Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18;
From:   Maninder Singh <maninder1.s@samsung.com>
To:     ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com, glider@google.com, andreyknvl@gmail.com,
        akpm@linux-foundation.org, dvyukov@google.com
Cc:     kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, a.sahrawat@samsung.com,
        Maninder Singh <maninder1.s@samsung.com>,
        Vaneet Narang <v.narang@samsung.com>
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] mm/kasan: proc interface to read KASAN errors at any
 time
Date:   Thu, 22 Apr 2021 13:45:17 +0530
Message-Id: <1619079317-1131-2-git-send-email-maninder1.s@samsung.com>
In-Reply-To: <1619079317-1131-1-git-send-email-maninder1.s@samsung.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
CMS-TYPE: 105P
References: <1619079317-1131-1-git-send-email-maninder1.s@samsung.com>
        <CGME20210422081536epcas5p417c144cce0235933a1cd0f29ad55470a@epcas5p4.samsung.com>
Precedence: bulk

store minimal information required to regenerate KASAN logs
from reading of proc interface.

kernel buffer is allocated for 4K bytes to avoid multiple
checks of sanity for snprintf returns, and it will be checked
before copying that data to user space if user buffer has that
much capacity or not.

During long time aging test of targets, it is diffucult to check for
KASAN reported issues. Thus it will be better it proc interface is
present to check for Unique KASAN errors reported till time.

sample output and verification for ARM64:
Run sample TC's of KASAN:

[   25.450749] kasan test: kmalloc_oob_right out-of-bounds to right
[   25.452851] ==================================================================
[   25.453779] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmalloc_oob_right+0x80/0xa4
[   25.454800] Write of size 1 at addr ffff0000c3f1c27b by task cat/125
[   25.455891]
....
[   25.488283] kasan test: kmalloc_oob_left out-of-bounds to left
[   25.488819] ==================================================================
[   25.489189] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmalloc_oob_left+0x80/0xac
[   25.489601] Read of size 1 at addr ffff0000c3f1c2ff by task cat/125
...

After first reporting, NO KASAN reports for same issues:

[  115.078095] kasan test: kmalloc_oob_right out-of-bounds to right
[  115.078773] kasan test: kmalloc_oob_left out-of-bounds to left
[  115.079237] kasan test: kmalloc_node_oob_right kmalloc_node(): out-of-bounds to right
[  115.080056] kasan test: kmalloc_pagealloc_oob_right kmalloc pagealloc allocation: out-of-bounds to right
[  115.080683] kasan test: kmalloc_pagealloc_uaf kmalloc pagealloc allocation: use-after-free
[  115.081209] kasan test: kmalloc_pagealloc_invalid_free kmalloc pagealloc allocation: invalid-free

Check same from /proc/kasan_log:
KASAN Issue no. 1
==================================================================

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmalloc_oob_right+0x80/0xa4 at addr ffff0000c3f1c27b
Write of size 1 by task cat/125
...
...
Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff0000c3f1c100: 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff0000c3f1c180: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff0000c3f1c200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03
                                                                ^
 ffff0000c3f1c280: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff0000c3f1c300: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
==================================================================
KASAN Issue no. 2
==================================================================

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmalloc_oob_left+0x80/0xac at addr ffff0000c3f1c2ff
Read of size 1 by task cat/125
...
...
Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff0000c3f1c180: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff0000c3f1c200: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff0000c3f1c280: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
                                                                ^
 ffff0000c3f1c300: 00 07 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff0000c3f1c380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
==================================================================
KASAN Issue no. 3
==================================================================
...
...

Co-developed-by: Vaneet Narang <v.narang@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Vaneet Narang <v.narang@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Maninder Singh <maninder1.s@samsung.com>
---
 mm/kasan/kasan.h          |  32 +++-
 mm/kasan/report.c         | 377 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 mm/kasan/report_generic.c |  42 ++++-
 mm/kasan/report_hw_tags.c |   5 +-
 mm/kasan/report_sw_tags.c |  30 ++-
 5 files changed, 431 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
index d14ccce246ba..2c2c79551cbd 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h
+++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
@@ -94,6 +94,25 @@ extern bool kasan_flag_panic __ro_after_init;
 #define META_MEM_BYTES_PER_ROW (META_BYTES_PER_ROW * KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE)
 #define META_ROWS_AROUND_ADDR 2
 
+#define SHADOW_ROWS	(2 * META_ROWS_AROUND_ADDR + 1)
+#define CACHE_NAME_LEN	(20)
+
+typedef enum {
+	UNKNOWN,
+	OUT_OF_BOUNDS,
+	OUT_OF_BOUNDS_SLAB,
+	OUT_OF_BOUNDS_GLOBAL,
+	OUT_OF_BOUNDS_STACK,
+	USE_AFTER_FREE,
+	OUT_OF_BOUNDS_ALLOCA,
+	OUT_OF_BOUNDS_VMALLOC,
+	INVALID_ACCESS,
+	NULL_PTR_DEREFER,
+	USER_MEMORY_ACCESS,
+	WILD_MEMORY_ACCESS,
+	DOUBLE_INVALID_FREE
+} kasan_bug_type;
+
 struct kasan_access_info {
 	const void *access_addr;
 	const void *first_bad_addr;
@@ -106,6 +125,17 @@ struct kasan_record {
 	depot_stack_handle_t	bt_handle;
 	depot_stack_handle_t	alloc_handle;
 	depot_stack_handle_t	free_handle;
+	const void		*access_addr;
+	const void		*first_bad_addr;
+	unsigned long		ip;
+	size_t			access_size;
+	char			comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
+	char			cache_name[CACHE_NAME_LEN];
+	int			cache_size;
+	pid_t			pid;
+	kasan_bug_type		bug_type;
+	u8			buf[SHADOW_ROWS][META_BYTES_PER_ROW];
+	bool			is_write;
 };
 
 /* The layout of struct dictated by compiler */
@@ -234,7 +264,7 @@ static inline void kasan_print_tags(u8 addr_tag, const void *addr) { }
 #endif
 
 void *kasan_find_first_bad_addr(void *addr, size_t size);
-const char *kasan_get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info);
+const char *kasan_get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info, kasan_bug_type *bug);
 void kasan_metadata_fetch_row(char *buffer, void *row);
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && defined(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK)
diff --git a/mm/kasan/report.c b/mm/kasan/report.c
index 4576de76991b..b0cc95fedc29 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/report.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/report.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/printk.h>
+#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/stackdepot.h>
@@ -66,7 +67,7 @@ __setup("kasan_multi_shot", kasan_set_multi_shot);
 static void print_error_description(struct kasan_access_info *info)
 {
 	pr_err("BUG: KASAN: %s in %pS\n",
-		kasan_get_bug_type(info), (void *)info->ip);
+		kasan_get_bug_type(info, NULL), (void *)info->ip);
 	if (info->access_size)
 		pr_err("%s of size %zu at addr %px by task %s/%d\n",
 			info->is_write ? "Write" : "Read", info->access_size,
@@ -342,26 +343,50 @@ static void kasan_update_kunit_status(struct kunit *cur_test)
 }
 #endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KUNIT) */
 
-void kasan_report_invalid_free(void *object, unsigned long ip)
+static void copy_error_description(struct kasan_access_info *info,
+			struct kasan_record *record)
 {
-	unsigned long flags;
-	u8 tag = get_tag(object);
+	record->ip = info->ip;
+	record->first_bad_addr = info->first_bad_addr;
+	record->access_addr = info->access_addr;
+	record->is_write = info->is_write;
+	record->access_size = info->access_size;
+	record->pid = task_pid_nr(current);
+	strncpy(record->comm, current->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
+}
 
-	object = kasan_reset_tag(object);
+static void copy_shadow_for_address(struct kasan_record *record)
+{
+	int i;
+	void *addr = (void *)record->first_bad_addr;
+	void *row = (void *)round_down((unsigned long)addr, META_MEM_BYTES_PER_ROW)
+			- META_ROWS_AROUND_ADDR * META_MEM_BYTES_PER_ROW;
 
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KUNIT)
-	if (current->kunit_test)
-		kasan_update_kunit_status(current->kunit_test);
-#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KUNIT) */
 
-	start_report(&flags);
-	pr_err("BUG: KASAN: double-free or invalid-free in %pS\n", (void *)ip);
-	kasan_print_tags(tag, object);
-	pr_err("\n");
-	print_address_description(object, tag);
-	pr_err("\n");
-	print_memory_metadata(object);
-	end_report(&flags, (unsigned long)object);
+	for (i = 0; i < SHADOW_ROWS; i++) {
+		kasan_metadata_fetch_row((char *)&record->buf[i], row);
+		row += META_MEM_BYTES_PER_ROW;
+	}
+}
+
+static bool match_handles(struct kasan_record *record)
+{
+	int i = 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < stored_kasan_records; i++) {
+		if (record->bt_handle != kasan_records[i].bt_handle)
+			continue;
+		if (record->alloc_handle != kasan_records[i].alloc_handle)
+			continue;
+		if ((record->bug_type == USE_AFTER_FREE ||
+			record->bug_type == DOUBLE_INVALID_FREE) &&
+			(record->free_handle != kasan_records[i].free_handle))
+			continue;
+
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -370,21 +395,26 @@ void kasan_report_invalid_free(void *object, unsigned long ip)
  * returns false if same record is already saved.
  * returns true if its new record and saved in database of KASAN.
  */
-static bool save_report(void *addr, struct kasan_access_info *info, u8 tag, unsigned long *flags)
+static bool save_report(void *addr, struct kasan_access_info *info, u8 tag,
+				unsigned long *flags, kasan_bug_type *bug)
 {
 	struct kasan_record record = {0};
 	depot_stack_handle_t bt_handle;
-	int i = 0;
-	const char *bug_type;
 	struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta;
 	struct kasan_track *free_track;
 	struct page *page;
+	kasan_bug_type bug_enum = UNKNOWN;
 	bool ret = true;
 
 	kasan_disable_current();
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&report_lock, *flags);
 
-	bug_type = kasan_get_bug_type(info);
+	if (!bug) {
+		kasan_get_bug_type(info, &bug_enum);
+		record.bug_type = bug_enum;
+	} else
+		record.bug_type = *bug;
+
 	page = kasan_addr_to_page(addr);
 	bt_handle = kasan_save_stack(GFP_KERNEL);
 
@@ -397,23 +427,27 @@ static bool save_report(void *addr, struct kasan_access_info *info, u8 tag, unsi
 		record.alloc_handle = alloc_meta->alloc_track.stack;
 		if (free_track)
 			record.free_handle = free_track->stack;
+
+		strncpy(record.cache_name, cache->name, CACHE_NAME_LEN - 1);
+		record.cache_name[CACHE_NAME_LEN - 1] = '\0';
+		record.cache_size = cache->object_size;
 	}
 
 	record.bt_handle = bt_handle;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < stored_kasan_records; i++) {
-		if (record.bt_handle != kasan_records[i].bt_handle)
-			continue;
-		if (record.alloc_handle != kasan_records[i].alloc_handle)
-			continue;
-		if (!strncmp("use-after-free", bug_type, 15) &&
-			(record.free_handle != kasan_records[i].free_handle))
-			continue;
+	if (match_handles(&record)) {
+		ret = false;
+		goto done;
+	}
 
+	if (stored_kasan_records >= MAX_RECORDS) {
+		WARN_ONCE(1, "KASAN database reached capacity");
 		ret = false;
 		goto done;
 	}
 
+	copy_error_description(info, &record);
+	copy_shadow_for_address(&record);
 	memcpy(&kasan_records[stored_kasan_records], &record, sizeof(struct kasan_record));
 	stored_kasan_records++;
 
@@ -423,6 +457,38 @@ static bool save_report(void *addr, struct kasan_access_info *info, u8 tag, unsi
 	return ret;
 }
 
+void kasan_report_invalid_free(void *object, unsigned long ip)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+	u8 tag = get_tag(object);
+	struct kasan_access_info info;
+	kasan_bug_type bug_enum = DOUBLE_INVALID_FREE;
+
+	object = kasan_reset_tag(object);
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KUNIT)
+	if (current->kunit_test)
+		kasan_update_kunit_status(current->kunit_test);
+#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KUNIT) */
+
+	info.ip = ip;
+	info.first_bad_addr = object;
+	info.access_addr = 0;
+	info.is_write = 0;
+	info.access_size = 0;
+	if (!save_report(object, &info, tag, &flags, &bug_enum))
+		return;
+
+	start_report(&flags);
+	pr_err("BUG: KASAN: double-free or invalid-free in %pS\n", (void *)ip);
+	kasan_print_tags(tag, object);
+	pr_err("\n");
+	print_address_description(object, tag);
+	pr_err("\n");
+	print_memory_metadata(object);
+	end_report(&flags, (unsigned long)object);
+}
+
 static void __kasan_report(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool is_write,
 				unsigned long ip)
 {
@@ -442,18 +508,17 @@ static void __kasan_report(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool is_write,
 	untagged_addr = kasan_reset_tag(tagged_addr);
 
 	info.access_addr = tagged_addr;
-	if (addr_has_metadata(untagged_addr))
-		info.first_bad_addr =
-			kasan_find_first_bad_addr(tagged_addr, size);
-	else
-		info.first_bad_addr = untagged_addr;
 	info.access_size = size;
 	info.is_write = is_write;
 	info.ip = ip;
 
-	if (addr_has_metadata(untagged_addr) &&
-		!save_report(untagged_addr, &info, get_tag(tagged_addr), &flags))
-		return;
+	if (addr_has_metadata(untagged_addr)) {
+		info.first_bad_addr = kasan_find_first_bad_addr(tagged_addr, size);
+
+		if (!save_report(untagged_addr, &info, get_tag(tagged_addr), &flags, NULL))
+			return;
+	} else
+		info.first_bad_addr = untagged_addr;
 
 	start_report(&flags);
 
@@ -528,3 +593,241 @@ void kasan_non_canonical_hook(unsigned long addr)
 		 orig_addr, orig_addr + KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 1);
 }
 #endif
+
+#define READ_SIZE	(4096)
+static ssize_t print_kasan_error(char __user *buf, size_t count,
+		struct kasan_record *record, loff_t *ppos, char *kbuf)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+	unsigned long *entries;
+	unsigned long nr_entries;
+	const char *bug_type = "unknown-crash";
+	int i, j;
+	void *row;
+	void *addr = (void *)record->first_bad_addr;
+
+	if (!kbuf)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	switch (record->bug_type) {
+	case OUT_OF_BOUNDS:
+		bug_type = "out-of-bounds";
+		break;
+	case OUT_OF_BOUNDS_SLAB:
+		bug_type = "slab-out-of-bounds";
+		break;
+	case OUT_OF_BOUNDS_GLOBAL:
+		bug_type = "global-out-of-bounds";
+		break;
+	case OUT_OF_BOUNDS_STACK:
+		bug_type = "stack-out-of-bounds";
+		break;
+	case USE_AFTER_FREE:
+		bug_type = "use-after-free";
+		break;
+	case OUT_OF_BOUNDS_ALLOCA:
+		bug_type = "alloca-out-of-bounds";
+		break;
+	case OUT_OF_BOUNDS_VMALLOC:
+		bug_type = "alloca-out-of-vmalloc";
+		break;
+	case INVALID_ACCESS:
+		bug_type = "invalid-access";
+		break;
+	case NULL_PTR_DEREFER:
+		bug_type = "null-ptr-deref";
+		break;
+	case USER_MEMORY_ACCESS:
+		bug_type = "user-memory-access";
+		break;
+	case WILD_MEMORY_ACCESS:
+		bug_type = "wild-memory-access";
+		break;
+	case DOUBLE_INVALID_FREE:
+		bug_type = "double-free or invalid-free";
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	ret += snprintf(kbuf + ret, count - ret,
+				"KASAN Issue no. %lld\n", *ppos);
+	ret += snprintf(kbuf + ret, count - ret,
+			"==============================="
+			"===================================\n");
+
+	if (record->bug_type != DOUBLE_INVALID_FREE) {
+		ret += snprintf(kbuf + ret, count - ret,
+				"\nBUG: KASAN: %s in %pS at addr %px\n",
+				bug_type, (void *)record->ip, record->access_addr);
+		ret += snprintf(kbuf + ret, count - ret,
+				"%s of size %zu by task %s/%d\n",
+				record->is_write ? "Write" : "Read",
+				record->access_size, record->comm, record->pid);
+	} else {
+		ret += snprintf(kbuf + ret, count - ret,
+			"\nBUG: KASAN: %s in %pS\n",
+			bug_type, (void *)record->ip);
+	}
+
+	ret += snprintf(kbuf + ret, count - ret, "\nBacktrace:\n");
+	nr_entries = stack_depot_fetch(record->bt_handle, &entries);
+
+	ret += stack_trace_snprint(kbuf + ret, count - ret, entries, nr_entries, 0);
+
+	if (record->alloc_handle) {
+		ret += snprintf(kbuf + ret, count - ret,
+				"\nBelongs to the cache %s of size: %d\n",
+				record->cache_name, record->cache_size);
+		ret += snprintf(kbuf + ret, count - ret,
+				"------------------------------------------"
+				"-----------------------------------\n");
+
+		nr_entries = stack_depot_fetch(record->alloc_handle, &entries);
+		ret += snprintf(kbuf + ret, count - ret, "INFO Allocation path:\n");
+
+		ret += stack_trace_snprint(kbuf + ret, count - ret, entries, nr_entries, 0);
+
+		if (record->free_handle) {
+			ret += snprintf(kbuf + ret, count - ret, "\nINFO Free path:\n");
+
+			nr_entries = stack_depot_fetch(record->free_handle, &entries);
+			ret += stack_trace_snprint(kbuf + ret, count - ret, entries, nr_entries, 0);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (kernel_or_module_addr(addr)) {
+		if (!init_task_stack_addr(addr))
+			ret += snprintf(kbuf + ret, count - ret,
+				"The buggy address belongs to the variable %pS\n",
+				(void *)record->access_addr);
+	}
+
+	ret += snprintf(kbuf + ret, count - ret,
+				"Memory state around the buggy address:\n");
+
+	row = (void *)round_down((unsigned long)addr, META_MEM_BYTES_PER_ROW)
+			- META_ROWS_AROUND_ADDR * META_MEM_BYTES_PER_ROW;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < SHADOW_ROWS; i++) {
+		if (i)
+			ret += snprintf(kbuf + ret, count - ret, "\n");
+
+		ret += snprintf(kbuf + ret, count - ret,
+		(i == 2) ? ">%px: " : " %px: ", row);
+
+		for (j = 0; j < META_BYTES_PER_ROW; j++) {
+			u8 value = record->buf[i][j];
+				ret += snprintf(kbuf + ret, count - ret, "%02x ", value);
+		}
+
+		if (meta_row_is_guilty(row, addr))
+			ret += snprintf(kbuf + ret, count - ret, "\n%*c",
+				meta_pointer_offset(row, addr),
+				'^');
+
+		row += META_MEM_BYTES_PER_ROW;
+	}
+
+	ret += snprintf(kbuf + ret, count - ret,
+			"\n==============================="
+			"===================================\n");
+
+	/*
+	 * checking for space in buffer only when copying to user,
+	 * otherwise if overflow'ed in kernel buffer, it will
+	 * lead to kernel crash and then size of vmalloc'ed
+	 * memory can be increased.
+	 *
+	 * Benefit: checks on each snprintf avoided.
+	 */
+	if (ret >= count) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	if (copy_to_user(buf, kbuf, ret))
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+
+err:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * read_kasan_errors()
+ *
+ * function to print all the entries present
+ * in KASAN depot_stack database currently in system.
+ */
+static ssize_t read_kasan_errors(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+		size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	/*
+	 * No need of lock here for reading stored_kasan_records,
+	 * As it is an integer variable, we can read it one value less
+	 * if it is getting updated simultaneously.
+	 */
+	int total_records = stored_kasan_records;
+	char *kbuf = (char *)file->private_data;
+
+	while (*ppos < total_records) {
+		struct kasan_record *record;
+
+		record  = &kasan_records[*ppos];
+		*ppos = *ppos + 1;
+		return print_kasan_error(buf, count, record, ppos, kbuf);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int read_kasan_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	char *kasan_kbuf;
+
+	/*
+	 * One KASAN error will always be less than 4 KB,
+	 * without page dump info.
+	 *
+	 * Thus allocate buffer of READ_SIZE, rather than
+	 * count to avoid return checks of snprintfs.
+	 */
+	kasan_kbuf = vzalloc(READ_SIZE);
+
+	if (!kasan_kbuf)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	file->private_data = (void *)kasan_kbuf;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int read_kasan_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	char *kasan_kbuf = (char *)file->private_data;
+
+	if (kasan_kbuf)
+		vfree(kasan_kbuf);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct proc_ops proc_kasan_ops = {
+	.proc_open		= read_kasan_open,
+	.proc_read		= read_kasan_errors,
+	.proc_release		= read_kasan_release,
+};
+
+static int __init register_kasan_proc(void)
+{
+	struct proc_dir_entry *entry;
+
+	entry = proc_create("kasan_log", 0400,
+			NULL, &proc_kasan_ops);
+
+	if (!entry)
+		pr_err("registration of KASAN proc interface failed\n");
+
+	return 0;
+}
+fs_initcall(register_kasan_proc);
diff --git a/mm/kasan/report_generic.c b/mm/kasan/report_generic.c
index 139615ef326b..0206d5f9b486 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/report_generic.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/report_generic.c
@@ -39,10 +39,12 @@ void *kasan_find_first_bad_addr(void *addr, size_t size)
 	return p;
 }
 
-static const char *get_shadow_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)
+static const char *get_shadow_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info,
+		kasan_bug_type *bug_save)
 {
 	const char *bug_type = "unknown-crash";
 	u8 *shadow_addr;
+	kasan_bug_type bug = UNKNOWN;
 
 	shadow_addr = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(info->first_bad_addr);
 
@@ -60,52 +62,70 @@ static const char *get_shadow_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)
 		 * due to a data race in the kernel code.
 		 */
 		bug_type = "out-of-bounds";
+		bug = OUT_OF_BOUNDS;
 		break;
 	case KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE:
 	case KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE:
 		bug_type = "slab-out-of-bounds";
+		bug = OUT_OF_BOUNDS_SLAB;
 		break;
 	case KASAN_GLOBAL_REDZONE:
 		bug_type = "global-out-of-bounds";
+		bug = OUT_OF_BOUNDS_GLOBAL;
 		break;
 	case KASAN_STACK_LEFT:
 	case KASAN_STACK_MID:
 	case KASAN_STACK_RIGHT:
 	case KASAN_STACK_PARTIAL:
 		bug_type = "stack-out-of-bounds";
+		bug = OUT_OF_BOUNDS_STACK;
 		break;
 	case KASAN_FREE_PAGE:
 	case KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE:
 	case KASAN_KMALLOC_FREETRACK:
 		bug_type = "use-after-free";
+		bug = USE_AFTER_FREE;
 		break;
 	case KASAN_ALLOCA_LEFT:
 	case KASAN_ALLOCA_RIGHT:
 		bug_type = "alloca-out-of-bounds";
+		bug = OUT_OF_BOUNDS_ALLOCA;
 		break;
 	case KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID:
 		bug_type = "vmalloc-out-of-bounds";
+		bug = OUT_OF_BOUNDS_VMALLOC;
 		break;
 	}
 
+	if (bug_save)
+		*bug_save = bug;
+
 	return bug_type;
 }
 
-static const char *get_wild_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)
+static const char *get_wild_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info, kasan_bug_type *bug)
 {
 	const char *bug_type = "unknown-crash";
+	kasan_bug_type bug_enum = UNKNOWN;
 
-	if ((unsigned long)info->access_addr < PAGE_SIZE)
+	if ((unsigned long)info->access_addr < PAGE_SIZE) {
 		bug_type = "null-ptr-deref";
-	else if ((unsigned long)info->access_addr < TASK_SIZE)
+		bug_enum = NULL_PTR_DEREFER;
+	} else if ((unsigned long)info->access_addr < TASK_SIZE) {
 		bug_type = "user-memory-access";
-	else
+		bug_enum = USER_MEMORY_ACCESS;
+	} else {
 		bug_type = "wild-memory-access";
+		bug_enum = WILD_MEMORY_ACCESS;
+	}
+
+	if (bug)
+		*bug = bug_enum;
 
 	return bug_type;
 }
 
-const char *kasan_get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)
+const char *kasan_get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info, kasan_bug_type *bug)
 {
 	/*
 	 * If access_size is a negative number, then it has reason to be
@@ -115,12 +135,16 @@ const char *kasan_get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)
 	 * a large size_t and its value will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2,
 	 * so that this can qualify as out-of-bounds.
 	 */
-	if (info->access_addr + info->access_size < info->access_addr)
+	if (info->access_addr + info->access_size < info->access_addr) {
+		if (bug)
+			*bug = OUT_OF_BOUNDS;
+
 		return "out-of-bounds";
+	}
 
 	if (addr_has_metadata(info->access_addr))
-		return get_shadow_bug_type(info);
-	return get_wild_bug_type(info);
+		return get_shadow_bug_type(info, bug);
+	return get_wild_bug_type(info, bug);
 }
 
 void kasan_metadata_fetch_row(char *buffer, void *row)
diff --git a/mm/kasan/report_hw_tags.c b/mm/kasan/report_hw_tags.c
index 42b2168755d6..ae516e92f9f3 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/report_hw_tags.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/report_hw_tags.c
@@ -15,8 +15,11 @@
 
 #include "kasan.h"
 
-const char *kasan_get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)
+const char *kasan_get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info, kasan_bug_type *bug)
 {
+	if (bug)
+		*bug = INVALID_ACCESS;
+
 	return "invalid-access";
 }
 
diff --git a/mm/kasan/report_sw_tags.c b/mm/kasan/report_sw_tags.c
index 3d20d3451d9e..11c869d4ad3c 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/report_sw_tags.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/report_sw_tags.c
@@ -29,8 +29,10 @@
 #include "kasan.h"
 #include "../slab.h"
 
-const char *kasan_get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)
+const char *kasan_get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info, kasan_bug_type *bug)
 {
+	kasan_bug_type bug_enum;
+	const char *bug_type;
 #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS_IDENTIFY
 	struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta;
 	struct kmem_cache *cache;
@@ -50,11 +52,16 @@ const char *kasan_get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)
 
 		if (alloc_meta) {
 			for (i = 0; i < KASAN_NR_FREE_STACKS; i++) {
-				if (alloc_meta->free_pointer_tag[i] == tag)
-					return "use-after-free";
+				if (alloc_meta->free_pointer_tag[i] == tag) {
+					bug_type = "use-after-free";
+					bug_enum = USE_AFTER_FREE;
+					goto done;
+				}
 			}
 		}
-		return "out-of-bounds";
+		bug_type = "out-of-bounds";
+		bug_enum = OUT_OF_BOUNDS;
+		goto done;
 	}
 
 #endif
@@ -66,10 +73,19 @@ const char *kasan_get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)
 	 * a large size_t and its value will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2,
 	 * so that this can qualify as out-of-bounds.
 	 */
-	if (info->access_addr + info->access_size < info->access_addr)
-		return "out-of-bounds";
+	if (info->access_addr + info->access_size < info->access_addr) {
+		bug_enum = OUT_OF_BOUNDS;
+		bug_type = "out-of-bounds";
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	bug_enum = INVALID_ACCESS;
+	bug_type = "invalid-access";
+done:
+	if (bug)
+		*bug = bug_enum;
 
-	return "invalid-access";
+	return bug_type;
 }
 
 void *kasan_find_first_bad_addr(void *addr, size_t size)
-- 
2.17.1