Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S932781AbWJGTSi (ORCPT ); Sat, 7 Oct 2006 15:18:38 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S932780AbWJGTSi (ORCPT ); Sat, 7 Oct 2006 15:18:38 -0400 Received: from mail.aknet.ru ([82.179.72.26]:31507 "EHLO mail.aknet.ru") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S932781AbWJGTSh (ORCPT ); Sat, 7 Oct 2006 15:18:37 -0400 Message-ID: <4527FC8B.8010208@aknet.ru> Date: Sat, 07 Oct 2006 23:14:19 +0400 From: Stas Sergeev User-Agent: Thunderbird 1.5.0.7 (X11/20060913) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Ulrich Drepper Cc: Alan Cox , Jakub Jelinek , Arjan van de Ven , Linux kernel , Hugh Dickins Subject: Re: [patch] honour MNT_NOEXEC for access() References: <4516B721.5070801@redhat.com> <45198395.4050008@aknet.ru> <1159396436.3086.51.camel@laptopd505.fenrus.org> <451E3C0C.10105@aknet.ru> <1159887682.2891.537.camel@laptopd505.fenrus.org> <45229A99.6060703@aknet.ru> <1159899820.2891.542.camel@laptopd505.fenrus.org> <4522AEA1.5060304@aknet.ru> <1159900934.2891.548.camel@laptopd505.fenrus.org> <4522B4F9.8000301@aknet.ru> <20061003210037.GO20982@devserv.devel.redhat.com> <45240640.4070104@aknet.ru> <45269BEE.7050008@aknet.ru> <1160170464.12835.4.camel@localhost.localdomain> <4526C7F4.6090706@redhat.com> <45278D2A.4020605@aknet.ru> <4527D64A.7060002@redhat.com> In-Reply-To: <4527D64A.7060002@redhat.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 851 Lines: 20 Hello. Ulrich Drepper wrote: >> Now, as the access(X_OK) is fixed, would it be >> feasible for ld.so to start using it? > Just must be kidding. No access control can be reliably implemented at > userlevel. There is no point starting something as stupid as this. But in this case how can you ever solve the problem of ld.so executing the binaries for which the user does not have an exec permission? Yes, the userspace apps usually should not enforce the kernel's access control, but ld.so seems to be the special case - it is a kernel helper after all, so it have to be carefull and check what it does. - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/