Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18;
Date:   Mon,  5 Apr 2021 15:06:47 -0700
Message-Id: <20210405220647.1965262-1-pcc@google.com>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Subject: [PATCH v2] kasan: fix kasan_byte_accessible() to be consistent with
 actual checks
From:   Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
To:     Marco Elver <elver@google.com>, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
        Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc:     Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>,
        Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>,
        Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>, linux-mm@kvack.org,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
Precedence: bulk

We can sometimes end up with kasan_byte_accessible() being called
on non-slab memory. For example ksize() and krealloc() may end up
calling it on KFENCE allocated memory. In this case the memory will
be tagged with KASAN_SHADOW_INIT, which a subsequent patch ("kasan:
initialize shadow to TAG_INVALID for SW_TAGS") will set to the same
value as KASAN_TAG_INVALID, causing kasan_byte_accessible() to fail
when called on non-slab memory.

This highlighted the fact that the check in kasan_byte_accessible()
was inconsistent with checks as implemented for loads and stores
(kasan_check_range() in SW tags mode and hardware-implemented
checks in HW tags mode). kasan_check_range() does not have a
check for KASAN_TAG_INVALID, and instead has a comparison against
KASAN_SHADOW_START. In HW tags mode, we do not have either, but we
do set TCR_EL1.TCMA which corresponds with the comparison against
KASAN_TAG_KERNEL.

Therefore, update kasan_byte_accessible() for both SW and HW tags
modes to correspond with the respective checks on loads and stores.

Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Ic6d40803c57dcc6331bd97fbb9a60b0d38a65a36
Signed-off-by: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
---
 mm/kasan/kasan.h   |  3 +--
 mm/kasan/sw_tags.c | 10 +++++++---
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
index 8c55634d6edd..e18e8da35255 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h
+++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
@@ -368,8 +368,7 @@ static inline bool kasan_byte_accessible(const void *addr)
 	u8 ptr_tag = get_tag(addr);
 	u8 mem_tag = hw_get_mem_tag((void *)addr);
 
-	return (mem_tag != KASAN_TAG_INVALID) &&
-		(ptr_tag == KASAN_TAG_KERNEL || ptr_tag == mem_tag);
+	return ptr_tag == KASAN_TAG_KERNEL || ptr_tag == mem_tag;
 }
 
 #else /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */
diff --git a/mm/kasan/sw_tags.c b/mm/kasan/sw_tags.c
index 94c2d33be333..00ae8913fc74 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/sw_tags.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/sw_tags.c
@@ -121,10 +121,14 @@ bool kasan_check_range(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool write,
 bool kasan_byte_accessible(const void *addr)
 {
 	u8 tag = get_tag(addr);
-	u8 shadow_byte = READ_ONCE(*(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(kasan_reset_tag(addr)));
+	void *untagged_addr = kasan_reset_tag(addr);
+	u8 shadow_byte;
 
-	return (shadow_byte != KASAN_TAG_INVALID) &&
-		(tag == KASAN_TAG_KERNEL || tag == shadow_byte);
+	if (untagged_addr < kasan_shadow_to_mem((void *)KASAN_SHADOW_START))
+		return false;
+
+	shadow_byte = READ_ONCE(*(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(untagged_addr));
+	return tag == KASAN_TAG_KERNEL || tag == shadow_byte;
 }
 
 #define DEFINE_HWASAN_LOAD_STORE(size)					\
-- 
2.31.0.208.g409f899ff0-goog