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To:     Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc:     Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>,
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From:   David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Organization: Red Hat GmbH
Subject: Re: [PATCH v17 08/10] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active
 secretmem users
Message-ID: <770690dc-634a-78dd-0772-3aba1a3beba8@redhat.com>
Date:   Mon, 8 Feb 2021 12:13:49 +0100
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On 08.02.21 11:57, Michal Hocko wrote:
> On Mon 08-02-21 11:53:58, David Hildenbrand wrote:
>> On 08.02.21 11:51, Michal Hocko wrote:
>>> On Mon 08-02-21 11:32:11, David Hildenbrand wrote:
>>>> On 08.02.21 11:18, Michal Hocko wrote:
>>>>> On Mon 08-02-21 10:49:18, Mike Rapoport wrote:
>>>>>> From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It is unsafe to allow saving of secretmem areas to the hibernation
>>>>>> snapshot as they would be visible after the resume and this essentially
>>>>>> will defeat the purpose of secret memory mappings.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Prevent hibernation whenever there are active secret memory users.
>>>>>
>>>>> Does this feature need any special handling? As it is effectivelly
>>>>> unevictable memory then it should behave the same as other mlock, ramfs
>>>>> which should already disable hibernation as those cannot be swapped out,
>>>>> no?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Why should unevictable memory not go to swap when hibernating? We're merely
>>>> dumping all of our system RAM (including any unmovable allocations) to swap
>>>> storage and the system is essentially completely halted.
>>>>
>>> My understanding is that mlock is never really made visible via swap
>>> storage.
>>
>> "Using swap storage for hibernation" and "swapping at runtime" are two
>> different things. I might be wrong, though.
> 
> Well, mlock is certainly used to keep sensitive information, not only to
> protect from major/minor faults.
> 

I think you're right in theory, the man page mentions "Cryptographic 
security software often handles critical bytes like passwords or secret 
keys as data structures" ...

however, I am not aware of any such swap handling and wasn't able to 
spot it quickly. Let me take a closer look.


-- 
Thanks,

David / dhildenb