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From:   Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Date:   Mon, 19 Apr 2021 14:00:17 -0500
Message-ID: <CAL_JsqKV_m8tzKpBq=3w-LUksWLmU-1mO1GgQS1nB9sDJanEpQ@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 02/10] arm64: perf: Enable PMU counter direct access
 for perf event
To:     Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc:     Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
        Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
        Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>, Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>,
        Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
        Honnappa Nagarahalli <honnappa.nagarahalli@arm.com>,
        Zachary.Leaf@arm.com, Raphael Gault <raphael.gault@arm.com>,
        Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>,
        Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
        Itaru Kitayama <itaru.kitayama@gmail.com>,
        linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
        "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
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On Mon, Apr 19, 2021 at 11:14 AM Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Apr 08, 2021 at 01:38:17PM -0500, Rob Herring wrote:
> > On Thu, Apr 8, 2021 at 6:08 AM Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> wrote:
> > > On Wed, Apr 07, 2021 at 01:44:37PM +0100, Will Deacon wrote:
> > > > On Thu, Apr 01, 2021 at 02:45:21PM -0500, Rob Herring wrote:
> > > > > On Wed, Mar 31, 2021 at 11:01 AM Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> wrote:
> > > > I guess I'm just worried about exposing the counters to userspace after
> > > > the PMU driver (or perf core?) thinks that they're no longer exposed in
> > > > case we leak other events.
> > >
> > > IMO that's not practically different from the single-PMU case (i.e.
> > > multi-PMU isn't material, either we have a concern with leaking or we
> > > don't); more on that below.
>
> Well, maybe. It looks the single-PMU case is exposed to the same issue,
> but I think a solution needs to take into account the multi-PMU situation.
>
> > > While it looks odd to place this on the mm, I don't think it's the end
> > > of the world.
> > >
> > > > However, I'm not sure how this is supposed to work normally: what
> > > > happens if e.g. a privileged user has a per-cpu counter for a kernel
> > > > event while a task has a counter with direct access -- can that task
> > > > read the kernel event out of the PMU registers from userspace?
> > >
> > > Yes -- userspace could go read any counters even though it isn't
> > > supposed to, and could potentially infer information from those. It
> > > won't have access to the config registers or kernel data structures, so
> > > it isn't guaranteed to know what the even is or when it is
> > > context-switched/reprogrammed/etc.
> > >
> > > If we believe that's a problem, then it's difficult to do anything
> > > robust other than denying userspace access entirely, since disabling
> > > userspace access while in use would surprise applications, and denying
> > > privileged events would need some global state that we consult at event
> > > creation time (in addition to being an inversion of privilege).
> > >
> > > IIRC there was some fuss about this a while back on x86; I'll go dig and
> > > see what I can find, unless Peter has a memory...
> >
> > Maybe this one[1].
> >
> > Rob
> >
> > [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200730123815.18518-1-kan.liang@linux.intel.com/
>
> Going through the archives and talking to Peter, it looks like this is still
> an active area of concern:
>
>   - There are patches to clear "dirty" counters on context-switch. They were
>     queued for 5.13 but broke -tip on Friday:
>
>     https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YHm%2FM4za2LpRYePw@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net/

Yes, nice timing. I've reworked the arm64 support to do the same
things (minus the breakage). And it looks like we can simplify things
a bit by moving all the context switch handling into .sched_task() and
out of switch_mm. Unless there's some case where that wouldn't work
that I'm not aware of (entirely likely).

>   - Per-cpu events cannot be protected in software:
>
>     https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CALCETrVVPzUd_hQ8xoomHn_wWRQJUvROeCt2do4_D4ROZoAVMg@mail.gmail.com/
>
>     so without hardware support, we need a way to disable user access for
>     people that care about this leakage
>
> x86 has an "rdpmc" file exposed for the PMU device in sysfs which allows
> access to be disabled. I don't think these patches add such a thing, and
> that's where the fun with multi-PMU machines would come into play.

The fun is because sysfs will end up with multiple 'rdpmc' files or
something else?

Rob