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[23.128.96.18]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id h23si813512ila.44.2021.03.04.16.55.33; Thu, 04 Mar 2021 16:55:46 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=k20201202 header.b=QDPSmjS1; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S238099AbhCDTHl (ORCPT + 99 others); Thu, 4 Mar 2021 14:07:41 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:39318 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S237815AbhCDTHa (ORCPT ); Thu, 4 Mar 2021 14:07:30 -0500 Received: by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 204E264F60; Thu, 4 Mar 2021 19:06:15 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1614884775; bh=W2uCattgdUKkB9iMIfGtw0+yefy39EmwWsmKzrxozsY=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=QDPSmjS1Pr+ZVC+s15PeFz0jliVrNfcLXWsyCUK7ANJtivv7LpQ1zGcytwB996YFY zz0lBQLN7BnXmmBM4xqWrLECcZA5K773e+gsHjtzmX41UHrBydCeTTpu1j/Xmpm/4Q XX6i54YsdKHO9aEpMRfm7rozBFO0c2ooHt3HfD1z4kY7V2Ou+CBEfDwUuuDKnmsVRf JEzTvGISlWI9yrTpteQdZ21C1N44K5U9+eMfZX+hKhPjBPbyY/X3vSsmu2f5PdJnLf UuZotx4295ue3LfURj6Hh7AIcSxB+WJ1K8aMpnYxQrtT8JuVkme/rIRkd9ErZFD9z/ 3S8CUZLkqOoEA== From: Andy Lutomirski To: x86@kernel.org Cc: LKML , Mark Rutland , Andy Lutomirski Subject: [PATCH v3 09/11] kentry: Add debugging checks for proper kentry API usage Date: Thu, 4 Mar 2021 11:06:02 -0800 Message-Id: <3b1dba88d76b21d4bb84ffe1dbbfc2b805634315.1614884673.git.luto@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org It's quite easy to mess up kentry calls. Add debgging checks that kentry transitions to and from user mode match up and that kentry_nmi_enter() and kentry_nmi_exit() match up. Checking full matching of kentry_enter() with kentry_exit() needs per-task state. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski --- kernel/entry/common.c | 81 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 80 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/entry/common.c b/kernel/entry/common.c index 4ba82c684189..f62934d761e3 100644 --- a/kernel/entry/common.c +++ b/kernel/entry/common.c @@ -11,9 +11,65 @@ #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS #include +/* + * kentry_cpu_depth is 0 in user mode, 1 in normal kernel mode, and + * 1 + n * KENTRY_DEPTH_NMI in kentry_nmi_enter() mode. We can't + * use a percpu variable to match up kentry_enter() from kernel mode + * with the corresponding kentry_exit() because tasks may schedule inside + * nested kentry_enter() regions. + */ +#define KENTRY_CPU_DEPTH_NMI 1024UL + +#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY + +/* + * Extra safe WARN_ONCE. Per-arch optimized WARN_ONCE() implementations + * might go through the low-level entry and kentry code even before noticing + * that the warning already fired, which could result in recursive warnings. + * This carefully avoids any funny business once a given warning has fired. + */ +#define DEBUG_ENTRY_WARN_ONCE(condition, format...) ({ \ + static bool __section(".data.once") __warned; \ + int __ret_warn_once = !!(condition); \ + \ + if (unlikely(__ret_warn_once && !READ_ONCE(__warned))) {\ + WRITE_ONCE(__warned, true); \ + WARN(1, format); \ + } \ + unlikely(__ret_warn_once); \ +}) + + +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned int, kentry_cpu_depth) = 1UL; + +static __always_inline void kentry_cpu_depth_add(unsigned int n) +{ + this_cpu_add(kentry_cpu_depth, n); +} + +static void kentry_cpu_depth_check(unsigned int n) +{ + DEBUG_ENTRY_WARN_ONCE(this_cpu_read(kentry_cpu_depth) < n, "kentry depth underflow"); +} + +static __always_inline void kentry_cpu_depth_sub(unsigned int n) +{ + this_cpu_sub(kentry_cpu_depth, n); +} +#else + +#define DEBUG_ENTRY_WARN_ONCE(condition, format...) do {} while (0) + +static __always_inline void kentry_cpu_depth_add(unsigned int n) {} +static void kentry_cpu_depth_check(unsigned int n) {} +static __always_inline void kentry_cpu_depth_sub(unsigned int n) {} + +#endif + /* See comment for enter_from_user_mode() in entry-common.h */ static __always_inline void __enter_from_user_mode(struct pt_regs *regs) { + kentry_cpu_depth_add(1); arch_check_user_regs(regs); lockdep_hardirqs_off(CALLER_ADDR0); @@ -22,6 +78,14 @@ static __always_inline void __enter_from_user_mode(struct pt_regs *regs) instrumentation_begin(); trace_hardirqs_off_finish(); + +#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY + DEBUG_ENTRY_WARN_ONCE( + this_cpu_read(kentry_cpu_depth) != 1, + "kentry: __enter_from_user_mode() called while kentry thought the CPU was in the kernel (%u)", + this_cpu_read(kentry_cpu_depth)); +#endif + instrumentation_end(); } @@ -99,6 +163,11 @@ long kentry_syscall_begin(struct pt_regs *regs, long syscall) static __always_inline void __exit_to_user_mode(void) { instrumentation_begin(); +#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY + DEBUG_ENTRY_WARN_ONCE(this_cpu_read(kentry_cpu_depth) != 1, + "__exit_to_user_mode called at wrong kentry cpu depth (%u)", + this_cpu_read(kentry_cpu_depth)); +#endif trace_hardirqs_on_prepare(); lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare(CALLER_ADDR0); instrumentation_end(); @@ -106,6 +175,7 @@ static __always_inline void __exit_to_user_mode(void) user_enter_irqoff(); arch_exit_to_user_mode(); lockdep_hardirqs_on(CALLER_ADDR0); + kentry_cpu_depth_sub(1); } #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64 @@ -360,7 +430,12 @@ noinstr void kentry_exit(struct pt_regs *regs, kentry_state_t state) /* Check whether this returns to user mode */ if (user_mode(regs)) { kentry_exit_to_user_mode(regs); - } else if (!regs_irqs_disabled(regs)) { + return; + } + + kentry_cpu_depth_check(1); + + if (!regs_irqs_disabled(regs)) { /* * If RCU was not watching on entry this needs to be done * carefully and needs the same ordering of lockdep/tracing @@ -399,6 +474,8 @@ kentry_state_t noinstr kentry_nmi_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) irq_state.lockdep = lockdep_hardirqs_enabled(); + kentry_cpu_depth_add(KENTRY_CPU_DEPTH_NMI); + __nmi_enter(); lockdep_hardirqs_off(CALLER_ADDR0); lockdep_hardirq_enter(); @@ -415,6 +492,7 @@ kentry_state_t noinstr kentry_nmi_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) void noinstr kentry_nmi_exit(struct pt_regs *regs, kentry_state_t irq_state) { instrumentation_begin(); + kentry_cpu_depth_check(KENTRY_CPU_DEPTH_NMI); ftrace_nmi_exit(); if (irq_state.lockdep) { trace_hardirqs_on_prepare(); @@ -427,4 +505,5 @@ void noinstr kentry_nmi_exit(struct pt_regs *regs, kentry_state_t irq_state) if (irq_state.lockdep) lockdep_hardirqs_on(CALLER_ADDR0); __nmi_exit(); + kentry_cpu_depth_sub(KENTRY_CPU_DEPTH_NMI); } -- 2.29.2