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Wed, 31 Mar 2021 14:14:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: from [10.36.113.60] (ovpn-113-60.ams2.redhat.com [10.36.113.60]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id EB5B619727; Wed, 31 Mar 2021 14:14:13 +0000 (UTC) To: Steven Price , Catalin Marinas Cc: Mark Rutland , Peter Maydell , "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" , Andrew Jones , Haibo Xu , Suzuki K Poulose , qemu-devel@nongnu.org, Marc Zyngier , Juan Quintela , Richard Henderson , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Dave Martin , James Morse , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, Thomas Gleixner , Will Deacon , kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu, Julien Thierry References: <20210312151902.17853-1-steven.price@arm.com> <20210312151902.17853-3-steven.price@arm.com> <20210327152324.GA28167@arm.com> <20210328122131.GB17535@arm.com> <20210330103013.GD18075@arm.com> <8977120b-841d-4882-2472-6e403bc9c797@redhat.com> <20210331092109.GA21921@arm.com> <86a968c8-7a0e-44a4-28c3-bac62c2b7d65@arm.com> From: David Hildenbrand Organization: Red Hat GmbH Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 2/6] arm64: kvm: Introduce MTE VM feature Message-ID: Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2021 16:14:12 +0200 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/78.8.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <86a968c8-7a0e-44a4-28c3-bac62c2b7d65@arm.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.84 on 10.5.11.23 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 31.03.21 12:41, Steven Price wrote: > On 31/03/2021 10:32, David Hildenbrand wrote: >> On 31.03.21 11:21, Catalin Marinas wrote: >>> On Wed, Mar 31, 2021 at 09:34:44AM +0200, David Hildenbrand wrote: >>>> On 30.03.21 12:30, Catalin Marinas wrote: >>>>> On Mon, Mar 29, 2021 at 05:06:51PM +0100, Steven Price wrote: >>>>>> On 28/03/2021 13:21, Catalin Marinas wrote: >>>>>>> On Sat, Mar 27, 2021 at 03:23:24PM +0000, Catalin Marinas wrote: >>>>>>>> On Fri, Mar 12, 2021 at 03:18:58PM +0000, Steven Price wrote: >>>>>>>>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c >>>>>>>>> index 77cb2d28f2a4..b31b7a821f90 100644 >>>>>>>>> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c >>>>>>>>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c >>>>>>>>> @@ -879,6 +879,22 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu >>>>>>>>> *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa, >>>>>>>>>         if (vma_pagesize == PAGE_SIZE && !force_pte) >>>>>>>>>             vma_pagesize = transparent_hugepage_adjust(memslot, >>>>>>>>> hva, >>>>>>>>>                                    &pfn, &fault_ipa); >>>>>>>>> + >>>>>>>>> +    if (fault_status != FSC_PERM && kvm_has_mte(kvm) && >>>>>>>>> pfn_valid(pfn)) { >>>>>>>>> +        /* >>>>>>>>> +         * VM will be able to see the page's tags, so we must >>>>>>>>> ensure >>>>>>>>> +         * they have been initialised. if PG_mte_tagged is set, >>>>>>>>> tags >>>>>>>>> +         * have already been initialised. >>>>>>>>> +         */ >>>>>>>>> +        struct page *page = pfn_to_page(pfn); >>>>>>>>> +        unsigned long i, nr_pages = vma_pagesize >> PAGE_SHIFT; >>>>>>>>> + >>>>>>>>> +        for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++, page++) { >>>>>>>>> +            if (!test_and_set_bit(PG_mte_tagged, &page->flags)) >>>>>>>>> +                mte_clear_page_tags(page_address(page)); >>>>>>>>> +        } >>>>>>>>> +    } >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> This pfn_valid() check may be problematic. Following commit >>>>>>>> eeb0753ba27b >>>>>>>> ("arm64/mm: Fix pfn_valid() for ZONE_DEVICE based memory"), it >>>>>>>> returns >>>>>>>> true for ZONE_DEVICE memory but such memory is allowed not to >>>>>>>> support >>>>>>>> MTE. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Some more thinking, this should be safe as any ZONE_DEVICE would be >>>>>>> mapped as untagged memory in the kernel linear map. It could be >>>>>>> slightly >>>>>>> inefficient if it unnecessarily tries to clear tags in ZONE_DEVICE, >>>>>>> untagged memory. Another overhead is pfn_valid() which will likely >>>>>>> end >>>>>>> up calling memblock_is_map_memory(). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> However, the bigger issue is that Stage 2 cannot disable tagging for >>>>>>> Stage 1 unless the memory is Non-cacheable or Device at S2. Is >>>>>>> there a >>>>>>> way to detect what gets mapped in the guest as Normal Cacheable >>>>>>> memory >>>>>>> and make sure it's only early memory or hotplug but no ZONE_DEVICE >>>>>>> (or >>>>>>> something else like on-chip memory)?  If we can't guarantee that all >>>>>>> Cacheable memory given to a guest supports tags, we should disable >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> feature altogether. >>>>>> >>>>>> In stage 2 I believe we only have two types of mapping - 'normal' or >>>>>> DEVICE_nGnRE (see stage2_map_set_prot_attr()). Filtering out the >>>>>> latter is a >>>>>> case of checking the 'device' variable, and makes sense to avoid the >>>>>> overhead you describe. >>>>>> >>>>>> This should also guarantee that all stage-2 cacheable memory >>>>>> supports tags, >>>>>> as kvm_is_device_pfn() is simply !pfn_valid(), and pfn_valid() >>>>>> should only >>>>>> be true for memory that Linux considers "normal". >>>> >>>> If you think "normal" == "normal System RAM", that's wrong; see below. >>> >>> By "normal" I think both Steven and I meant the Normal Cacheable memory >>> attribute (another being the Device memory attribute). > > Sadly there's no good standardised terminology here. Aarch64 provides > the "normal (cacheable)" definition. Memory which is mapped as "Normal > Cacheable" is implicitly MTE capable when shared with a guest (because > the stage 2 mappings don't allow restricting MTE other than mapping it > as Device memory). > > So MTE also forces us to have a definition of memory which is "bog > standard memory"[1] separate from the mapping attributes. This is the > main memory which fully supports MTE. > > Separate from the "bog standard" we have the "special"[1] memory, e.g. > ZONE_DEVICE memory may be mapped as "Normal Cacheable" at stage 1 but > that memory may not support MTE tags. This memory can only be safely > shared with a guest in the following situations: > > 1. MTE is completely disabled for the guest > > 2. The stage 2 mappings are 'device' (e.g. DEVICE_nGnRE) > > 3. We have some guarantee that guest MTE access are in some way safe. > > (1) is the situation today (without this patch series). But it prevents > the guest from using MTE in any form. > > (2) is pretty terrible for general memory, but is the get-out clause for > mapping devices into the guest. > > (3) isn't something we have any architectural way of discovering. We'd > need to know what the device did with the MTE accesses (and any caches > between the CPU and the device) to ensure there aren't any side-channels > or h/w lockup issues. We'd also need some way of describing this memory > to the guest. > > So at least for the time being the approach is to avoid letting a guest > with MTE enabled have access to this sort of memory. > > [1] Neither "bog standard" nor "special" are real terms - like I said > there's a lack of standardised terminology. > >>>>> That's the problem. With Anshuman's commit I mentioned above, >>>>> pfn_valid() returns true for ZONE_DEVICE mappings (e.g. persistent >>>>> memory, not talking about some I/O mapping that requires Device_nGnRE). >>>>> So kvm_is_device_pfn() is false for such memory and it may be mapped as >>>>> Normal but it is not guaranteed to support tagging. >>>> >>>> pfn_valid() means "there is a struct page"; if you do pfn_to_page() and >>>> touch the page, you won't fault. So Anshuman's commit is correct. >>> >>> I agree. >>> >>>> pfn_to_online_page() means, "there is a struct page and it's system RAM >>>> that's in use; the memmap has a sane content" >>> >>> Does pfn_to_online_page() returns a valid struct page pointer for >>> ZONE_DEVICE pages? IIUC, these are not guaranteed to be system RAM, for >>> some definition of system RAM (I assume NVDIMM != system RAM). For >>> example, pmem_attach_disk() calls devm_memremap_pages() and this would >>> use the Normal Cacheable memory attribute without necessarily being >>> system RAM. >> >> No, not for ZONE_DEVICE. >> >> However, if you expose PMEM via dax/kmem as System RAM to the system (-> >> add_memory_driver_managed()), then PMEM (managed via ZONE_NOMRAL or >> ZONE_MOVABLE) would work with pfn_to_online_page() -- as the system >> thinks it's "ordinary system RAM" and the memory is managed by the buddy. > > So if I'm understanding this correctly for KVM we need to use > pfn_to_online_pages() and reject if NULL is returned? In the case of > dax/kmem there already needs to be validation that the memory supports > MTE (otherwise we break user space) before it's allowed into the > "ordinary system RAM" bucket. That should work. 1. One alternative is if (!pfn_valid(pfn)) return false; #ifdef CONFIG_ZONE_DEVICE page = pfn_to_page(pfn); if (page_zonenum(page) == ZONE_DEVICE) return false; #endif return true; Note that when you are dealing with random PFNs, this approach is in general not safe; the memmap could be uninitialized and contain garbage. You can have false positives for ZONE_DEVICE. 2. Yet another (slower?) variant to detect (some?) ZONE_DEVICE is pgmap = get_dev_pagemap(pfn, NULL); put_dev_pagemap(pgmap); if (pgmap) return false; return true; I know that /dev/mem mappings can be problematic ... because the memmap could be in any state and actually we shouldn't even touch/rely on any "struct pages" at all, as we have a pure PFN mapping ... -- Thanks, David / dhildenb