Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18;
IronPort-SDR: QUpz64eg2gnFCpzxDWzU/AwdrbTUJxrBXgfjbrrtWatHMBwK5ASN5glArcmYGrKckRBAVv66VO
 L60nOvGTEpHA==
IronPort-SDR: D3QHX5UVSB8YX34MZLNYlLK0kPKdVmkIBWjKvFADTZAC3rD9R9M8THaBbj3tnr/+TF6aChcI+z
 hErj278onk1A==
Date:   Thu, 8 Apr 2021 16:29:08 +0300
From:   Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
To:     Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Cc:     Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
        Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>, Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>,
        Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>,
        Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>,
        Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>,
        Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org>,
        Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
        Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
        Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
        "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>,
        "Steven Rostedt (VMware)" <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
        linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org,
        openipmi-developer@lists.sourceforge.net,
        linux-remoteproc@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
        kexec@lists.infradead.org, rcu@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
        Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
        Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
        x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
        "K. Y. Srinivasan" <kys@microsoft.com>,
        Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com>,
        Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@microsoft.com>,
        Corey Minyard <minyard@acm.org>,
        Ohad Ben-Cohen <ohad@wizery.com>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
        Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
        Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>,
        Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>,
        Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>,
        Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>,
        Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        Iurii Zaikin <yzaikin@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] kernel.h: Split out panic and oops helpers
Message-ID: <YG8FJOYVovYIOLXA@smile.fi.intel.com>
References: <20210406133158.73700-1-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
 <03be4ed9-8e8d-e2c2-611d-ac09c61d84f9@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <03be4ed9-8e8d-e2c2-611d-ac09c61d84f9@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Organization: Intel Finland Oy - BIC 0357606-4 - Westendinkatu 7, 02160 Espoo
Precedence: bulk

On Thu, Apr 08, 2021 at 02:45:12PM +0200, Rasmus Villemoes wrote:
> On 06/04/2021 15.31, Andy Shevchenko wrote:
> > kernel.h is being used as a dump for all kinds of stuff for a long time.
> > Here is the attempt to start cleaning it up by splitting out panic and
> > oops helpers.
> 
> Yay.
> 
> Acked-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>

Thanks!

> > At the same time convert users in header and lib folder to use new header.
> > Though for time being include new header back to kernel.h to avoid twisted
> > indirected includes for existing users.
> 
> I think it would be good to have some place to note that "This #include
> is just for backwards compatibility, it will go away RealSoonNow, so if
> you rely on something from linux/panic.h, include that explicitly
> yourself TYVM. And if you're looking for a janitorial task, write a
> script to check that every file that uses some identifier defined in
> panic.h actually includes that file. When all offenders are found and
> dealt with, remove the #include and this note.".

Good and...

> > +struct taint_flag {
> > +	char c_true;	/* character printed when tainted */
> > +	char c_false;	/* character printed when not tainted */
> > +	bool module;	/* also show as a per-module taint flag */
> > +};
> > +
> > +extern const struct taint_flag taint_flags[TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT];
> 
> While you're doing this, nothing outside of kernel/panic.c cares about
> the definition of struct taint_flag or use the taint_flags array, so
> could you make the definition private to that file and make the array
> static? (Another patch, of course.)

...according to the above if *you are looking for a janitorial task*... :-))

> > +enum lockdep_ok {
> > +	LOCKDEP_STILL_OK,
> > +	LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE,
> > +};
> > +
> > +extern const char *print_tainted(void);
> > +extern void add_taint(unsigned flag, enum lockdep_ok);
> > +extern int test_taint(unsigned flag);
> > +extern unsigned long get_taint(void);
> 
> I know you're just moving code, but it would be a nice opportunity to
> drop the redundant externs.

As above. But for all these I have heard you. So, I'll keep this response
as part of my always only growing TODO list.

-- 
With Best Regards,
Andy Shevchenko