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Date:   Fri, 16 Apr 2021 16:34:53 -0500
From:   "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To:     Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc:     "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
        lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        "Andrew G. Morgan" <morgan@kernel.org>,
        "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        security@kernel.org, Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] capabilities: require CAP_SETFCAP to map uid 0 (v3)
Message-ID: <20210416213453.GA29094@mail.hallyn.com>
References: <20210416045851.GA13811@mail.hallyn.com>
 <20210416150501.zam55gschpn2w56i@wittgenstein>
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On Fri, Apr 16, 2021 at 05:05:01PM +0200, Christian Brauner wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 15, 2021 at 11:58:51PM -0500, Serge Hallyn wrote:
> > (Eric - this patch (v3) is a cleaned up version of the previous approach.
> > v4 is at https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux.git/log/?h=2021-04-15/setfcap-nsfscaps-v4
> > and is the approach you suggested.  I can send it also as a separate patch
> > if you like)
> > 
> > A process running as uid 0 but without cap_setfcap currently can simply
> > unshare a new user namespace with uid 0 mapped to 0.  While this task
> > will not have new capabilities against the parent namespace, there is
> > a loophole due to the way namespaced file capabilities work.  File
> > capabilities valid in userns 1 are distinguised from file capabilities
> > valid in userns 2 by the kuid which underlies uid 0.  Therefore
> > the restricted root process can unshare a new self-mapping namespace,
> > add a namespaced file capability onto a file, then use that file
> > capability in the parent namespace.
> > 
> > To prevent that, do not allow mapping uid 0 if the process which
> > opened the uid_map file does not have CAP_SETFCAP, which is the capability
> > for setting file capabilities.
> > 
> > A further wrinkle:  a task can unshare its user namespace, then
> > open its uid_map file itself, and map (only) its own uid.  In this
> > case we do not have the credential from before unshare,  which was
> > potentially more restricted.  So, when creating a user namespace, we
> > record whether the creator had CAP_SETFCAP.  Then we can use that
> > during map_write().
> > 
> > With this patch:
> > 
> > 1. unprivileged user can still unshare -Ur
> > 
> > ubuntu@caps:~$ unshare -Ur
> > root@caps:~# logout
> > 
> > 2. root user can still unshare -Ur
> > 
> > ubuntu@caps:~$ sudo bash
> > root@caps:/home/ubuntu# unshare -Ur
> > root@caps:/home/ubuntu# logout
> > 
> > 3. root user without CAP_SETFCAP cannot unshare -Ur:
> > 
> > root@caps:/home/ubuntu# /sbin/capsh --drop=cap_setfcap --
> > root@caps:/home/ubuntu# /sbin/setcap cap_setfcap=p /sbin/setcap
> > unable to set CAP_SETFCAP effective capability: Operation not permitted
> > root@caps:/home/ubuntu# unshare -Ur
> > unshare: write failed /proc/self/uid_map: Operation not permitted
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> > 
> > Changelog:
> >    * fix logic in the case of writing to another task's uid_map
> >    * rename 'ns' to 'map_ns', and make a file_ns local variable
> >    * use /* comments */
> >    * update the CAP_SETFCAP comment in capability.h
> >    * rename parent_unpriv to parent_can_setfcap (and reverse the
> >      logic)
> >    * remove printks
> >    * clarify (i hope) the code comments
> >    * update capability.h comment
> >    * renamed parent_can_setfcap to parent_could_setfcap
> >    * made the check its own disallowed_0_mapping() fn
> >    * moved the check into new_idmap_permitted
> > ---
> 
> Thank you for working on this fix!
> 
> I do prefer your approach of doing the check at user namespace creation
> time instead of moving it into the setxattr() codepath.
> 
> Let me reiterate that the ability to write through fscaps is a valid
> usecase and this should continue to work but that for locked down user
> namespace as Andrew wants to use them your patch provides a clean
> solution.
> We've are using identity mappings in quite a few scenarios partially
> when performing tests but also to write through fscaps.
> We also had reports of users that use identity mappings. They create
> their rootfs by running image extraction in an identity mapped userns
> where fscaps are written through.
> Podman has use-cases for this feature as well and has been affected by
> the regression of the first fix.

Thanks for reviewing.

I'm not sure what your point above is, so just to make sure - the
alternative implementation also does allow fscaps for cases where
root uid is remapped, only disallowing it if it would violate the
ancestor's lack of cap_setfcap.


> >  include/linux/user_namespace.h  |  3 ++
> >  include/uapi/linux/capability.h |  3 +-
> >  kernel/user_namespace.c         | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> >  3 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
> > index 64cf8ebdc4ec..f6c5f784be5a 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
> > @@ -63,6 +63,9 @@ struct user_namespace {
> >  	kgid_t			group;
> >  	struct ns_common	ns;
> >  	unsigned long		flags;
> > +	/* parent_could_setfcap: true if the creator if this ns had CAP_SETFCAP
> > +	 * in its effective capability set at the child ns creation time. */
> > +	bool			parent_could_setfcap;
> >  
> >  #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
> >  	/* List of joinable keyrings in this namespace.  Modification access of
> > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
> > index c6ca33034147..2ddb4226cd23 100644
> > --- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
> > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
> > @@ -335,7 +335,8 @@ struct vfs_ns_cap_data {
> >  
> >  #define CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL    30
> >  
> > -/* Set or remove capabilities on files */
> > +/* Set or remove capabilities on files.
> > +   Map uid=0 into a child user namespace. */
> >  
> >  #define CAP_SETFCAP	     31
> >  
> > diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
> > index af612945a4d0..8c75028a9aae 100644
> > --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
> > +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
> > @@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ int create_user_ns(struct cred *new)
> >  	if (!ns)
> >  		goto fail_dec;
> >  
> > +	ns->parent_could_setfcap = cap_raised(new->cap_effective, CAP_SETFCAP);
> >  	ret = ns_alloc_inum(&ns->ns);
> >  	if (ret)
> >  		goto fail_free;
> > @@ -841,6 +842,56 @@ static int sort_idmaps(struct uid_gid_map *map)
> >  	return 0;
> >  }
> >  
> > +/*
> > + * If mapping uid 0, then file capabilities created by the new namespace will
> > + * be effective in the parent namespace.  Adding file capabilities requires
> > + * CAP_SETFCAP, which the child namespace will have, so creating such a
> > + * mapping requires CAP_SETFCAP in the parent namespace.
> > + */
> > +static bool disallowed_0_mapping(const struct file *file,
> > +				 struct user_namespace *map_ns,
> > +				 struct uid_gid_map *new_map)
> > +{
> > +	int idx;
> > +	bool zeromapping = false;
> > +	const struct user_namespace *file_ns = file->f_cred->user_ns;
> > +
> > +	for (idx = 0; idx < new_map->nr_extents; idx++) {
> 
> I think having that loop is acceptable here since it's only called once
> at map creation time even though the forward array is not yet sorted.
> 
> > +		struct uid_gid_extent *e;
> > +		u32 lower_first;
> > +
> > +		if (new_map->nr_extents <= UID_GID_MAP_MAX_BASE_EXTENTS)
> > +			e = &new_map->extent[idx];
> > +		else
> > +			e = &new_map->forward[idx];
> > +		if (e->lower_first == 0) {
> > +			zeromapping = true;
> > +			break;
> > +		}
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	if (!zeromapping)
> > +		return false;
> > +
> > +	if (map_ns == file_ns) {
> > +		/* The user unshared first and is writing to
> > +		 * /proc/self/uid_map.  User already has full
> > +		 * capabilites in the new namespace, so verify
> > +		 * that the parent has CAP_SETFCAP. */
> > +		if (!file_ns->parent_could_setfcap)
> > +			return true;
> > +	} else {
> > +		/* Process p1 is writing to uid_map of p2, who
> > +		 * is in a child user namespace to p1's.  So
> > +		 * we verify that p1 has CAP_SETFCAP to its
> > +		 * own namespace */
> > +		if (!file_ns_capable(file, map_ns->parent, CAP_SETFCAP))
> > +			return true;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	return false;
> > +}
> 
> Maybe we can tweak this a tiny bit to get rid of the "zeromapping"?:
> 
> static bool disallowed_0_mapping(const struct file *file,
> 				 struct user_namespace *map_ns,
> 				 struct uid_gid_map *new_map)
> {
> 	int idx;
> 	const struct user_namespace *file_ns = file->f_cred->user_ns;
> 	struct uid_gid_extent *extent0 = NULL;
> 
> 	for (idx = 0; idx < new_map->nr_extents; idx++) {
> 		u32 lower_first;
> 
> 		if (new_map->nr_extents <= UID_GID_MAP_MAX_BASE_EXTENTS)
> 			extent0 = &new_map->extent[idx];
> 		else
> 			extent0 = &new_map->forward[idx];
> 		if (extent0->lower_first == 0)
> 			break;
> 
> 		extent0 = NULL;
> 	}
> 
> 	if (!extent0)
> 		return false;

Feels a little less clear to me, but that's probably just me, so I'll
switch it over, thanks.

> 
> 	if (map_ns == file_ns) {
> 		/* 
> 		 * The user unshared first and is writing to
> 		 * /proc/self/uid_map.  User already has full
> 		 * capabilites in the new namespace, so verify
> 		 * that the parent has CAP_SETFCAP.
> 		 */
> 		if (!file_ns->parent_could_setfcap)
> 			return true;
> 	} else {
> 		/* 
> 		 * Process p1 is writing to uid_map of p2, who
> 		 * is in a child user namespace to p1's. So
> 		 * we verify that p1 has CAP_SETFCAP to its
> 		 * own namespace.
> 		 */
> 		if (!file_ns_capable(file, map_ns->parent, CAP_SETFCAP))
> 			return true;
> 	}
> 
> 	return false;
> }
> 
> In addition I would think that expressing the logic the other way around
> is more legible. I'm not too keen on having negations in function names.
> We should probably also tweak the comment a bit and make it kernel-doc
> clean:
> 
> /**
>  * verify_root_map() - check the uid 0 mapping

Hm.  restrict_root_map() ?  "verify" sounds like we should sometimes reject
it.

>  * @file: idmapping file
>  * @map_ns: user namespace of the target process
>  * @new_map: requested idmap
>  *
>  * If a process requested a mapping for uid 0 onto
>  * uid 0 verify that the process writing the map had the CAP_SETFCAP
>  * capability as the target process will be able to
>  * write fscaps that are valid in ancestor user namespaces.
>  *
>  * Return: true if the mapping is allow, false if not.
>  */
> static bool verify_root_map()