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From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        Aditya Pakki <pakki001@umn.edu>,
        "David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Subject: [PATCH 068/190] Revert "fore200e: Fix incorrect checks of NULL pointer dereference"
Date:   Wed, 21 Apr 2021 14:59:03 +0200
Message-Id: <20210421130105.1226686-69-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
In-Reply-To: <20210421130105.1226686-1-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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This reverts commit bbd20c939c8aa3f27fa30e86691af250bf92973a.

Commits from @umn.edu addresses have been found to be submitted in "bad
faith" to try to test the kernel community's ability to review "known
malicious" changes.  The result of these submissions can be found in a
paper published at the 42nd IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
entitled, "Open Source Insecurity: Stealthily Introducing
Vulnerabilities via Hypocrite Commits" written by Qiushi Wu (University
of Minnesota) and Kangjie Lu (University of Minnesota).

Because of this, all submissions from this group must be reverted from
the kernel tree and will need to be re-reviewed again to determine if
they actually are a valid fix.  Until that work is complete, remove this
change to ensure that no problems are being introduced into the
codebase.

Cc: Aditya Pakki <pakki001@umn.edu>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/atm/fore200e.c | 25 +++++++------------------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/atm/fore200e.c b/drivers/atm/fore200e.c
index 495fd0a1f040..e83286e3216e 100644
--- a/drivers/atm/fore200e.c
+++ b/drivers/atm/fore200e.c
@@ -1412,14 +1412,12 @@ fore200e_open(struct atm_vcc *vcc)
 static void
 fore200e_close(struct atm_vcc* vcc)
 {
+    struct fore200e*        fore200e = FORE200E_DEV(vcc->dev);
     struct fore200e_vcc*    fore200e_vcc;
-    struct fore200e*        fore200e;
     struct fore200e_vc_map* vc_map;
     unsigned long           flags;
 
     ASSERT(vcc);
-    fore200e = FORE200E_DEV(vcc->dev);
-
     ASSERT((vcc->vpi >= 0) && (vcc->vpi < 1<<FORE200E_VPI_BITS));
     ASSERT((vcc->vci >= 0) && (vcc->vci < 1<<FORE200E_VCI_BITS));
 
@@ -1464,10 +1462,10 @@ fore200e_close(struct atm_vcc* vcc)
 static int
 fore200e_send(struct atm_vcc *vcc, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-    struct fore200e*        fore200e;
-    struct fore200e_vcc*    fore200e_vcc;
+    struct fore200e*        fore200e     = FORE200E_DEV(vcc->dev);
+    struct fore200e_vcc*    fore200e_vcc = FORE200E_VCC(vcc);
     struct fore200e_vc_map* vc_map;
-    struct host_txq*        txq;
+    struct host_txq*        txq          = &fore200e->host_txq;
     struct host_txq_entry*  entry;
     struct tpd*             tpd;
     struct tpd_haddr        tpd_haddr;
@@ -1480,18 +1478,9 @@ fore200e_send(struct atm_vcc *vcc, struct sk_buff *skb)
     unsigned char*          data;
     unsigned long           flags;
 
-    if (!vcc)
-        return -EINVAL;
-
-    fore200e = FORE200E_DEV(vcc->dev);
-    fore200e_vcc = FORE200E_VCC(vcc);
-
-    if (!fore200e)
-        return -EINVAL;
-
-    txq = &fore200e->host_txq;
-    if (!fore200e_vcc)
-        return -EINVAL;
+    ASSERT(vcc);
+    ASSERT(fore200e);
+    ASSERT(fore200e_vcc);
 
     if (!test_bit(ATM_VF_READY, &vcc->flags)) {
 	DPRINTK(1, "VC %d.%d.%d not ready for tx\n", vcc->itf, vcc->vpi, vcc->vpi);
-- 
2.31.1