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Date: Mon, 21 Jun 2021 08:29:44 -0700 Message-ID: Subject: Re: LockDown that allows read of /dev/mem ? To: "Enrico Weigelt, metux IT consult" Cc: linux-kernel Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Lockdown required by secure boot and shim signing (prevent acpi patching), root because it's main use is a utility boot disk. If lockdown could be forced when secure boot active but not when not active, that be best, but I'm not seeing that option. The other option maybe to modify open_port on mem.c to do the secure boot check. However searching EFI_SECURE_BOOT doesn't exist in 5.10.x as in efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT) - It appears that is some other patch that is not applied to the base, I do see struct boot_params has a secure_boot field set, but can I access that from mem.c? If not, is efi_get_secureboot() function available when /drivers/char/mem.c may be used? On Mon, Jun 21, 2021 at 3:27 AM Enrico Weigelt, metux IT consult wrote: > > On 20.06.21 01:55, David F. wrote: > > > I'm finding that LockDown Integrity prevents blocks things like mdadm, > > Xvesa, and a couple of my specialized tools. There should be an > > option to allow /dev/mem read access. Is there? There are no secrets > > to the boot disk booted environment it's all root. > > Looks like conflict of goals. lockdown is used in scenarios where one > really doesn't take any chance that code running w/ root privileges can > do such things (there's a lot of security critical information one can > learn from reading the raw memory). > > I wonder what your actual use case is. > > * why are you using lockdown and also running everything as root ? > * why are you still using the old Xvesa instead of using KMS or > framebuffer device ? > * why does mdadm want to access /dev/mem ? > > > > --mtx > > -- > --- > Hinweis: unverschl=C3=BCsselte E-Mails k=C3=B6nnen leicht abgeh=C3=B6rt u= nd manipuliert > werden ! F=C3=BCr eine vertrauliche Kommunikation senden Sie bitte ihren > GPG/PGP-Schl=C3=BCssel zu. > --- > Enrico Weigelt, metux IT consult > Free software and Linux embedded engineering > info@metux.net -- +49-151-27565287