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[23.128.96.18]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id bs12si2806975ejb.127.2021.02.04.01.12.06; Thu, 04 Feb 2021 01:12:33 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232685AbhBDJHI (ORCPT + 99 others); Thu, 4 Feb 2021 04:07:08 -0500 Received: from relay10.mail.gandi.net ([217.70.178.230]:47645 "EHLO relay10.mail.gandi.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S234799AbhBDJFL (ORCPT ); Thu, 4 Feb 2021 04:05:11 -0500 Received: from xps13 (lfbn-tou-1-972-150.w86-210.abo.wanadoo.fr [86.210.203.150]) (Authenticated sender: miquel.raynal@bootlin.com) by relay10.mail.gandi.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 470C7240018; Thu, 4 Feb 2021 09:04:09 +0000 (UTC) Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2021 10:04:08 +0100 From: Miquel Raynal To: Boris Brezillon Cc: Manivannan Sadhasivam , richard@nod.at, vigneshr@ti.com, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-msm@vger.kernel.org, bjorn.andersson@linaro.org Subject: Re: [PATCH] mtd: rawnand: Do not check for bad block if bbt is unavailable Message-ID: <20210204100408.6eb053d8@xps13> In-Reply-To: <20210204095945.51ef0c33@collabora.com> References: <20210202041614.GA840@work> <20210202091459.0c41a769@xps13> <20210203110522.12f2b326@xps13> <20210203111914.1c2f68f6@collabora.com> <8A2468D5-B435-4923-BA4F-7BF7CC0FF207@linaro.org> <20210203122422.6963b0ed@collabora.com> <20210204091336.1406ca3b@xps13> <20210204085221.GB8235@thinkpad> <20210204095945.51ef0c33@collabora.com> Organization: Bootlin X-Mailer: Claws Mail 3.17.4 (GTK+ 2.24.32; x86_64-pc-linux-gnu) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Hi Boris, Boris Brezillon wrote on Thu, 4 Feb 2021 09:59:45 +0100: > On Thu, 4 Feb 2021 14:22:21 +0530 > Manivannan Sadhasivam wrote: > > > On Thu, Feb 04, 2021 at 09:13:36AM +0100, Miquel Raynal wrote: > > > Hi Manivannan, > > > > > > Manivannan Sadhasivam wrote on Wed, > > > 03 Feb 2021 17:11:31 +0530: > > > > > > > On 3 February 2021 4:54:22 PM IST, Boris Brezillon wrote: > > > > >On Wed, 03 Feb 2021 16:22:42 +0530 > > > > >Manivannan Sadhasivam wrote: > > > > > > > > > >> On 3 February 2021 3:49:14 PM IST, Boris Brezillon > > > > > wrote: > > > > >> >On Wed, 03 Feb 2021 15:42:02 +0530 > > > > >> >Manivannan Sadhasivam wrote: > > > > >> > > > > > >> >> >> > > > > >> >> >> I got more information from the vendor, Telit. The access to > > > > >the > > > > >> >3rd > > > > >> >> >partition is protected by Trustzone and any access in non > > > > >privileged > > > > >> >> >mode (where Linux kernel runs) causes kernel panic and the device > > > > >> >> >reboots. > > > > >> > > > > > >> >Out of curiosity, is it a per-CS-line thing or is this section > > > > >> >protected on all CS? > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > >> Sorry, I didn't get your question. > > > > > > > > > >The qcom controller can handle several chips, each connected through a > > > > >different CS (chip-select) line, right? I'm wondering if the firmware > > > > >running in secure mode has the ability to block access for a specific > > > > >CS line or if all CS lines have the same constraint. That will impact > > > > >the way you describe it in your DT (in one case the secure-region > > > > >property should be under the controller node, in the other case it > > > > >should be under the NAND chip node). > > > > > > > > Right. I believe the implementation is common to all NAND chips so the property should be in the controller node. > > > > > > Looks weird: do you mean that each of the chips will have a secure area? > > > > I way I said is, the "secure-region" property will be present in the controller > > node and not in the NAND chip node since this is not related to the device > > functionality. > > > > But for referencing the NAND device, the property can have the phandle as below: > > > > secure-region = <&nand0 0xffff>; > > My question was really what happens from a functional PoV. If you have > per-chip protection at the FW level, this property should be under the > NAND node. OTH, if the FW doesn't look at the selected chip before > blocking the access, it should be at the controller level. So, you > really have to understand what the secure FW does. I'm not so sure actually, that's why I like the phandle to nand0 -> in any case it's not a property of the NAND chip itself, it's kind of a host constraint, so I don't get why the property should be at the NAND node level? Also, we should probably support several secure regions (which could be a way to express the fact that the FW does not look at the CS)?