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From:   Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
To:     Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
        Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
        "mjg59@google.com" <mjg59@google.com>
CC:     "linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org" <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
        "linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" 
        <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
        "linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
        "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: RE: [PATCH v5 06/12] evm: Ignore INTEGRITY_NOLABEL/INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS
 if conditions are safe
Thread-Topic: [PATCH v5 06/12] evm: Ignore
 INTEGRITY_NOLABEL/INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS if conditions are safe
Thread-Index: AQHXK5xdbQY13c/E0Ea5lrgi3mZG3arQ6VCAgAChtnCAAGkoMA==
Date:   Mon, 3 May 2021 14:15:22 +0000
Message-ID: <33cad84d2f894ed5a05a3bd6854f73a0@huawei.com>
References: <20210407105252.30721-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
         <20210407105252.30721-7-roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
 <b8790b57e289980d4fe1133d15203ce016d2319d.camel@linux.ibm.com>
 <c12f18094cc0479faa3f0f152b4964de@huawei.com>
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> From: Roberto Sassu [mailto:roberto.sassu@huawei.com]
> Sent: Monday, May 3, 2021 9:55 AM
> > From: Mimi Zohar [mailto:zohar@linux.ibm.com]
> > Sent: Monday, May 3, 2021 2:13 AM
> > Hi Roberto,
> >
> > On Wed, 2021-04-07 at 12:52 +0200, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> > > When a file is being created, LSMs can set the initial label with the
> > > inode_init_security hook. If no HMAC key is loaded, the new file will have
> > > LSM xattrs but not the HMAC. It is also possible that the file remains
> > > without protected xattrs after creation if no active LSM provided it.
> > >
> > > Unfortunately, EVM will deny any further metadata operation on new
> files,
> > > as evm_protect_xattr() will always return the INTEGRITY_NOLABEL error,
> or
> > > INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS if no protected xattrs exist. This would limit the
> > > usability of EVM when only a public key is loaded, as commands such as
> cp
> > > or tar with the option to preserve xattrs won't work.
> > >
> > > This patch ignores these errors when they won't be an issue, if no HMAC
> > key
> > > is loaded and cannot be loaded in the future (which can be enforced by
> > > setting the EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE initialization flag).
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
> > > ---
> > >  security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
> > >  1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> > b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> > > index 998818283fda..6556e8c22da9 100644
> > > --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> > > +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> > > @@ -90,6 +90,24 @@ static bool evm_key_loaded(void)
> > >  	return (bool)(evm_initialized & EVM_KEY_MASK);
> > >  }
> > >
> > > +/*
> > > + * Ignoring INTEGRITY_NOLABEL/INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS is safe if no
> HMAC
> > key
> > > + * is loaded and the EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE initialization flag is set.
> > > + */
> > > +static bool evm_ignore_error_safe(enum integrity_status evm_status)
> > > +{
> > > +	if (evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)
> > > +		return false;
> > > +
> > > +	if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE))
> > > +		return false;
> > > +
> > > +	if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_NOLABEL && evm_status !=
> > INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS)
> > > +		return false;
> > > +
> > > +	return true;
> > > +}
> > > +
> > >  static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry)
> > >  {
> > >  	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
> > > @@ -354,6 +372,8 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry
> *dentry,
> > const char *xattr_name,
> > >  				    -EPERM, 0);
> > >  	}
> > >  out:
> > > +	if (evm_ignore_error_safe(evm_status))
> > > +		return 0;
> >
> > I agree with the concept, but the function name doesn't provide enough
> > context.  Perhaps defining a function more along the lines of
> > "evm_hmac_disabled()" would be more appropriate and at the same time
> > self documenting.
> 
> Since the function checks if the passed error can be ignored,
> would evm_ignore_error_hmac_disabled() also be ok?
> 
> > >  	if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS)
> > >  		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA,
> > d_backing_inode(dentry),
> > >  				    dentry->d_name.name,
> > "appraise_metadata",
> > > @@ -515,7 +535,8 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> struct
> > iattr *attr)
> > >  		return 0;
> > >  	evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
> > >  	if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) ||
> > > -	    (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
> > > +	    (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) ||
> > > +	    (evm_ignore_error_safe(evm_status)))
> >
> > It would also remove the INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS test duplication here.
> 
> Ok.

Actually, it does not seem a duplication. Currently, INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS
is ignored also when the HMAC key is loaded.

Roberto

HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES Duesseldorf GmbH, HRB 56063
Managing Director: Li Peng, Li Jian, Shi Yanli

> Thanks
> 
> Roberto
> 
> HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES Duesseldorf GmbH, HRB 56063
> Managing Director: Li Peng, Li Jian, Shi Yanli
> 
> > thanks,
> >
> > Mimi
> >
> > >  		return 0;
> > >  	integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA,
> > d_backing_inode(dentry),
> > >  			    dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata",