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Date:   Tue, 8 Jun 2021 11:04:49 -0400
From:   Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
To:     Sergey Nazarov <s-nazarov@yandex.ru>
Cc:     Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>, linux-audit@redhat.com,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] audit: Rename enum audit_state constants to avoid
 AUDIT_DISABLED redefinition
Message-ID: <20210608150449.GC2268484@madcap2.tricolour.ca>
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On 2021-06-08 09:32, Sergey Nazarov wrote:
> AUDIT_DISABLED defined in kernel/audit.h as element of enum audit_state
> and redefined in kernel/audit.c. This produces a warning when kernel builds
> with syscalls audit disabled and brokes kernel build if -Werror used.
> enum audit_state used in syscall audit code only. This patch changes
> enum audit_state constants prefix AUDIT to AUDIT_STATE to avoid
> AUDIT_DISABLED redefinition.
> 
> v2: the comments of Richard Guy Briggs and Paul Moore were taken into account
> 
> Signed-off-by: Sergey Nazarov <s-nazarov@yandex.ru>

Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>

> ---
>  kernel/audit.h   |  8 ++++----
>  kernel/auditsc.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++-----------------
>  2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
> index 1522e10..e518ad9 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.h
> +++ b/kernel/audit.h
> @@ -21,16 +21,16 @@
>     a per-task filter.  At syscall entry, the audit_state is augmented by
>     the syscall filter. */
>  enum audit_state {
> -	AUDIT_DISABLED,		/* Do not create per-task audit_context.
> +	AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED,	/* Do not create per-task audit_context.
>  				 * No syscall-specific audit records can
>  				 * be generated. */
> -	AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT,	/* Create the per-task audit_context,
> +	AUDIT_STATE_BUILD,	/* Create the per-task audit_context,
>  				 * and fill it in at syscall
>  				 * entry time.  This makes a full
>  				 * syscall record available if some
>  				 * other part of the kernel decides it
>  				 * should be recorded. */
> -	AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT	/* Create the per-task audit_context,
> +	AUDIT_STATE_RECORD	/* Create the per-task audit_context,
>  				 * always fill it in at syscall entry
>  				 * time, and always write out the audit
>  				 * record at syscall exit time.  */
> @@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ static inline int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> -#define audit_filter_inodes(t, c) AUDIT_DISABLED
> +#define audit_filter_inodes(t, c) AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED
>  #endif /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */
>  
>  extern char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len);
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index 175ef6f..92ca5a2 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
>  {
>  	if (!ctx->prio) {
>  		ctx->prio = 1;
> -		ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
> +		ctx->current_state = AUDIT_STATE_RECORD;
>  	}
>  }
>  
> @@ -751,10 +751,10 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
>  	}
>  	switch (rule->action) {
>  	case AUDIT_NEVER:
> -		*state = AUDIT_DISABLED;
> +		*state = AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED;
>  		break;
>  	case AUDIT_ALWAYS:
> -		*state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
> +		*state = AUDIT_STATE_RECORD;
>  		break;
>  	}
>  	return 1;
> @@ -773,14 +773,14 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
>  	list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
>  		if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL,
>  				       &state, true)) {
> -			if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
> +			if (state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
>  				*key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
>  			rcu_read_unlock();
>  			return state;
>  		}
>  	}
>  	rcu_read_unlock();
> -	return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
> +	return AUDIT_STATE_BUILD;
>  }
>  
>  static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val)
> @@ -802,7 +802,7 @@ static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val)
>  /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if the audit_state is
>   * not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is also not
>   * high enough that we already know we have to write an audit record
> - * (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
> + * (i.e., the state is AUDIT_STATE_BUILD).
>   */
>  static void audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
>  				 struct audit_context *ctx)
> @@ -923,7 +923,7 @@ static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
>  	if (!context)
>  		return NULL;
>  	context->state = state;
> -	context->prio = state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
> +	context->prio = state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD ? ~0ULL : 0;
>  	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees);
>  	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->names_list);
>  	context->fds[0] = -1;
> @@ -950,7 +950,7 @@ int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
>  		return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
>  
>  	state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key);
> -	if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED) {
> +	if (state == AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED) {
>  		clear_task_syscall_work(tsk, SYSCALL_AUDIT);
>  		return 0;
>  	}
> @@ -1628,7 +1628,7 @@ void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
>  
>  		audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context);
>  		audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
> -		if (context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
> +		if (context->current_state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
>  			audit_log_exit();
>  	}
>  
> @@ -1647,7 +1647,7 @@ void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
>   * Fill in audit context at syscall entry.  This only happens if the
>   * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
>   * filters demand the audit context be built.  If the state from the
> - * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
> + * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_STATE_RECORD,
>   * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
>   * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
>   * be written).
> @@ -1664,11 +1664,11 @@ void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
>  	BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
>  
>  	state = context->state;
> -	if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
> +	if (state == AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED)
>  		return;
>  
>  	context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
> -	if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) {
> +	if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_STATE_BUILD) {
>  		context->prio = 0;
>  		if (auditd_test_task(current))
>  			return;
> @@ -1693,7 +1693,7 @@ void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
>   * @return_code: return value of the syscall
>   *
>   * Tear down after system call.  If the audit context has been marked as
> - * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
> + * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_STATE_RECORD state from
>   * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel wrote an audit
>   * message), then write out the syscall information.  In call cases,
>   * free the names stored from getname().
> @@ -1735,12 +1735,12 @@ void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
>  
>  		audit_filter_syscall(current, context);
>  		audit_filter_inodes(current, context);
> -		if (context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
> +		if (context->current_state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
>  			audit_log_exit();
>  	}
>  
>  	context->in_syscall = 0;
> -	context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
> +	context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD ? ~0ULL : 0;
>  
>  	audit_free_module(context);
>  	audit_free_names(context);
> @@ -1753,7 +1753,7 @@ void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
>  	context->sockaddr_len = 0;
>  	context->type = 0;
>  	context->fds[0] = -1;
> -	if (context->state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
> +	if (context->state != AUDIT_STATE_RECORD) {
>  		kfree(context->filterkey);
>  		context->filterkey = NULL;
>  	}
> @@ -2203,7 +2203,7 @@ int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
>  	*serial    = ctx->serial;
>  	if (!ctx->prio) {
>  		ctx->prio = 1;
> -		ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
> +		ctx->current_state = AUDIT_STATE_RECORD;
>  	}
>  	return 1;
>  }
> -- 
> 1.8.3.1
> 
> 
> --
> Linux-audit mailing list
> Linux-audit@redhat.com
> https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit

- RGB

--
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635