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[23.128.96.18]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id a7si7145jat.120.2021.05.19.11.43.33; Wed, 19 May 2021 11:43:46 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=xmission.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S234074AbhERWrB (ORCPT + 99 others); Tue, 18 May 2021 18:47:01 -0400 Received: from out01.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.231]:45516 "EHLO out01.mta.xmission.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S233749AbhERWrB (ORCPT ); Tue, 18 May 2021 18:47:01 -0400 Received: from in01.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.51]) by out01.mta.xmission.com with esmtps (TLS1.2) tls TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (Exim 4.93) (envelope-from ) id 1lj8T1-00C3FV-Jh; Tue, 18 May 2021 16:45:35 -0600 Received: from ip68-227-160-95.om.om.cox.net ([68.227.160.95] helo=fess.xmission.com) by in01.mta.xmission.com with esmtpsa (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.87) (envelope-from ) id 1lj8Sz-0000jv-Fq; Tue, 18 May 2021 16:45:35 -0600 From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) To: Arnd Bergmann Cc: linux-arch , Christoph Hellwig , Alexander Viro , Andrew Morton , Borislav Petkov , Brian Gerst , Ingo Molnar , "H. Peter Anvin" , Thomas Gleixner , Linux ARM , Linux Kernel Mailing List , Linux-MM , kexec@lists.infradead.org References: <20210517203343.3941777-1-arnd@kernel.org> <20210517203343.3941777-2-arnd@kernel.org> Date: Tue, 18 May 2021 17:45:23 -0500 In-Reply-To: (Arnd Bergmann's message of "Tue, 18 May 2021 16:17:53 +0200") Message-ID: User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/26.1 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain X-XM-SPF: eid=1lj8Sz-0000jv-Fq;;;mid=;;;hst=in01.mta.xmission.com;;;ip=68.227.160.95;;;frm=ebiederm@xmission.com;;;spf=neutral X-XM-AID: U2FsdGVkX1/4EKDkInLXQv/kdxJtbD4q26Fyh8T6eMg= X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 68.227.160.95 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.2 (2018-09-13) on sa07.xmission.com X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.3 required=8.0 tests=ALL_TRUSTED,BAYES_50, DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE,T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG,T_TooManySym_01, XMGappySubj_01 autolearn=disabled version=3.4.2 X-Spam-Report: * -1.0 ALL_TRUSTED Passed through trusted hosts only via SMTP * 0.8 BAYES_50 BODY: Bayes spam probability is 40 to 60% * [score: 0.4999] * 0.5 XMGappySubj_01 Very gappy subject * 0.0 T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG BODY: No description available. * -0.0 DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE Not listed in DCC * [sa07 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1] * 0.0 T_TooManySym_01 4+ unique symbols in subject X-Spam-DCC: XMission; sa07 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1 X-Spam-Combo: ;Arnd Bergmann X-Spam-Relay-Country: X-Spam-Timing: total 1370 ms - load_scoreonly_sql: 0.05 (0.0%), signal_user_changed: 9 (0.7%), b_tie_ro: 8 (0.6%), parse: 1.39 (0.1%), extract_message_metadata: 20 (1.5%), get_uri_detail_list: 5 (0.4%), tests_pri_-1000: 22 (1.6%), tests_pri_-950: 1.27 (0.1%), tests_pri_-900: 1.10 (0.1%), tests_pri_-90: 649 (47.3%), check_bayes: 646 (47.1%), b_tokenize: 16 (1.2%), b_tok_get_all: 527 (38.5%), b_comp_prob: 3.1 (0.2%), b_tok_touch_all: 96 (7.0%), b_finish: 0.87 (0.1%), tests_pri_0: 638 (46.6%), check_dkim_signature: 0.73 (0.1%), check_dkim_adsp: 2.0 (0.1%), poll_dns_idle: 0.21 (0.0%), tests_pri_10: 3.4 (0.2%), tests_pri_500: 21 (1.6%), rewrite_mail: 0.00 (0.0%) Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/4] kexec: simplify compat_sys_kexec_load X-Spam-Flag: No X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Thu, 05 May 2016 13:38:54 -0600) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in01.mta.xmission.com) Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Arnd Bergmann writes: > On Tue, May 18, 2021 at 4:05 PM Arnd Bergmann wrote: >> >> On Tue, May 18, 2021 at 3:41 PM Eric W. Biederman wrote: >> > >> > Arnd Bergmann writes: >> > >> > > From: Arnd Bergmann KEXEC_ARCH_DEFAULT >> > > >> > > The compat version of sys_kexec_load() uses compat_alloc_user_space to >> > > convert the user-provided arguments into the native format. >> > > >> > > Move the conversion into the regular implementation with >> > > an in_compat_syscall() check to simplify it and avoid the >> > > compat_alloc_user_space() call. >> > > >> > > compat_sys_kexec_load() now behaves the same as sys_kexec_load(). >> > >> > Nacked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" >> >KEXEC_ARCH_DEFAULT >> > The patch is wrong. >> > >> > The logic between the compat entry point and the ordinary entry point >> > are by necessity different. This unifies the logic and breaks the compat >> > entry point. >> > >> > The fundamentally necessity is that the code being loaded needs to know >> > which mode the kernel is running in so it can safely transition to the >> > new kernel. >> > >> > Given that the two entry points fundamentally need different logic, >> > and that difference was not preserved and the goal of this patchset >> > was to unify that which fundamentally needs to be different. I don't >> > think this patch series makes any sense for kexec. >> >> Sorry, I'm not following that explanation. Can you clarify what different >> modes of the kernel you are referring to here, and how my patch >> changes this? I think something like the untested diff below is enough to get rid of compat_alloc_user cleanly. Certainly it should be enough to give any idea what I am thinking. diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c index c82c6c06f051..ce69a5d68023 100644 --- a/kernel/kexec.c +++ b/kernel/kexec.c @@ -19,26 +19,21 @@ #include "kexec_internal.h" -static int copy_user_segment_list(struct kimage *image, +static void copy_user_segment_list(struct kimage *image, unsigned long nr_segments, - struct kexec_segment __user *segments) + struct kexec_segment *segments) { - int ret; size_t segment_bytes; /* Read in the segments */ image->nr_segments = nr_segments; segment_bytes = nr_segments * sizeof(*segments); - ret = copy_from_user(image->segment, segments, segment_bytes); - if (ret) - ret = -EFAULT; - - return ret; + memcpy(image->segment, segments, segment_bytes); } static int kimage_alloc_init(struct kimage **rimage, unsigned long entry, unsigned long nr_segments, - struct kexec_segment __user *segments, + struct kexec_segment *segments, unsigned long flags) { int ret; @@ -59,9 +54,7 @@ static int kimage_alloc_init(struct kimage **rimage, unsigned long entry, image->start = entry; - ret = copy_user_segment_list(image, nr_segments, segments); - if (ret) - goto out_free_image; + copy_user_segment_list(image, nr_segments, segments); if (kexec_on_panic) { /* Enable special crash kernel control page alloc policy. */ @@ -103,8 +96,8 @@ static int kimage_alloc_init(struct kimage **rimage, unsigned long entry, return ret; } -static int do_kexec_load(unsigned long entry, unsigned long nr_segments, - struct kexec_segment __user *segments, unsigned long flags) +static int do_kexec_load_locked(unsigned long entry, unsigned long nr_segments, + struct kexec_segment *segments, unsigned long flags) { struct kimage **dest_image, *image; unsigned long i; @@ -174,6 +167,27 @@ static int do_kexec_load(unsigned long entry, unsigned long nr_segments, return ret; } +static int do_kexec_load(unsigned long entry, unsigned long nr_segments, + struct kexec_segment *segments, unsigned long flags) +{ + int result; + + /* Because we write directly to the reserved memory + * region when loading crash kernels we need a mutex here to + * prevent multiple crash kernels from attempting to load + * simultaneously, and to prevent a crash kernel from loading + * over the top of a in use crash kernel. + * + * KISS: always take the mutex. + */ + if (!mutex_trylock(&kexec_mutex)) + return -EBUSY; + + result = do_kexec_load_locked(entry, nr_segments, segments, flags); + mutex_unlock(&kexec_mutex); + return result; +} + /* * Exec Kernel system call: for obvious reasons only root may call it. * @@ -224,6 +238,11 @@ static inline int kexec_load_check(unsigned long nr_segments, if ((flags & KEXEC_FLAGS) != (flags & ~KEXEC_ARCH_MASK)) return -EINVAL; + /* Verify we are on the appropriate architecture */ + if (((flags & KEXEC_ARCH_MASK) != KEXEC_ARCH) && + ((flags & KEXEC_ARCH_MASK) != KEXEC_ARCH_DEFAULT)) + return -EINVAL; + /* Put an artificial cap on the number * of segments passed to kexec_load. */ @@ -236,33 +255,29 @@ static inline int kexec_load_check(unsigned long nr_segments, SYSCALL_DEFINE4(kexec_load, unsigned long, entry, unsigned long, nr_segments, struct kexec_segment __user *, segments, unsigned long, flags) { - int result; + struct kexec_segment *ksegments; + unsigned long bytes, result; result = kexec_load_check(nr_segments, flags); if (result) return result; - /* Verify we are on the appropriate architecture */ - if (((flags & KEXEC_ARCH_MASK) != KEXEC_ARCH) && - ((flags & KEXEC_ARCH_MASK) != KEXEC_ARCH_DEFAULT)) - return -EINVAL; - - /* Because we write directly to the reserved memory - * region when loading crash kernels we need a mutex here to - * prevent multiple crash kernels from attempting to load - * simultaneously, and to prevent a crash kernel from loading - * over the top of a in use crash kernel. - * - * KISS: always take the mutex. - */ - if (!mutex_trylock(&kexec_mutex)) - return -EBUSY; + bytes = nr_segments * sizeof(ksegments[0]); + ksegments = kmalloc(bytes, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ksegments) + return -ENOMEM; + result = copy_from_user(ksegments, segments, bytes); + if (result) + goto fail; + result = do_kexec_load(entry, nr_segments, segments, flags); + kfree(ksegments); - mutex_unlock(&kexec_mutex); - +fail: + kfree(ksegments); return result; + } #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT @@ -272,9 +287,9 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE4(kexec_load, compat_ulong_t, entry, compat_ulong_t, flags) { struct compat_kexec_segment in; - struct kexec_segment out, __user *ksegments; - unsigned long i, result; - + struct kexec_segment *ksegments; + unsigned long bytes, i, result; + result = kexec_load_check(nr_segments, flags); if (result) return result; @@ -285,37 +300,26 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE4(kexec_load, compat_ulong_t, entry, if ((flags & KEXEC_ARCH_MASK) == KEXEC_ARCH_DEFAULT) return -EINVAL; - ksegments = compat_alloc_user_space(nr_segments * sizeof(out)); + bytes = nr_segments * sizeof(ksegments[0]); + ksegments = kmalloc(bytes, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ksegments) + return -ENOMEM; + for (i = 0; i < nr_segments; i++) { result = copy_from_user(&in, &segments[i], sizeof(in)); if (result) - return -EFAULT; - - out.buf = compat_ptr(in.buf); - out.bufsz = in.bufsz; - out.mem = in.mem; - out.memsz = in.memsz; + goto fail; - result = copy_to_user(&ksegments[i], &out, sizeof(out)); - if (result) - return -EFAULT; + ksegments[i].buf = compat_ptr(in.buf); + ksegments[i].bufsz = in.bufsz; + ksegments[i].mem = in.mem; + ksegments[i].memsz = in.memsz; } - /* Because we write directly to the reserved memory - * region when loading crash kernels we need a mutex here to - * prevent multiple crash kernels from attempting to load - * simultaneously, and to prevent a crash kernel from loading - * over the top of a in use crash kernel. - * - * KISS: always take the mutex. - */ - if (!mutex_trylock(&kexec_mutex)) - return -EBUSY; - result = do_kexec_load(entry, nr_segments, ksegments, flags); - mutex_unlock(&kexec_mutex); - +fail: + kfree(ksegments); return result; } #endif