Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18;
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        stable@vger.kernel.org, Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be>,
        Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5.4 014/177] mac80211: assure all fragments are encrypted
Date:   Mon, 31 May 2021 15:12:51 +0200
Message-Id: <20210531130648.400682153@linuxfoundation.org>
In-Reply-To: <20210531130647.887605866@linuxfoundation.org>
References: <20210531130647.887605866@linuxfoundation.org>
User-Agent: quilt/0.66
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Precedence: bulk

From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be>

commit 965a7d72e798eb7af0aa67210e37cf7ecd1c9cad upstream.

Do not mix plaintext and encrypted fragments in protected Wi-Fi
networks. This fixes CVE-2020-26147.

Previously, an attacker was able to first forward a legitimate encrypted
fragment towards a victim, followed by a plaintext fragment. The
encrypted and plaintext fragment would then be reassembled. For further
details see Section 6.3 and Appendix D in the paper "Fragment and Forge:
Breaking Wi-Fi Through Frame Aggregation and Fragmentation".

Because of this change there are now two equivalent conditions in the
code to determine if a received fragment requires sequential PNs, so we
also move this test to a separate function to make the code easier to
maintain.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.30c4394bb835.I5acfdb552cc1d20c339c262315950b3eac491397@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/mac80211/rx.c |   23 ++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

--- a/net/mac80211/rx.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c
@@ -2154,6 +2154,16 @@ ieee80211_reassemble_find(struct ieee802
 	return NULL;
 }
 
+static bool requires_sequential_pn(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx, __le16 fc)
+{
+	return rx->key &&
+		(rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP ||
+		 rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256 ||
+		 rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP ||
+		 rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256) &&
+		ieee80211_has_protected(fc);
+}
+
 static ieee80211_rx_result debug_noinline
 ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 {
@@ -2198,12 +2208,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802
 		/* This is the first fragment of a new frame. */
 		entry = ieee80211_reassemble_add(rx->sdata, frag, seq,
 						 rx->seqno_idx, &(rx->skb));
-		if (rx->key &&
-		    (rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP ||
-		     rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256 ||
-		     rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP ||
-		     rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256) &&
-		    ieee80211_has_protected(fc)) {
+		if (requires_sequential_pn(rx, fc)) {
 			int queue = rx->security_idx;
 
 			/* Store CCMP/GCMP PN so that we can verify that the
@@ -2245,11 +2250,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802
 		u8 pn[IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN], *rpn;
 		int queue;
 
-		if (!rx->key ||
-		    (rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP &&
-		     rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256 &&
-		     rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP &&
-		     rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256))
+		if (!requires_sequential_pn(rx, fc))
 			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 		memcpy(pn, entry->last_pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
 		for (i = IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN - 1; i >= 0; i--) {