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[23.128.96.18]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id dt5si7023738ejb.639.2021.02.19.19.06.20; Fri, 19 Feb 2021 19:06:44 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=k20201202 header.b=cpl6s9Ww; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230016AbhBTDDx (ORCPT + 99 others); Fri, 19 Feb 2021 22:03:53 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:44554 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229796AbhBTDDu (ORCPT ); Fri, 19 Feb 2021 22:03:50 -0500 Received: by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 82EB664ECA; Sat, 20 Feb 2021 03:03:08 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1613790189; bh=GH+2O6KD5MEIhlMf6/HszdBP9FzLwKyidhQiQesqIoY=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=cpl6s9Wwe8TllUthV8Etr/NlqI5NrwCB47ZAGpQxqJ+7Ej6KgdQbOWBHHxmmOw3s/ F8srAvqMgb9oPFm0aJp2ajgg55ZdALKvnbRG1zwAEq4OkFnpZNJ5CNO8LDtUzQZSsI kK3osWyjw1Hd+530MiA1nGiHLEH+beQgiNf74varFYSbT3TIUyIcu9KZrOyVT7+bbI y6FiTpe5W6fjIC2JhWWdv6Ak4Nd1ZGc2KlKNhRa7si4loZhZXeqg5pa+jf2f6eMhBM BGKmC23MetD3iijGzT8/Ud4i0goVEIeVVxeh6W4IcLDwhgPcrqopMoK+p+R2YAvtgB jOwTsIxL4c4kg== Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 05:02:53 +0200 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: Matthew Garrett Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-pm@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jejb@linux.ibm.com, corbet@lwn.net, rjw@rjwysocki.net, Matthew Garrett Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/9] tpm: Allow PCR 23 to be restricted to kernel-only use Message-ID: References: <20210220013255.1083202-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> <20210220013255.1083202-3-matthewgarrett@google.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20210220013255.1083202-3-matthewgarrett@google.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Sat, Feb 20, 2021 at 01:32:48AM +0000, Matthew Garrett wrote: > Under certain circumstances it might be desirable to enable the creation > of TPM-backed secrets that are only accessible to the kernel. In an > ideal world this could be achieved by using TPM localities, but these > don't appear to be available on consumer systems. An alternative is to > simply block userland from modifying one of the resettable PCRs, leaving > it available to the kernel. If the kernel ensures that no userland can > access the TPM while it is carrying out work, it can reset PCR 23, > extend it to an arbitrary value, create or load a secret, and then reset > the PCR again. Even if userland somehow obtains the sealed material, it > will be unable to unseal it since PCR 23 will never be in the > appropriate state. Does this leave room to use them *if* they are available? Not saying that this patch set must support them, but neither would like to disclude them from unforseeable future. > > Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett > --- > drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig | 10 +++++++++ > drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c | 8 +++++++ > drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 21 +++++++++++++++++++ > drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++ > drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c | 2 +- > 6 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig > index a18c314da211..bba30fb16a2e 100644 > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig > @@ -190,4 +190,14 @@ config TCG_FTPM_TEE > This driver proxies for firmware TPM running in TEE. > > source "drivers/char/tpm/st33zp24/Kconfig" > + > +config TCG_TPM_RESTRICT_PCR > + bool "Restrict userland access to PCR 23" > + depends on TCG_TPM > + help > + If set, block userland from extending or resetting PCR 23. This > + allows it to be restricted to in-kernel use, preventing userland > + from being able to make use of data sealed to the TPM by the kernel. > + This is required for secure hibernation support, but should be left > + disabled if any userland may require access to PCR23. > endif # TCG_TPM > diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c > index 1784530b8387..d3db4fd76257 100644 > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c > @@ -193,6 +193,14 @@ ssize_t tpm_common_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, > priv->response_read = false; > *off = 0; > > + if (priv->chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) > + ret = tpm2_cmd_restricted(priv->chip, priv->data_buffer, size); > + else > + ret = tpm1_cmd_restricted(priv->chip, priv->data_buffer, size); > + > + if (ret) > + goto out; > + I have to admit my knowledge is limited here. I'm not sure how widely is 23 used by the pre-existing user space in the wild. > /* > * If in nonblocking mode schedule an async job to send > * the command return the size. > diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h > index 746f7696bdc0..8eed5016d733 100644 > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h > @@ -232,6 +232,8 @@ void tpm2_shutdown(struct tpm_chip *chip, u16 shutdown_type); > unsigned long tpm2_calc_ordinal_duration(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 ordinal); > int tpm2_probe(struct tpm_chip *chip); > int tpm2_get_cc_attrs_tbl(struct tpm_chip *chip); > +int tpm_find_and_validate_cc(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space, > + const void *buf, size_t bufsiz); > int tpm2_find_cc(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 cc); > int tpm2_init_space(struct tpm_space *space, unsigned int buf_size); > void tpm2_del_space(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space); > @@ -245,4 +247,23 @@ void tpm_bios_log_setup(struct tpm_chip *chip); > void tpm_bios_log_teardown(struct tpm_chip *chip); > int tpm_dev_common_init(void); > void tpm_dev_common_exit(void); > + > +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM_RESTRICT_PCR > +#define TPM_RESTRICTED_PCR 23 > + > +int tpm1_cmd_restricted(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buffer, size_t size); > +int tpm2_cmd_restricted(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buffer, size_t size); > +#else > +static inline int tpm1_cmd_restricted(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buffer, > + size_t size) > +{ > + return 0; > +} > + > +static inline int tpm2_cmd_restricted(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buffer, > + size_t size) > +{ > + return 0; > +} > +#endif > #endif > diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c > index 36990e9d2dc1..2dab1647d89c 100644 > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c > @@ -840,3 +840,38 @@ int tpm1_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip) > > return 0; > } > + > +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM_RESTRICT_PCR > +int tpm1_cmd_restricted(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buffer, size_t size) > +{ > + struct tpm_header *header = (struct tpm_header *)buffer; > + char len, offset; > + u32 *pcr; > + int pos; > + > + switch (be32_to_cpu(header->ordinal)) { > + case TPM_ORD_PCR_EXTEND: > + if (size < (TPM_HEADER_SIZE + sizeof(u32))) > + return -EINVAL; > + pcr = (u32 *)&buffer[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]; > + if (be32_to_cpu(*pcr) == TPM_RESTRICTED_PCR) > + return -EPERM; > + break; > + case TPM_ORD_PCR_RESET: > + if (size < (TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 1)) > + return -EINVAL; > + len = buffer[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]; > + if (size < (TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 1 + len)) > + return -EINVAL; > + offset = TPM_RESTRICTED_PCR/3; > + if (len < offset) > + break; > + pos = TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 1 + offset; > + if (buffer[pos] & (1 << (TPM_RESTRICTED_PCR - 2 * offset))) > + return -EPERM; > + break; > + } > + > + return 0; > +} > +#endif > diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c > index 9609ae8086c6..7dbd4590dee8 100644 > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c > @@ -795,3 +795,25 @@ int tpm2_find_cc(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 cc) > > return -1; > } > + > +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM_RESTRICT_PCR > +int tpm2_cmd_restricted(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buffer, size_t size) > +{ > + int cc = tpm_find_and_validate_cc(chip, NULL, buffer, size); > + u32 *handle; > + > + switch (cc) { > + case TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND: > + case TPM2_CC_PCR_RESET: > + if (size < (TPM_HEADER_SIZE + sizeof(u32))) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + handle = (u32 *)&buffer[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]; > + if (be32_to_cpu(*handle) == TPM_RESTRICTED_PCR) > + return -EPERM; > + break; > + } > + > + return 0; > +} > +#endif > diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c > index 784b8b3cb903..76a993492962 100644 > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c > @@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ static int tpm2_map_command(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 cc, u8 *cmd) > return 0; > } > > -static int tpm_find_and_validate_cc(struct tpm_chip *chip, > +int tpm_find_and_validate_cc(struct tpm_chip *chip, > struct tpm_space *space, > const void *cmd, size_t len) > { > -- > 2.30.0.617.g56c4b15f3c-goog > > What are the consumer use cases anyway? Why wouldn't locality based solution make sense to those use cases where this makes sense. Finally, where does hibernate make sense? :-) This comes more down to on how lay out the requirements. /Jarkko