Received: by 2002:a05:6a10:206:0:0:0:0 with SMTP id 6csp321321pxj; Thu, 27 May 2021 00:33:10 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJxPSLZpYZpVXqrdqkQ0Ppn92tAaZWFgNAUlToCeX027RZUWZyj7S9QN68JZTr3rhnarCCzx X-Received: by 2002:a5d:83ce:: with SMTP id u14mr1788756ior.45.1622100790208; Thu, 27 May 2021 00:33:10 -0700 (PDT) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1622100790; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=pZ8ChpOQp21eNHOTxdIkkkBFRPUqw9VFqOMQRvyPARDMW07zGQYYTIa2eDRWmIv8xA nJKjHk5cDLHoHmHLG9L4yYMRpPCSXnA4NHUeQhQAEp2Ss47ryZsh6L/gNRlEjfFKW9SZ 0Asue3rB1p1RedyUJgGpzTqaQxgXQAAPadpRRz7RUpyewW47oLNt7U1zVnPyXhY9a+95 EAjiurmwN9FQNkLl+cP1St92IeOG1A5DGF43S9u9oLgopG1K5B7DJFm4sXxMoOSQ5Z4s LpQf/l2TAoSHtEJxzOtevbWD6xjhLDxHtIKRUqGCgDSHsUVDgvjUODqHsZLUm62DQJFT 0fEg== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:content-transfer-encoding:content-language :in-reply-to:mime-version:user-agent:date:message-id:from:references :cc:to:subject; bh=d4IUgEKsBAGX/7IIclWqCMVPY2tuSnEnRzrjbAcszCg=; b=MbTjncNA+xTgCZbwHd3PMurtjicQR501s+0P5KGNPB7BI0SF5JA0sfb2sO21EJrkk4 Qp3RlbAqyiaUjMmIjn65PPMOA4NGM6BfB5ph0mMJsSOjqKA0m8aLfEPQKjFtJnNMRacC tp28/1Ky97HHdyUZTL6VbAZ6bWFeBIptLhK49D2x9rNCiTUmjEW5L4vXDCz9wfCgHHAh gp2HAbBNsYHaRMr8DMha4RKwMGd00CGSJRrdwML1pAefrcbXNYVblZefrdTqWOheqYrW /SZcRmevviPves1pYCDLelTt9Q+9Xx+czdYKZtbnqgXZhQMPvW3Gq7u8gc5W6CbJEvAH OvpQ== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Return-Path: Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org. [23.128.96.18]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id l11si1940532jaj.50.2021.05.27.00.32.56; Thu, 27 May 2021 00:33:10 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S234061AbhE0HA6 (ORCPT + 99 others); Thu, 27 May 2021 03:00:58 -0400 Received: from www262.sakura.ne.jp ([202.181.97.72]:62013 "EHLO www262.sakura.ne.jp" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232416AbhE0HA4 (ORCPT ); Thu, 27 May 2021 03:00:56 -0400 Received: from fsav405.sakura.ne.jp (fsav405.sakura.ne.jp [133.242.250.104]) by www262.sakura.ne.jp (8.15.2/8.15.2) with ESMTP id 14R6xDM8046659; Thu, 27 May 2021 15:59:13 +0900 (JST) (envelope-from penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp) Received: from www262.sakura.ne.jp (202.181.97.72) by fsav405.sakura.ne.jp (F-Secure/fsigk_smtp/550/fsav405.sakura.ne.jp); Thu, 27 May 2021 15:59:13 +0900 (JST) X-Virus-Status: clean(F-Secure/fsigk_smtp/550/fsav405.sakura.ne.jp) Received: from [192.168.1.9] (M106072142033.v4.enabler.ne.jp [106.72.142.33]) (authenticated bits=0) by www262.sakura.ne.jp (8.15.2/8.15.2) with ESMTPSA id 14R6xCVq046654 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NO); Thu, 27 May 2021 15:59:13 +0900 (JST) (envelope-from penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp) Subject: Re: [syzbot] unexpected kernel reboot (5) To: Dmitry Vyukov , syzbot , Joey Jiao Cc: LKML , syzkaller-bugs References: <000000000000b808c705c345b35d@google.com> <0000000000009dfd7c05c3463b32@google.com> From: Tetsuo Handa Message-ID: Date: Thu, 27 May 2021 15:59:12 +0900 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; Win64; x64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/78.10.2 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 2021/05/27 15:40, Dmitry Vyukov wrote: > The reproducer writes into /sys/power/state. I assume this is an > intentional way to reboot a machine and we can't let the fuzzer mess > with all sysfs files with: > > openat$sysfs(fd const[AT_FDCWD], dir ptr[in, glob["/sys/**/*"]], flags > flags[open_flags], mode flags[open_mode]) fd > > +Joey, how do you deal with this? > I have CaitSith LSM module ( https://caitsith.osdn.jp/#5.2 ). Maybe we could invent a simple LSM module for excluding access to specific pseudo files?