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From:   Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Date:   Mon, 5 Apr 2021 12:04:28 -0700
Message-ID: <CAMn1gO6bmtA6mtTg5OzDPV1Ta=rRhKknJO324_eS3CWtuThaHQ@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] kfence: unpoison pool region before use
To:     Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc:     Marco Elver <elver@google.com>, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
        Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
        Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>,
        Linux Memory Management List <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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On Sat, Apr 3, 2021 at 4:52 PM Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On Sun, Apr 4, 2021 at 12:31 AM Marco Elver <elver@google.com> wrote:
> >
> > However, given the above, I think we need to explain this in the
> > commit message (which also makes the dependency between these 2
> > patches clear) and add a comment above the new kasan_unpoison_range().
> > That is, if we still think this is the right fix -- I'm not entirely
> > sure it is.
> >
> > Because what I gather from "kasan: initialize shadow to TAG_INVALID
> > for SW_TAGS", is the requirement that "0xFF pointer tag is a match-all
> > tag, it doesn't matter what tag the accessed memory has".
> >
> > While KFENCE memory is accessible through the slab API, and in this
> > case ksize() calling kasan_check_byte() leading to a failure, the
> > kasan_check_byte() call is part of the public KASAN API. Which means
> > that if some subsystem decides to memblock_alloc() some memory, and
> > wishes to use kasan_check_byte() on that memory but with an untagged
> > pointer, will get the same problem as KFENCE: with generic and HW_TAGS
> > mode everything is fine, but with SW_TAGS mode things break.
>
> It makes sense to allow this function to operate on any kind of
> memory, including memory that hasn't been previously marked by KASAN.
>
> > To me this indicates the fix is not with KFENCE, but should be in
> > mm/kasan/sw_tags.c:kasan_byte_accessible(), which should not load the
> > shadow when the pointer is untagged.
>
> The problem isn't in accessing shadow per se. Looking at
> kasan_byte_accessible() (in both sw_tags.c and kasan.h), the return
> statement there seems just wrong and redundant. The KASAN_TAG_KERNEL
> check should come first:
>
> return tag == KASAN_TAG_KERNEL || (shadow_byte != KASAN_TAG_INVALID &&
> tag == shadow_byte);
>
> This way, if the pointer tag is KASAN_TAG_KERNEL, the memory is
> accessible no matter what the memory tag is.
>
> But then the KASAN_TAG_INVALID check isn't needed, as this value is
> never assigned to a pointer tag. Which brings us to:
>
> return tag == KASAN_TAG_KERNEL || tag == shadow_byte;
>
> Which is essentially the same check that kasan_check_range() performs.
>
> Although, kasan_check_range() also checks that the shadow is <
> KASAN_SHADOW_START. It makes makes sense to add this check into
> kasan_byte_accessible() as well, before accessing shadow.
>
> Thanks!

Okay, if the intent is that kasan_byte_accessible() should work on any
memory, not just slab memory, then I agree that it should do the same
thing as kasan_check_range().

Peter