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Date:   Tue, 16 Mar 2021 12:24:07 -0700
From:   Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To:     Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc:     =?iso-8859-1?Q?Micka=EBl_Sala=FCn?= <mic@digikod.net>,
        Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
        James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
        Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
        Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
        Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>,
        Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
        David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
        Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>,
        "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
        John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
        Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>,
        Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
        Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
        linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
        kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
        =?iso-8859-1?Q?Micka=EBl_Sala=FCn?= <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)
Message-ID: <202103161221.8291CC3E6@keescook>
References: <20210316170135.226381-1-mic@digikod.net>
 <20210316170135.226381-2-mic@digikod.net>
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On Tue, Mar 16, 2021 at 08:04:09PM +0100, Jann Horn wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 16, 2021 at 6:02 PM Micka?l Sala?n <mic@digikod.net> wrote:
> > One could argue that chroot(2) is useless without a properly populated
> > root hierarchy (i.e. without /dev and /proc).  However, there are
> > multiple use cases that don't require the chrooting process to create
> > file hierarchies with special files nor mount points, e.g.:
> > * A process sandboxing itself, once all its libraries are loaded, may
> >   not need files other than regular files, or even no file at all.
> > * Some pre-populated root hierarchies could be used to chroot into,
> >   provided for instance by development environments or tailored
> >   distributions.
> > * Processes executed in a chroot may not require access to these special
> >   files (e.g. with minimal runtimes, or by emulating some special files
> >   with a LD_PRELOADed library or seccomp).
> >
> > Unprivileged chroot is especially interesting for userspace developers
> > wishing to harden their applications.  For instance, chroot(2) and Yama
> > enable to build a capability-based security (i.e. remove filesystem
> > ambient accesses) by calling chroot/chdir with an empty directory and
> > accessing data through dedicated file descriptors obtained with
> > openat2(2) and RESOLVE_BENEATH/RESOLVE_IN_ROOT/RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS.
> 
> I don't entirely understand. Are you writing this with the assumption
> that a future change will make it possible to set these RESOLVE flags
> process-wide, or something like that?

I thought it meant "open all out-of-chroot dirs as fds using RESOLVE_...
flags then chroot". As in, there's no way to then escape "up" for the
old opens, and the new opens stay in the chroot.

> [...]
> > diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
> [...]
> > +static inline int current_chroot_allowed(void)
> > +{
> > +       /*
> > +        * Changing the root directory for the calling task (and its future
> > +        * children) requires that this task has CAP_SYS_CHROOT in its
> > +        * namespace, or be running with no_new_privs and not sharing its
> > +        * fs_struct and not escaping its current root (cf. create_user_ns()).
> > +        * As for seccomp, checking no_new_privs avoids scenarios where
> > +        * unprivileged tasks can affect the behavior of privileged children.
> > +        */
> > +       if (task_no_new_privs(current) && current->fs->users == 1 &&
> 
> this read of current->fs->users should be using READ_ONCE()

Ah yeah, good call. I should remember this when I think "can this race?"
:P

-- 
Kees Cook