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To:     Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
        Olivier Langlois <olivier@trillion01.com>
Cc:     Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>, Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, io-uring@vger.kernel.org,
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From:   Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] io_uring: Add to traces the req pointer when available
Message-ID: <6fd74635-d3a8-7319-bcc6-c2c1de9c87ee@gmail.com>
Date:   Sat, 29 May 2021 13:30:31 +0100
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On 5/28/21 11:42 PM, Steven Rostedt wrote:
> On Wed, 26 May 2021 12:18:37 -0400
> Olivier Langlois <olivier@trillion01.com> wrote:
> 
>>> If that gets changed, could be also include the personality id and
>>> flags here,
>>> and maybe also translated the opcode and flags to human readable
>>> strings?
>>>   
>> If Jens and Pavel agrees that they would like to see this info in the
>> traces, I have no objection adding it.
>>
>> Still waiting input from Steven Rostedt which I believe is the trace
>> system maintainer concerning the hash-ptr situation.
>>
>> I did receive an auto-respond from him saying that he was in vacation
>> until May 28th...
> 
> Yep, I'm back now.
> 
> Here's how it works using your patch as an example:
> 
>>  	TP_fast_assign(
>>  		__entry->ctx		= ctx;
>> +		__entry->req		= req;
> 
> The "__entry" is a structure defined by TP_STRUCT__entry() that is located
> on the ring buffer that can be read directly by user space (aka trace-cmd).
> So yes, that value is never hashed, and one of the reasons that tracefs
> requires root privilege to read it.
> 
>>  		__entry->opcode		= opcode;
>>  		__entry->user_data	= user_data;
>>  		__entry->force_nonblock	= force_nonblock;
>>  		__entry->sq_thread	= sq_thread;
>>  	),
>>  
>> -	TP_printk("ring %p, op %d, data 0x%llx, non block %d, sq_thread %d",
>> -			  __entry->ctx, __entry->opcode,
>> -			  (unsigned long long) __entry->user_data,
>> -			  __entry->force_nonblock, __entry->sq_thread)
>> +	TP_printk("ring %p, req %p, op %d, data 0x%llx, non block %d, "
>> +		  "sq_thread %d",  __entry->ctx, __entry->req,
>> +		  __entry->opcode, (unsigned long long)__entry->user_data,
>> +		  __entry->force_nonblock, __entry->sq_thread)
>>  );
> 
> The TP_printk() macro *is* used when reading the "trace" or "trace_pipe"
> file, and that uses vsnprintf() to process it. Which will hash the values
> for %p (by default, because that's what it always did when vsnprintf()
> started hashing values).
> 
> Masami Hiramatsu added the hash-ptr option (which I told him to be the
> default as that was the behavior before that option was created), where the
> use could turn off the hashing.
> 
> There's lots of trace events that expose the raw pointers when hash-ptr is
> off or if the ring buffers are read via the trace_pip_raw interface.
> 
> What's special about these pointers to hash them before they are recorded?

io_uring offers all different operations and has internal request/memory
recycling, so it may be an easy vector of attack in case of some
vulnerabilities found, but nothing special. As that's the status quo,
I wouldn't care, let's put aside my concerns and print them raw.

-- 
Pavel Begunkov