Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1754743AbWKIGUx (ORCPT ); Thu, 9 Nov 2006 01:20:53 -0500 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1754740AbWKIGUx (ORCPT ); Thu, 9 Nov 2006 01:20:53 -0500 Received: from e33.co.us.ibm.com ([32.97.110.151]:38348 "EHLO e33.co.us.ibm.com") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754732AbWKIGUv (ORCPT ); Thu, 9 Nov 2006 01:20:51 -0500 Date: Thu, 9 Nov 2006 00:10:21 -0600 From: "Serge E. Hallyn" To: "Serge E. Hallyn" Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Stephen Smalley , James Morris , Chris Wright , Andrew Morton , KaiGai Kohei , Chris Friedhoff , Alexey Dobriyan Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] security: introduce fs caps Message-ID: <20061109061021.GA32696@sergelap.austin.ibm.com> References: <20061108222453.GA6408@sergelap.austin.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20061108222453.GA6408@sergelap.austin.ibm.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.13 (2006-08-11) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 4326 Lines: 148 Sorry, I should have noticed and fixed this much sooner. This patch is against the latest full fscaps patch which I'm replying to. From: Serge E. Hallyn Date: Thu, 9 Nov 2006 00:01:49 -0600 Subject: security: file caps: fix unused variable warnings Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper function. Rename vfs_cap_data_struct to remove redundant '_struct'. Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn --- security/commoncap.c | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------- 1 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 6f5e46c..4b50b4d 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -109,16 +109,17 @@ void cap_capset_set (struct task_struct target->cap_permitted = *permitted; } +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FS_CAPABILITIES #define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability" #define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX -struct vfs_cap_data_struct { +struct vfs_cap_data { __u32 version; __u32 effective; __u32 permitted; __u32 inheritable; }; -static inline void convert_to_le(struct vfs_cap_data_struct *cap) +static inline void convert_to_le(struct vfs_cap_data *cap) { cap->version = le32_to_cpu(cap->version); cap->effective = le32_to_cpu(cap->effective); @@ -126,7 +127,7 @@ static inline void convert_to_le(struct cap->inheritable = le32_to_cpu(cap->inheritable); } -static int check_cap_sanity(struct vfs_cap_data_struct *cap) +static int check_cap_sanity(struct vfs_cap_data *cap) { int i; @@ -149,39 +150,14 @@ static int check_cap_sanity(struct vfs_c return 0; } -int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm) +/* Locate any VFS capabilities: */ +static int set_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { struct dentry *dentry; ssize_t rc; - struct vfs_cap_data_struct cap_struct; + struct vfs_cap_data cap_struct; struct inode *inode; - /* Copied from fs/exec.c:prepare_binprm. */ - - cap_clear (bprm->cap_inheritable); - cap_clear (bprm->cap_permitted); - cap_clear (bprm->cap_effective); - - /* To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root - * executables under compatibility mode, we raise all three - * capability sets for the file. - * - * If only the real uid is 0, we only raise the inheritable - * and permitted sets of the executable file. - */ - - if (!issecure (SECURE_NOROOT)) { - if (bprm->e_uid == 0 || current->uid == 0) { - cap_set_full (bprm->cap_inheritable); - cap_set_full (bprm->cap_permitted); - } - if (bprm->e_uid == 0) - cap_set_full (bprm->cap_effective); - } - -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FS_CAPABILITIES - /* Locate any VFS capabilities: */ - dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry); inode = dentry->d_inode; if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr) { @@ -216,9 +192,42 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FS_CAPABILITIES bprm->cap_permitted = cap_struct.permitted; bprm->cap_inheritable = cap_struct.inheritable; -#endif return 0; } +#else +static int set_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif + +int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + /* Copied from fs/exec.c:prepare_binprm. */ + + cap_clear (bprm->cap_inheritable); + cap_clear (bprm->cap_permitted); + cap_clear (bprm->cap_effective); + + /* To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root + * executables under compatibility mode, we raise all three + * capability sets for the file. + * + * If only the real uid is 0, we only raise the inheritable + * and permitted sets of the executable file. + */ + + if (!issecure (SECURE_NOROOT)) { + if (bprm->e_uid == 0 || current->uid == 0) { + cap_set_full (bprm->cap_inheritable); + cap_set_full (bprm->cap_permitted); + } + if (bprm->e_uid == 0) + cap_set_full (bprm->cap_effective); + } + + return set_file_caps(bprm); +} void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe) { -- 1.4.1 - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/