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Hallyn" , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/3] Allow access to confidential computing secret area To: Dov Murik , linux-efi@vger.kernel.org References: <20210513062634.2481118-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com> From: Brijesh Singh Message-ID: <2c8ae998-6dd0-bcb9-f735-e90da05ab9d9@amd.com> Date: Fri, 14 May 2021 08:01:12 -0500 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/78.10.0 In-Reply-To: <20210513062634.2481118-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Language: en-US X-Originating-IP: [70.112.153.56] X-ClientProxiedBy: SN4PR0601CA0015.namprd06.prod.outlook.com (2603:10b6:803:2f::25) To SN6PR12MB2718.namprd12.prod.outlook.com (2603:10b6:805:6f::22) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-MS-Exchange-MessageSentRepresentingType: 1 Received: from Brijeshs-MacBook-Pro.local (70.112.153.56) by SN4PR0601CA0015.namprd06.prod.outlook.com (2603:10b6:803:2f::25) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id 15.20.4108.32 via Frontend Transport; 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In SEV, > secret injection is performed early in the VM launch process, before the > guest starts running. > > Support for secret injection is already available in OVMF (in its AmdSev > package; see edk2 commit 01726b6d23d4 "OvmfPkg/AmdSev: Expose the Sev > Secret area using a configuration table" [1]), but the secrets were not > available in the guest kernel. > > The patch series copies the secrets from the EFI-provided memory to > kernel reserved memory, and optionally exposes them to userspace via > securityfs using a new sev_secret kernel module. > > The first patch in efi/libstub copies the secret area from the EFI > memory to specially allocated memory; the second patch reserves that > memory block; and the third patch introduces the new sev_secret module > that exposes the content of the secret entries as securityfs files. > > This has been tested with AMD SEV guests, but the kernel side of > handling the secret area has no SEV-specific dependencies, and therefore > should be usable for any confidential computing hardware that can > publish the secret area via the standard EFI config table entry. > > Here is a simple example for usage of the sev_secret module in a guest to which > secrets were injected during launch: > > # modprobe sev_secret > # ls -la /sys/kernel/security/sev_secret > total 0 > drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 May 12 18:03 . > drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 May 12 18:02 .. > -r--r----- 1 root root 0 May 12 18:03 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b > -r--r----- 1 root root 0 May 12 18:03 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 > -r--r----- 1 root root 0 May 12 18:03 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 > -r--r----- 1 root root 0 May 12 18:03 e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 > > # xxd /sys/kernel/security/sev_secret/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 > 00000000: 7468 6573 652d 6172 652d 7468 652d 6b61 these-are-the-ka > 00000010: 7461 2d73 6563 7265 7473 0001 0203 0405 ta-secrets...... > 00000020: 0607 .. I am adding a new virt driver to help get the attestation report for the SEV-SNP guest. I understand they both are different, in case of the SEV the attestation is already completed and we are simply exposing the secret provided after the attestation to the userspace, whereas in SNP, the userspace is querying the attestation and will probably derive keys etc based on the attestation report. I am wondering if we should merge both the SEV secret and SNP attestation query in a single driver ? Should we cover usecases where SEV guest is not booted under the EFI ? Also, it appears that this driver need to be manually loaded, should we create a platform device so that the driver binds to platform device and use the resource structure to find the location of the secret data? I was trying to answer some of these questions SNP series. See these patches https://marc.info/?l=kvm&m=161978514019741&w=2 https://marc.info/?l=kvm&m=161978514119744&w=2 https://marc.info/?l=kvm&m=161978514219751&w=2 > > [1] https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/01726b6d23d4 > > > Cc: Laszlo Ersek > Cc: Ashish Kalra > Cc: Brijesh Singh > Cc: Tom Lendacky > Cc: James Bottomley > Cc: Ard Biesheuvel > Cc: James Morris > Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" > Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org > Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org > Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org > > Dov Murik (3): > efi/libstub: Copy confidential computing secret area > efi: Reserve confidential computing secret area > virt: Add sev_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets > > drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile | 2 +- > drivers/firmware/efi/confidential-computing.c | 41 +++ > drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 5 + > drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile | 3 +- > .../efi/libstub/confidential-computing.c | 68 +++++ > drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c | 2 + > drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h | 2 + > drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c | 2 + > drivers/virt/Kconfig | 2 + > drivers/virt/Makefile | 1 + > drivers/virt/sev_secret/Kconfig | 11 + > drivers/virt/sev_secret/Makefile | 2 + > drivers/virt/sev_secret/sev_secret.c | 260 ++++++++++++++++++ > include/linux/efi.h | 11 + > 14 files changed, 410 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/confidential-computing.c > create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/confidential-computing.c > create mode 100644 drivers/virt/sev_secret/Kconfig > create mode 100644 drivers/virt/sev_secret/Makefile > create mode 100644 drivers/virt/sev_secret/sev_secret.c > > > base-commit: c06a2ba62fc401b7aaefd23f5d0bc06d2457ccc1