Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S932088AbWKCUaq (ORCPT ); Fri, 3 Nov 2006 15:30:46 -0500 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1753527AbWKCUap (ORCPT ); Fri, 3 Nov 2006 15:30:45 -0500 Received: from zombie.ncsc.mil ([144.51.88.131]:37852 "EHLO jazzdrum.ncsc.mil") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753524AbWKCUao (ORCPT ); Fri, 3 Nov 2006 15:30:44 -0500 Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] security: introduce fs caps From: Stephen Smalley To: "Serge E. Hallyn" Cc: 20060906182719.GB24670@sergelap.austin.ibm.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org In-Reply-To: <20061103200011.GA2206@sergelap.austin.ibm.com> References: <20061103175730.87f55ff8.chris@friedhoff.org> <20061103200011.GA2206@sergelap.austin.ibm.com> Content-Type: text/plain Organization: National Security Agency Date: Fri, 03 Nov 2006 15:29:57 -0500 Message-Id: <1162585797.5519.175.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Evolution 2.8.1.1 (2.8.1.1-3.fc6) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1578 Lines: 37 On Fri, 2006-11-03 at 14:00 -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > Quoting chris friedhoff (chris@friedhoff.org): > > The patch applies cleanly , compiles and runs smoothly against 2.6.18.1. > > > > I'm running slackware-current with a 2.6.18.1 kernel on an ext3 > > filesystem. > > > > Background why I use the patch: > > With 2.6.18 to create a tuntap interface CAP_NET_ADMIN is required. > > Qemu uses tuntap to create a tap interface as a virtual net interface. > > Instead now running qemu with root privileges to give it the right > > to create a tap interface, i granted qemu with the help of the patch and > > Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools the cap-net_admin capability. So qemu > > runs again without root privilege but has now the right to create the > > tap interface. > > > > Thanks for the patch. It reduces my the need of suid-bit progs. > > It should be given a spin in -mm. > > One question is, if this were to be tested in -mm, do we want to keep > this mutually exclusive from selinux through config, or should selinux > stack on top of this? Given that SELinux already stacks with capability and you aren't using the security fields (last I looked), it would seem trivial to enable stacking with fscaps (just add a few secondary_ops calls to the SELinux hooks, right?). -- Stephen Smalley National Security Agency - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/