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Date:   Wed, 21 Apr 2021 12:21:37 -0700
From:   Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To:     "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc:     David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
        Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
        Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
        Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
        Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
        Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>,
        Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
        Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org>,
        Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>,
        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
        Kevin Brodsky <Kevin.Brodsky@arm.com>,
        Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>,
        Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com>,
        Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>, x86@kernel.org,
        linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 0/3] perf/binfmt/mm: remove in-tree usage of
 MAP_EXECUTABLE
Message-ID: <202104211220.B7648776D@keescook>
References: <20210421093453.6904-1-david@redhat.com>
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On Wed, Apr 21, 2021 at 02:03:49PM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> writes:
> 
> > Stumbling over the history of MAP_EXECUTABLE, I noticed that we still
> > have some in-tree users that we can get rid of.
> >
> > A good fit for the whole series could be Andrew's tree.
> 
> In general this looks like a good cleanup.
> 
> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>

Yeah, the PROT_EXEC parts are the only piece with meaning in the exec
allocations.

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

> As far as I can see we can go after MAP_DENYWRITE the same way.
> Today deny_write_access in open_exec is what causes -ETXTBSY
> when attempting to write to file that is current executing.

Oh, interesting point. I didn't realize MAP_DENYWRITE was separate from
deny_write_access().

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook