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Date:   Sat, 20 Feb 2021 05:05:36 +0200
From:   Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To:     Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
Cc:     linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-pm@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
        zohar@linux.ibm.com, jejb@linux.ibm.com, corbet@lwn.net,
        rjw@rjwysocki.net, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/9] security: keys: trusted: Parse out individual
 components of the key blob
Message-ID: <YDB8gM6Z9OOKujQu@kernel.org>
References: <20210220013255.1083202-1-matthewgarrett@google.com>
 <20210220013255.1083202-4-matthewgarrett@google.com>
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On Sat, Feb 20, 2021 at 01:32:49AM +0000, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> Performing any sort of state validation of a sealed TPM blob requires
> being able to access the individual members in the response. Parse the
> blob sufficiently to be able to stash pointers to each member, along
> with the length.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>

I'll just say LGTM for now. Did not see anything obviously wrong in
the code change (and does make sense to nitpick minor things just
yet).

Need to understand the whole use case just a little bit better.

/Jarkko