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From:   Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To:     x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
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        Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
        "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
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        Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
        Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
        Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
        Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>,
        Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com>
Cc:     Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>,
        "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v26 14/30] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking
Date:   Tue, 27 Apr 2021 13:42:59 -0700
Message-Id: <20210427204315.24153-15-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
In-Reply-To: <20210427204315.24153-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
References: <20210427204315.24153-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
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Shadow stack accesses are those that are performed by the CPU where it
expects to encounter a shadow stack mapping.  These accesses are performed
implicitly by CALL/RET at the site of the shadow stack pointer.  These
accesses are made explicitly by shadow stack management instructions like
WRUSSQ.

Shadow stacks accesses to shadow-stack mapping can see faults in normal,
valid operation just like regular accesses to regular mappings.  Shadow
stacks need some of the same features like delayed allocation, swap and
copy-on-write.

Shadow stack accesses can also result in errors, such as when a shadow
stack overflows, or if a shadow stack access occurs to a non-shadow-stack
mapping.

In handling a shadow stack page fault, verify it occurs within a shadow
stack mapping.  It is always an error otherwise.  For valid shadow stack
accesses, set FAULT_FLAG_WRITE to effect copy-on-write.  Because clearing
_PAGE_DIRTY (vs. _PAGE_RW) is used to trigger the fault, shadow stack read
fault and shadow stack write fault are not differentiated and both are
handled as a write access.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
---
v24:
- Change VM_SHSTK to VM_SHADOW_STACK.

 arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h |  2 ++
 arch/x86/mm/fault.c            | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h
index 10b1de500ab1..afa524325e55 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
  *   bit 3 ==				1: use of reserved bit detected
  *   bit 4 ==				1: fault was an instruction fetch
  *   bit 5 ==				1: protection keys block access
+ *   bit 6 ==				1: shadow stack access fault
  *   bit 15 ==				1: SGX MMU page-fault
  */
 enum x86_pf_error_code {
@@ -20,6 +21,7 @@ enum x86_pf_error_code {
 	X86_PF_RSVD	=		1 << 3,
 	X86_PF_INSTR	=		1 << 4,
 	X86_PF_PK	=		1 << 5,
+	X86_PF_SHSTK	=		1 << 6,
 	X86_PF_SGX	=		1 << 15,
 };
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index a73347e2cdfc..394e504305b7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -1100,6 +1100,17 @@ access_error(unsigned long error_code, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 				       (error_code & X86_PF_INSTR), foreign))
 		return 1;
 
+	/*
+	 * Verify a shadow stack access is within a shadow stack VMA.
+	 * It is always an error otherwise.  Normal data access to a
+	 * shadow stack area is checked in the case followed.
+	 */
+	if (error_code & X86_PF_SHSTK) {
+		if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK))
+			return 1;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	if (error_code & X86_PF_WRITE) {
 		/* write, present and write, not present: */
 		if (unlikely(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)))
@@ -1293,6 +1304,14 @@ void do_user_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs,
 
 	perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, regs, address);
 
+	/*
+	 * Clearing _PAGE_DIRTY is used to detect shadow stack access.
+	 * This method cannot distinguish shadow stack read vs. write.
+	 * For valid shadow stack accesses, set FAULT_FLAG_WRITE to effect
+	 * copy-on-write.
+	 */
+	if (error_code & X86_PF_SHSTK)
+		flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
 	if (error_code & X86_PF_WRITE)
 		flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
 	if (error_code & X86_PF_INSTR)
-- 
2.21.0