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Mon, 21 Jun 2021 21:51:59 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <000000000000c5b77105b4c3546e@google.com> <000000000000df47be05bf165394@google.com> <20210618040135.950-1-hdanton@sina.com> <23ba225593be391c384109af527bd0f3cb122a0d.camel@linux.ibm.com> In-Reply-To: <23ba225593be391c384109af527bd0f3cb122a0d.camel@linux.ibm.com> From: Amir Goldstein Date: Tue, 22 Jun 2021 07:51:47 +0300 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [syzbot] possible deadlock in ovl_maybe_copy_up To: Mimi Zohar Cc: Hillf Danton , syzbot , linux-kernel , syzkaller-bugs Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Tue, Jun 22, 2021 at 5:32 AM Mimi Zohar wrote: > > On Fri, 2021-06-18 at 12:01 +0800, Hillf Danton wrote: > > On Sun, 4 Apr 2021 11:10:48 +0300 Amir Goldstein wrote: > > >On Sat, Apr 3, 2021 at 10:18 PM syzbot wrote: > > >> > > >> syzbot has found a reproducer for the following issue on: > > >> > > >> HEAD commit: 454c576c Add linux-next specific files for 20210401 > > >> git tree: linux-next > > >> console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=1616e07ed00000 > > >> kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=920cc274cae812a5 > > >> dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c18f2f6a7b08c51e3025 > > >> syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=13da365ed00000 > > >> C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=13ca9d16d00000 > > >> > > >> IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit: > > >> Reported-by: syzbot+c18f2f6a7b08c51e3025@syzkaller.appspotmail.com > > >> > > >> ====================================================== > > >> WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected > > >> 5.12.0-rc5-next-20210401-syzkaller #0 Not tainted > > >> ------------------------------------------------------ > > >> syz-executor144/9166 is trying to acquire lock: > > >> ffff888144cf0460 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ovl_maybe_copy_up+0x11f/0x190 fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c:995 > > >> > > >> but task is already holding lock: > > >> ffff8880256d42c0 (&iint->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: process_measurement+0x3a8/0x17e0 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:253 > > >> > > >> which lock already depends on the new lock. > > >> > > >> > > >> the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: > > >> > > >> -> #1 (&iint->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: > > >> __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:949 [inline] > > >> __mutex_lock+0x139/0x1120 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1096 > > >> process_measurement+0x3a8/0x17e0 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:253 > > >> ima_file_check+0xb9/0x100 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:499 > > >> do_open fs/namei.c:3361 [inline] > > >> path_openat+0x15b5/0x27e0 fs/namei.c:3492 > > >> do_filp_open+0x17e/0x3c0 fs/namei.c:3519 > > >> do_sys_openat2+0x16d/0x420 fs/open.c:1187 > > >> do_sys_open fs/open.c:1203 [inline] > > >> __do_sys_open fs/open.c:1211 [inline] > > >> __se_sys_open fs/open.c:1207 [inline] > > >> __x64_sys_open+0x119/0x1c0 fs/open.c:1207 > > >> do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46 > > >> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae > > >> > > >> -> #0 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}: > > >> check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2938 [inline] > > >> check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3061 [inline] > > >> validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3676 [inline] > > >> __lock_acquire+0x2a17/0x5230 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4902 > > >> lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5512 [inline] > > >> lock_acquire+0x1ab/0x740 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5477 > > >> percpu_down_read include/linux/percpu-rwsem.h:51 [inline] > > >> __sb_start_write include/linux/fs.h:1758 [inline] > > >> sb_start_write include/linux/fs.h:1828 [inline] > > >> mnt_want_write+0x6e/0x3e0 fs/namespace.c:375 > > >> ovl_maybe_copy_up+0x11f/0x190 fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c:995 > > >> ovl_open+0xba/0x270 fs/overlayfs/file.c:149 > > >> do_dentry_open+0x4b9/0x11b0 fs/open.c:826 > > >> vfs_open fs/open.c:940 [inline] > > >> dentry_open+0x132/0x1d0 fs/open.c:956 > > >> ima_calc_file_hash+0x2d2/0x4b0 security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c:557 > > >> ima_collect_measurement+0x4ca/0x570 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c:252 > > >> process_measurement+0xd1c/0x17e0 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:330 > > >> ima_file_check+0xb9/0x100 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:499 > > >> do_open fs/namei.c:3361 [inline] > > >> path_openat+0x15b5/0x27e0 fs/namei.c:3492 > > >> do_filp_open+0x17e/0x3c0 fs/namei.c:3519 > > >> do_sys_openat2+0x16d/0x420 fs/open.c:1187 > > >> do_sys_open fs/open.c:1203 [inline] > > >> __do_sys_open fs/open.c:1211 [inline] > > >> __se_sys_open fs/open.c:1207 [inline] > > >> __x64_sys_open+0x119/0x1c0 fs/open.c:1207 > > >> do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46 > > >> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae > > >> > > >> other info that might help us debug this: > > >> > > >> Possible unsafe locking scenario: > > >> > > >> CPU0 CPU1 > > >> ---- ---- > > >> lock(&iint->mutex); > > >> lock(sb_writers#5); > > >> lock(&iint->mutex); > > >> lock(sb_writers#5); > > >> > > >> *** DEADLOCK *** > > >> > > >> 1 lock held by syz-executor144/9166: > > >> #0: ffff8880256d42c0 (&iint->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: process_measurement+0x3a8/0x17e0 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:253 > > >> > > > > It is reported again. > > https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/00000000000067d24205c4d0e599@google.com/ > > > > > >It's a false positive lockdep warning due to missing annotation of > > >stacking layer on iint->mutex in IMA code. > > > > Add it by copying what's created for ovl, see below. > > > > > >To fix it properly, iint->mutex, which can be taken in any of the > > >stacking fs layers, should be annotated with stacking depth like > > >ovl_lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key() > > > > > >I think it's the same root cause as: > > >https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=18a1619cceea30ed45af > > >https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ae82084b07d0297e566b > > > > > >I think both of the above were marked "fixed" by a paper over. > > >The latter was marked "fixed" by "ovl: detect overlapping layers" > > >but if you look at the repro, the fact that 'workdir' overlaps with > > >'lowerdir' has nothing to do with the lockdep warning, so said > > >"fix" just papered over the IMA lockdep warning. > > > > > >Thanks, > > >Amir. > > > > +++ x/security/integrity/iint.c > > @@ -85,6 +85,45 @@ static void iint_free(struct integrity_i > > kmem_cache_free(iint_cache, iint); > > } > > > > +/* > > + * a copy from ovl_lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key() in a bit to fix > > + > > + Possible unsafe locking scenario: > > + > > + CPU0 CPU1 > > + ---- ---- > > + lock(&iint->mutex); > > + lock(sb_writers#5); > > + lock(&iint->mutex); > > + lock(sb_writers#5); > > + > > + *** DEADLOCK *** > > + > > +It's a false positive lockdep warning due to missing annotation of > > +stacking layer on iint->mutex in IMA code. [1] > > + > > +[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-unionfs/CAOQ4uxjk4XYuwz5HCmN-Ge=Ld=tM1f7ZxVrd5U1AC2Wisc9MTA@mail.gmail.com/ > > +*/ > > +static void iint_annotate_mutex_key(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, > > + struct inode *inode) > > +{ > > +#ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP > > + static struct lock_class_key > > + iint_mutex_key[FILESYSTEM_MAX_STACK_DEPTH], > > + iint_mutex_dir_key[FILESYSTEM_MAX_STACK_DEPTH]; > > + > > + int depth = inode->i_sb->s_stack_depth - 1; > > + > > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(depth < 0 || depth >= FILESYSTEM_MAX_STACK_DEPTH)) > > + depth = 0; > > + > > + if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) > > + lockdep_set_class(&iint->mutex, &iint_mutex_dir_key[depth]); > > + else > > + lockdep_set_class(&iint->mutex, &iint_mutex_key[depth]); > > +#endif > > +} > > The iint cache is only for regular files. > > > + > > /** > > * integrity_inode_get - find or allocate an iint associated with an inode > > * @inode: pointer to the inode > > @@ -113,6 +152,7 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_i > > iint = kmem_cache_alloc(iint_cache, GFP_NOFS); > > if (!iint) > > return NULL; > > + iint_annotate_mutex_key(iint, inode); > > > > write_lock(&integrity_iint_lock); > > Should annotating the iint be limited to files on overlay filesystems? > Not to overlay files specifically but to files on stacked fs, i.e. (inode->i_sb->s_stack_depth > 0) Assuming that this patch is tested(?), how come it did not hit the WARN_ON_ONCE(depth < 0... above? Thanks, Amir.