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From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        stable@vger.kernel.org, Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>,
        Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5.11 031/342] libceph: bump CephXAuthenticate encoding version
Date:   Mon, 10 May 2021 12:17:01 +0200
Message-Id: <20210510102011.134876262@linuxfoundation.org>
In-Reply-To: <20210510102010.096403571@linuxfoundation.org>
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From: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

commit 7807dafda21a549403d922da98dde0ddfeb70d08 upstream.

A dummy v3 encoding (exactly the same as v2) was introduced so that
the monitors can distinguish broken clients that may not include their
auth ticket in CEPHX_GET_AUTH_SESSION_KEY request on reconnects, thus
failing to prove previous possession of their global_id (one part of
CVE-2021-20288).

The kernel client has always included its auth ticket, so it is
compatible with enforcing mode as is.  However we want to bump the
encoding version to avoid having to authenticate twice on the initial
connect -- all legacy (CephXAuthenticate < v3) are now forced do so in
order to expose insecure global_id reclaim.

Marking for stable since at least for 5.11 and 5.12 it is trivial
(v2 -> v3).

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.11+
URL: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/50452
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/ceph/auth_x.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/ceph/auth_x.c
+++ b/net/ceph/auth_x.c
@@ -526,7 +526,7 @@ static int ceph_x_build_request(struct c
 		if (ret < 0)
 			return ret;
 
-		auth->struct_v = 2;  /* nautilus+ */
+		auth->struct_v = 3;  /* nautilus+ */
 		auth->key = 0;
 		for (u = (u64 *)enc_buf; u + 1 <= (u64 *)(enc_buf + ret); u++)
 			auth->key ^= *(__le64 *)u;