Received: by 2002:a05:6a10:206:0:0:0:0 with SMTP id 6csp3932684pxj; Mon, 21 Jun 2021 09:39:25 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJx0kzF9XXvT92Y8wjdOXg6t0vzgAVrmzxgLGCvm9ElDpAFwQ9FWeZoqh1mGGSpJLPkV6935 X-Received: by 2002:a17:906:1f11:: with SMTP id w17mr25532709ejj.33.1624293564906; Mon, 21 Jun 2021 09:39:24 -0700 (PDT) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1624293564; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=StT7U8k8YfDjTEmcD29rP6dcbw/Tl/uC+UvyW/bzWpqFzFqixec63HHBjDyohoNB/C lmLRAtWSBQnBufsBXvaWdEqcCN9nNekX4LvfuogIMzfaQeiAgcGTOYybQ3G2TENjdxww MM42DdDDl/KOa0WcKu821fGJ0UfYO6GBzRB2J2Eo/e6rhbHbBJbuzvFVyPbO7W25tAL1 Xnw2v67yK2b+rR2rGMlNKvHQXzQwyNpoEKWpoTpY30txM+6ZzTcxJkBsifJxxQu1yS2Z yhAeekqc3bQiGD8uRE0MFviF7jUpFatzb0U8h17B4hb7wi7xXi9GV44V2D+S7FK4fQOy Ca8A== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:content-transfer-encoding:mime-version :user-agent:references:in-reply-to:message-id:date:subject:cc:to :from:dkim-signature; bh=06tNv9FNl9dSUtjtCHPIAaYTedpLK3QzbusF2LG+Ri4=; b=cnRVKJ2pU1JbUkCV7P2vk5hMyWufI3ZjNCJlK8elRO9haWrZk44e4/yz972cuiloYi BHwbJnF/Hm9i4JMlpEslziuSn3eSckgEuLyP2pULYUs8YT5jz2UFuyqRltiwHcY3UALK 8kmGB+s3YmxlBm+oBDIeJNZGR5B9Ll0XD0yi+YA1UiB5IF9gL8YGjIoDBwR1JyE/a4F4 SHo3QbMFcyoohjly36Foa82Q1/v9ul6hu1+qGAZXwbrvsA83ZaH8sIdpx2rcx/fIiJFw KGyjuVHltWQsgV1IZu9xNwb1Vcv4TGFdVEoAUSn9hC98QwYi0QzARtU5dIoWKAnScA/K bONA== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.s=korg header.b=CkJIuG1Q; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=linuxfoundation.org Return-Path: Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org. [23.128.96.18]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id yl23si463022ejb.359.2021.06.21.09.39.02; Mon, 21 Jun 2021 09:39:24 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.s=korg header.b=CkJIuG1Q; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=linuxfoundation.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232854AbhFUQiF (ORCPT + 99 others); Mon, 21 Jun 2021 12:38:05 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:54996 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232566AbhFUQeI (ORCPT ); Mon, 21 Jun 2021 12:34:08 -0400 Received: by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id E9A5061414; Mon, 21 Jun 2021 16:26:47 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1624292808; bh=lS2lUA3grUOoSRY/ioMBN/mwW6gDaI39hv8gN4E5mV8=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=CkJIuG1Q+BhY9Q75oXVIvrOyQ9WnF97KZyMeKYhOYWIpdFbbSGf60uK25NMN/DASY QllPeDsn3Q1P/4ioc7N8UPd+WSMLjYuWSilZNFbp82v2UJndw29otJazxze6C9QmJY rsshsCZNcb1NLMZzFe7Vil+aBuatNzoC4GC9vngM= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Kees Cook , Vlastimil Babka , Christoph Lameter , David Rientjes , Joonsoo Kim , "Lin, Zhenpeng" , Marco Elver , Pekka Enberg , Roman Gushchin , Andrew Morton , Linus Torvalds Subject: [PATCH 5.10 138/146] mm/slub: fix redzoning for small allocations Date: Mon, 21 Jun 2021 18:16:08 +0200 Message-Id: <20210621154920.382615932@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.32.0 In-Reply-To: <20210621154911.244649123@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20210621154911.244649123@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Kees Cook commit 74c1d3e081533825f2611e46edea1fcdc0701985 upstream. The redzone area for SLUB exists between s->object_size and s->inuse (which is at least the word-aligned object_size). If a cache were created with an object_size smaller than sizeof(void *), the in-object stored freelist pointer would overwrite the redzone (e.g. with boot param "slub_debug=ZF"): BUG test (Tainted: G B ): Right Redzone overwritten ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- INFO: 0xffff957ead1c05de-0xffff957ead1c05df @offset=1502. First byte 0x1a instead of 0xbb INFO: Slab 0xffffef3950b47000 objects=170 used=170 fp=0x0000000000000000 flags=0x8000000000000200 INFO: Object 0xffff957ead1c05d8 @offset=1496 fp=0xffff957ead1c0620 Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb ........ Object (____ptrval____): f6 f4 a5 40 1d e8 ...@.. Redzone (____ptrval____): 1a aa .. Padding (____ptrval____): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........ Store the freelist pointer out of line when object_size is smaller than sizeof(void *) and redzoning is enabled. Additionally remove the "smaller than sizeof(void *)" check under CONFIG_DEBUG_VM in kmem_cache_sanity_check() as it is now redundant: SLAB and SLOB both handle small sizes. (Note that no caches within this size range are known to exist in the kernel currently.) Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608183955.280836-3-keescook@chromium.org Fixes: 81819f0fc828 ("SLUB core") Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka Cc: Christoph Lameter Cc: David Rientjes Cc: Joonsoo Kim Cc: "Lin, Zhenpeng" Cc: Marco Elver Cc: Pekka Enberg Cc: Roman Gushchin Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- mm/slab_common.c | 3 +-- mm/slub.c | 8 +++++--- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) --- a/mm/slab_common.c +++ b/mm/slab_common.c @@ -87,8 +87,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmem_cache_size); #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_VM static int kmem_cache_sanity_check(const char *name, unsigned int size) { - if (!name || in_interrupt() || size < sizeof(void *) || - size > KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE) { + if (!name || in_interrupt() || size > KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE) { pr_err("kmem_cache_create(%s) integrity check failed\n", name); return -EINVAL; } --- a/mm/slub.c +++ b/mm/slub.c @@ -3684,15 +3684,17 @@ static int calculate_sizes(struct kmem_c */ s->inuse = size; - if (((flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_POISON)) || - s->ctor)) { + if ((flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_POISON)) || + ((flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) && s->object_size < sizeof(void *)) || + s->ctor) { /* * Relocate free pointer after the object if it is not * permitted to overwrite the first word of the object on * kmem_cache_free. * * This is the case if we do RCU, have a constructor or - * destructor or are poisoning the objects. + * destructor, are poisoning the objects, or are + * redzoning an object smaller than sizeof(void *). * * The assumption that s->offset >= s->inuse means free * pointer is outside of the object is used in the