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Date:   Fri, 30 Apr 2021 20:10:53 +0000
From:   Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To:     Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc:     linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
        srutherford@google.com, joro@8bytes.org, brijesh.singh@amd.com,
        thomas.lendacky@amd.com, ashish.kalra@amd.com,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
        x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] KVM: X86: Introduce KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS
 hypercall
Message-ID: <YIxkTZsblAzUzsf7@google.com>
References: <20210429104707.203055-1-pbonzini@redhat.com>
 <20210429104707.203055-3-pbonzini@redhat.com>
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On Thu, Apr 29, 2021, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst
> index 57fc4090031a..cf1b0b2099b0 100644
> --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst
> @@ -383,5 +383,10 @@ MSR_KVM_MIGRATION_CONTROL:
>  data:
>          This MSR is available if KVM_FEATURE_MIGRATION_CONTROL is present in
>          CPUID.  Bit 0 represents whether live migration of the guest is allowed.
> +
>          When a guest is started, bit 0 will be 1 if the guest has encrypted
> -        memory and 0 if the guest does not have encrypted memory.
> +        memory and 0 if the guest does not have encrypted memory.  If the
> +        guest is communicating page encryption status to the host using the
> +        ``KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS`` hypercall, it can set bit 0 in this MSR to
> +        allow live migration of the guest.  The MSR is read-only if
> +        ``KVM_FEATURE_HC_PAGE_STATUS`` is not advertised to the guest.

I still don't get the desire to tie MSR_KVM_MIGRATION_CONTROL to PAGE_ENC_STATUS
in any way shape or form.  I can understand making it read-only or dropping
writes if it's not intercepted by userspace, but making it read-only for
non-encrypted guests makes it useful only for encrypted guests, which defeats
the purpose of genericizing the MSR.

> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index e9c40be9235c..0c2524bbaa84 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> @@ -3279,6 +3279,12 @@ int kvm_set_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
>  		if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_MIGRATION_CONTROL))
>  			return 1;
>  
> +		/*
> +		 * This implementation is only good if userspace has *not*
> +		 * enabled KVM_FEATURE_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS.  If userspace
> +		 * enables KVM_FEATURE_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS it must set up an
> +		 * MSR filter in order to accept writes that change bit 0.
> +		 */
>  		if (data != !static_call(kvm_x86_has_encrypted_memory)(vcpu->kvm))
>  			return 1;

This behavior doesn't match the documentation.

  a. The MSR is not read-only for legacy guests since they can write '0'.
  b. The MSR is not read-only if KVM_FEATURE_HC_PAGE_STATUS isn't advertised,
     a guest with encrypted memory can write '1' regardless of whether userspace
     has enabled KVM_FEATURE_HC_PAGE_STATUS.
  c. The MSR is never fully writable, e.g. a guest with encrypted memory can set
     bit 0, but not clear it.  This doesn't seem intentional?

Why not simply drop writes?  E.g.

		if (data & ~KVM_MIGRATION_READY)
			return 1;
		break;

And then do "msr->data = 0;" in the read path.  That's just as effective as
making the MSR read-only to force userspace to intercept the MSR if it wants to
do anything useful with the information, and it's easy to document.

>  		break;