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Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] integrity: double check iint_cache was
 initialized
To:     Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
        Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc:     linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
        "Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
        linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
References: <20210319200358.22816-1-zohar@linux.ibm.com>
 <20210319200358.22816-2-zohar@linux.ibm.com>
 <8450c80a-104a-3f36-0963-0ae8fa69e0f2@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
 <CACT4Y+bvakfNhVs29QvbY6Z8Pw0zmAUKGWM-DD5DcPZW5ny90A@mail.gmail.com>
 <1a2245c6-3cab-7085-83d3-55b083619303@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
 <8039976be3df9bd07374fe4f1931b8ce28b89dab.camel@linux.ibm.com>
From:   Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Message-ID: <cde00350-2a18-1759-d53b-2e7489b6cc0e@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Date:   Tue, 23 Mar 2021 22:37:39 +0900
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On 2021/03/23 21:09, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> Please take a look at the newer version of this patch.   Do you want to
> add any tags?

Oh, I didn't know that you already posted the newer version.

> diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
> index 1d20003243c3..0ba01847e836 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/iint.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
> @@ -98,6 +98,14 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_inode_get(struct inode *inode)
>  	struct rb_node *node, *parent = NULL;
>  	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, *test_iint;
>  
> +	/*
> +	 * The integrity's "iint_cache" is initialized at security_init(),
> +	 * unless it is not included in the ordered list of LSMs enabled
> +	 * on the boot command line.
> +	 */
> +	if (!iint_cache)
> +		panic("%s: lsm=integrity required.\n", __func__);
> +

This looks strange. If "lsm=" parameter must include "integrity",
it implies that nobody is allowed to disable "integrity" at boot.
Then, why not unconditionally call integrity_iintcache_init() by
not counting on DEFINE_LSM(integrity) declaration?

>  	iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
>  	if (iint)
>  		return iint;
>