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From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        Wenwen Wang <wang6495@umn.edu>,
        "David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Subject: [PATCH 190/190] Revert "ethtool: fix a potential missing-check bug"
Date:   Wed, 21 Apr 2021 15:01:05 +0200
Message-Id: <20210421130105.1226686-191-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
In-Reply-To: <20210421130105.1226686-1-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
References: <20210421130105.1226686-1-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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This reverts commit d656fe49e33df48ee6bc19e871f5862f49895c9e.

Commits from @umn.edu addresses have been found to be submitted in "bad
faith" to try to test the kernel community's ability to review "known
malicious" changes.  The result of these submissions can be found in a
paper published at the 42nd IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
entitled, "Open Source Insecurity: Stealthily Introducing
Vulnerabilities via Hypocrite Commits" written by Qiushi Wu (University
of Minnesota) and Kangjie Lu (University of Minnesota).

Because of this, all submissions from this group must be reverted from
the kernel tree and will need to be re-reviewed again to determine if
they actually are a valid fix.  Until that work is complete, remove this
change to ensure that no problems are being introduced into the
codebase.

Cc: Wenwen Wang <wang6495@umn.edu>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/ethtool/ioctl.c | 5 -----
 1 file changed, 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/ethtool/ioctl.c b/net/ethtool/ioctl.c
index 807bc9465add..542f2428014c 100644
--- a/net/ethtool/ioctl.c
+++ b/net/ethtool/ioctl.c
@@ -869,11 +869,6 @@ static noinline_for_stack int ethtool_get_rxnfc(struct net_device *dev,
 		info_size = sizeof(info);
 		if (copy_from_user(&info, useraddr, info_size))
 			return -EFAULT;
-		/* Since malicious users may modify the original data,
-		 * we need to check whether FLOW_RSS is still requested.
-		 */
-		if (!(info.flow_type & FLOW_RSS))
-			return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	if (info.cmd == ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLALL) {
-- 
2.31.1