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[198.145.64.163]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id z12sm11550925pfn.150.2021.02.08.14.09.20 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Mon, 08 Feb 2021 14:09:20 -0800 (PST) Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 14:09:19 -0800 From: Kees Cook To: Dan Williams Cc: Jonathan Corbet , linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org, Ben Widawsky , Linux ACPI , Linux Kernel Mailing List , linux-nvdimm , Linux PCI , Bjorn Helgaas , Chris Browy , Ira Weiny , Jon Masters , Jonathan Cameron , Rafael Wysocki , Randy Dunlap , Vishal Verma , daniel.lll@alibaba-inc.com, "John Groves (jgroves)" , "Kelley, Sean V" Subject: Re: [PATCH 08/14] taint: add taint for direct hardware access Message-ID: <202102081406.CDE33FB8@keescook> References: <20210130002438.1872527-1-ben.widawsky@intel.com> <20210130002438.1872527-9-ben.widawsky@intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Mon, Feb 08, 2021 at 02:00:33PM -0800, Dan Williams wrote: > [ add Jon Corbet as I'd expect him to be Cc'd on anything that > generically touches Documentation/ like this, and add Kees as the last > person who added a taint (tag you're it) ] > > Jon, Kees, are either of you willing to ack this concept? > > Top-posting to add more context for the below: > > This taint is proposed because it has implications for > CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL among other things. These CXL devices > implement memory like DDR would, but unlike DDR there are > administrative / configuration commands that demand kernel > coordination before they can be sent. The posture taken with this > taint is "guilty until proven innocent" for commands that have yet to > be explicitly allowed by the driver. This is different than NVME for > example where an errant vendor-defined command could destroy data on > the device, but there is no wider threat to system integrity. The > taint allows a pressure release valve for any and all commands to be > sent, but flagged with WARN_TAINT_ONCE if the driver has not > explicitly enabled it on an allowed list of known-good / kernel > coordinated commands. > > On Fri, Jan 29, 2021 at 4:25 PM Ben Widawsky wrote: > > > > For drivers that moderate access to the underlying hardware it is > > sometimes desirable to allow userspace to bypass restrictions. Once > > userspace has done this, the driver can no longer guarantee the sanctity > > of either the OS or the hardware. When in this state, it is helpful for > > kernel developers to be made aware (via this taint flag) of this fact > > for subsequent bug reports. > > > > Example usage: > > - Hardware xyzzy accepts 2 commands, waldo and fred. > > - The xyzzy driver provides an interface for using waldo, but not fred. > > - quux is convinced they really need the fred command. > > - xyzzy driver allows quux to frob hardware to initiate fred. > > - kernel gets tainted. > > - turns out fred command is borked, and scribbles over memory. > > - developers laugh while closing quux's subsequent bug report. But a taint flag only lasts for the current boot. If this is a drive, it could still be compromised after reboot. It sounds like this taint is really only for ephemeral things? "vendor shenanigans" is a pretty giant scope ... -Kees > > > > Signed-off-by: Ben Widawsky > > --- > > Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst | 1 + > > Documentation/admin-guide/tainted-kernels.rst | 6 +++++- > > include/linux/kernel.h | 3 ++- > > kernel/panic.c | 1 + > > 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst > > index 1d56a6b73a4e..3e1eada53504 100644 > > --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst > > +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst > > @@ -1352,6 +1352,7 @@ ORed together. The letters are seen in "Tainted" line of Oops reports. > > 32768 `(K)` kernel has been live patched > > 65536 `(X)` Auxiliary taint, defined and used by for distros > > 131072 `(T)` The kernel was built with the struct randomization plugin > > +262144 `(H)` The kernel has allowed vendor shenanigans > > ====== ===== ============================================================== > > > > See :doc:`/admin-guide/tainted-kernels` for more information. > > diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/tainted-kernels.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/tainted-kernels.rst > > index ceeed7b0798d..ee2913316344 100644 > > --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/tainted-kernels.rst > > +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/tainted-kernels.rst > > @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ a particular type of taint. It's best to leave that to the aforementioned > > script, but if you need something quick you can use this shell command to check > > which bits are set:: > > > > - $ for i in $(seq 18); do echo $(($i-1)) $(($(cat /proc/sys/kernel/tainted)>>($i-1)&1));done > > + $ for i in $(seq 19); do echo $(($i-1)) $(($(cat /proc/sys/kernel/tainted)>>($i-1)&1));done > > > > Table for decoding tainted state > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > > @@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ Bit Log Number Reason that got the kernel tainted > > 15 _/K 32768 kernel has been live patched > > 16 _/X 65536 auxiliary taint, defined for and used by distros > > 17 _/T 131072 kernel was built with the struct randomization plugin > > + 18 _/H 262144 kernel has allowed vendor shenanigans > > === === ====== ======================================================== > > > > Note: The character ``_`` is representing a blank in this table to make reading > > @@ -175,3 +176,6 @@ More detailed explanation for tainting > > produce extremely unusual kernel structure layouts (even performance > > pathological ones), which is important to know when debugging. Set at > > build time. > > + > > + 18) ``H`` Kernel has allowed direct access to hardware and can no longer make > > + any guarantees about the stability of the device or driver. > > diff --git a/include/linux/kernel.h b/include/linux/kernel.h > > index f7902d8c1048..bc95486f817e 100644 > > --- a/include/linux/kernel.h > > +++ b/include/linux/kernel.h > > @@ -443,7 +443,8 @@ extern enum system_states { > > #define TAINT_LIVEPATCH 15 > > #define TAINT_AUX 16 > > #define TAINT_RANDSTRUCT 17 > > -#define TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT 18 > > +#define TAINT_RAW_PASSTHROUGH 18 > > +#define TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT 19 > > #define TAINT_FLAGS_MAX ((1UL << TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT) - 1) > > > > struct taint_flag { > > diff --git a/kernel/panic.c b/kernel/panic.c > > index 332736a72a58..dff22bd80eaf 100644 > > --- a/kernel/panic.c > > +++ b/kernel/panic.c > > @@ -386,6 +386,7 @@ const struct taint_flag taint_flags[TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT] = { > > [ TAINT_LIVEPATCH ] = { 'K', ' ', true }, > > [ TAINT_AUX ] = { 'X', ' ', true }, > > [ TAINT_RANDSTRUCT ] = { 'T', ' ', true }, > > + [ TAINT_RAW_PASSTHROUGH ] = { 'H', ' ', true }, > > }; > > > > /** > > -- > > 2.30.0 > > -- Kees Cook