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From:   Jian Cai <jiancai@google.com>
Date:   Thu, 4 Mar 2021 15:22:51 -0800
Message-ID: <CA+SOCL+M5YfhygG=ogqvqp7y40v+32RiteGr=53THzwvdGugyA@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5] ARM: Implement SLS mitigation
To:     Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Cc:     Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>,
        Manoj Gupta <manojgupta@google.com>,
        Luis Lozano <llozano@google.com>,
        clang-built-linux <clang-built-linux@googlegroups.com>,
        Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>,
        David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>,
        Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
        Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>,
        Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
        James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
        Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>,
        Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>,
        Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        =?UTF-8?Q?Andreas_F=C3=A4rber?= <afaerber@suse.de>,
        Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
        Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>,
        Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
        David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>,
        James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
        Linux ARM <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
        "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
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On Wed, Mar 3, 2021 at 7:04 AM Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Feb 23, 2021 at 3:36 AM Jian Cai <jiancai@google.com> wrote:
>
> > This patch adds CONFIG_HARDEN_SLS_ALL that can be used to turn on
> > -mharden-sls=all, which mitigates the straight-line speculation
> > vulnerability, speculative execution of the instruction following some
> > unconditional jumps. Notice -mharden-sls= has other options as below,
> > and this config turns on the strongest option.
> >
> > all: enable all mitigations against Straight Line Speculation that are implemented.
> > none: disable all mitigations against Straight Line Speculation.
> > retbr: enable the mitigation against Straight Line Speculation for RET and BR instructions.
> > blr: enable the mitigation against Straight Line Speculation for BLR instructions.
>
> I heard about compiler protection for this, so nice to see it happening!
>
> Would you happen to know if there is any plan to do the same for GCC?
> I know you folks at Google like LLVM, but if you know let us know.

I think gcc also has these options.
https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/AArch64-Options.html

>
> > +config HARDEN_SLS_ALL
> > +       bool "enable SLS vulnerability hardening"
>
> I would go in and also edit arch/arm/mm/Kconfig under:
> config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR add
> select HARDEN_SLS_ALL
>
> Because if the user wants hardening for branch prediction
> in general then the user certainly wants this as well, if
> available. The help text for that option literally says:
>
>  "This config option will take CPU-specific actions to harden
>    the branch predictor against aliasing attacks and may rely on
>    specific instruction sequences or control bits being set by
>    the system firmware."
>
> Notice this only turns on for CPUs with CPU_SPECTRE
> defined which makes sense. Also it is default y which fulfils
> Will's request that it be turned on by default where
> applicable. Notably it will not be turned on for pre-v7 silicon
> which would be unhelpful as they don't suffer from
> these bugs.

Thanks for the suggestion. I will update the patch.

>
> Reading Kristofs compiler patch here:
> https://reviews.llvm.org/rG195f44278c4361a4a32377a98a1e3a15203d3647
>
> I take it that for affected CPUs we should also patch all assembly
> in the kernel containing a RET, BR or BLR with
> DSB SYS followed by ISB?
>
> I suppose we would also need to look for any mov PC, <>
> code...
>
> I guess we can invent a "SB" macro to mimic what Aarch64 is
> doing so the code is easy to read. (Thinking aloud.)
>
> Yours,
> Linus Walleij