put_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset); > +void landlock_put_ruleset_deferred(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset); > + > +int landlock_insert_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, > + struct landlock_object *const object, const u32 access); > + > +struct landlock_ruleset *landlock_merge_ruleset( > + struct landlock_ruleset *const parent, > + struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset); > + > +const struct landlock_rule *landlock_find_rule( > + const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, > + const struct landlock_object *const object); > + > +static inline void landlock_get_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset) > +{ > + if (ruleset) > + refcount_inc(&ruleset->usage); > +} > + > +#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_RULESET_H */ > -- > 2.30.0