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From:   Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc:     Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
        "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>,
        Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>,
        Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
        Lee Duncan <lduncan@suse.com>, Chris Leech <cleech@redhat.com>,
        Adam Nichols <adam@grimm-co.com>,
        linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v3] sysfs: Unconditionally use vmalloc for buffer
Date:   Wed, 31 Mar 2021 19:21:45 -0700
Message-Id: <20210401022145.2019422-1-keescook@chromium.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Precedence: bulk

The sysfs interface to seq_file continues to be rather fragile
(seq_get_buf() should not be used outside of seq_file), as seen with
some recent exploits[1]. Move the seq_file buffer to the vmap area
(while retaining the accounting flag), since it has guard pages that
will catch and stop linear overflows. This seems justified given that
sysfs's use of seq_file already uses kvmalloc(), is almost always using
a PAGE_SIZE or larger allocation, has normally short-lived allocations,
and is not normally on a performance critical path.

Once seq_get_buf() has been removed (and all sysfs callbacks using
seq_file directly), this change can also be removed.

[1] https://blog.grimm-co.com/2021/03/new-old-bugs-in-linux-kernel.html

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
v3:
- Limit to only sysfs (instead of all of seq_file).
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210315174851.622228-1-keescook@chromium.org/
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210312205558.2947488-1-keescook@chromium.org/
---
 fs/sysfs/file.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/sysfs/file.c b/fs/sysfs/file.c
index 9aefa7779b29..70e7a450e5d1 100644
--- a/fs/sysfs/file.c
+++ b/fs/sysfs/file.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 
 #include "sysfs.h"
 
@@ -32,6 +33,25 @@ static const struct sysfs_ops *sysfs_file_ops(struct kernfs_node *kn)
 	return kobj->ktype ? kobj->ktype->sysfs_ops : NULL;
 }
 
+/*
+ * To be proactively defensive against sysfs show() handlers that do not
+ * correctly stay within their PAGE_SIZE buffer, use the vmap area to gain
+ * the trailing guard page which will stop linear buffer overflows.
+ */
+static void *sysfs_kf_seq_start(struct seq_file *sf, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct kernfs_open_file *of = sf->private;
+	struct kernfs_node *kn = of->kn;
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(sf->buf);
+	sf->buf = __vmalloc(kn->attr.size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!sf->buf)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	sf->size = kn->attr.size;
+
+	return NULL + !*ppos;
+}
+
 /*
  * Reads on sysfs are handled through seq_file, which takes care of hairy
  * details like buffering and seeking.  The following function pipes
@@ -206,14 +226,17 @@ static const struct kernfs_ops sysfs_file_kfops_empty = {
 };
 
 static const struct kernfs_ops sysfs_file_kfops_ro = {
+	.seq_start	= sysfs_kf_seq_start,
 	.seq_show	= sysfs_kf_seq_show,
 };
 
 static const struct kernfs_ops sysfs_file_kfops_wo = {
+	.seq_start	= sysfs_kf_seq_start,
 	.write		= sysfs_kf_write,
 };
 
 static const struct kernfs_ops sysfs_file_kfops_rw = {
+	.seq_start	= sysfs_kf_seq_start,
 	.seq_show	= sysfs_kf_seq_show,
 	.write		= sysfs_kf_write,
 };
-- 
2.25.1