Received: by 2002:a05:6a10:206:0:0:0:0 with SMTP id 6csp5720688pxj; Wed, 23 Jun 2021 07:37:54 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJzTVEUrrVcVaS8otIG5Brnzupl6IZ4LhAUdtVyD+XeJsg6f6qxHdem+98yt+gVbqTCQ46fL X-Received: by 2002:a92:ad04:: with SMTP id w4mr1177030ilh.221.1624459073859; Wed, 23 Jun 2021 07:37:53 -0700 (PDT) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1624459073; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=bsEsSsjlwdjthXLJWJXsLnjO9KaS8bnFvr3dQj8kISD2mZqAmT5SM6uIBkW+4QIOiJ Hpn5BNJm8TS3qWuLDgqCW3yWCFETi7ORDVDAjr2hPbJVVAS53MCd10drfUAlYEP4TZuo 0+2v+KKjpq6Bj/ESTl5+VQUg94pbld6f3IY+jQO2nA6SWOUScLgEW+vb1NKXu4cnZtm/ IhzyAiNdK3XVsIWXMtm5mYL43vxoj1eiIAnp27W8IncXhrX3uj+oVz5ioL9TfLzQ0p8z jsXBDx4n3fS2OstQySR/dVrhRznldOLphaDpMkZdOQnQxWYSEIkLy8EKkeBC12y09ifR WU5Q== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:subject:mime-version:user-agent:message-id :in-reply-to:date:references:cc:to:from; bh=ImCXnOsv0QCKJKRS4hq262QxGyZ99OC9MByc8Zxjy6o=; b=us94scpfcYDAB5+3iDs9FFpjq1U8RWuYJRmO/dAM+nq4HD62GYBorbnAVOmuKNntIs tiArYgDAjdJfLv3QIniXIQjfmci50uENnkd7KM56kd0P8k/HE3JqothUUKGwJsfAzVvt 3lOM1ax+++TwrYPEfZgpCIQF9e+cQWTAg61L45gLlssICzc6bHRkT5XLxLR2ISsU2f/t UV1t9DLO/AnWDkdIMnnADJ3ZdT7UugM+wx0U0/mEtL1PKpzzBSkpHbVprt1NSa+mi55p gcS5Ixi4RZalD+nNltLMU+ArRDcE48sdXh5rXHwQodkNmk2rQfXilBoYkPhthm0anQi2 BYdQ== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=xmission.com Return-Path: Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org. [23.128.96.18]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id 187si156042iow.86.2021.06.23.07.37.40; Wed, 23 Jun 2021 07:37:53 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=xmission.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231185AbhFWOjU (ORCPT + 99 others); Wed, 23 Jun 2021 10:39:20 -0400 Received: from out02.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.232]:51340 "EHLO out02.mta.xmission.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231310AbhFWOjR (ORCPT ); Wed, 23 Jun 2021 10:39:17 -0400 Received: from in01.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.51]) by out02.mta.xmission.com with esmtps (TLS1.3) tls TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (Exim 4.93) (envelope-from ) id 1lw3zq-00DaGO-Vs; Wed, 23 Jun 2021 08:36:58 -0600 Received: from ip68-227-160-95.om.om.cox.net ([68.227.160.95] helo=email.xmission.com) by in01.mta.xmission.com with esmtpsa (TLS1.3) tls TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (Exim 4.93) (envelope-from ) id 1lw3zp-00FFdy-0H; Wed, 23 Jun 2021 08:36:54 -0600 From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) To: Michael Schmitz Cc: Linus Torvalds , Al Viro , linux-arch , Jens Axboe , Oleg Nesterov , Linux Kernel Mailing List , Richard Henderson , Ivan Kokshaysky , Matt Turner , alpha , Geert Uytterhoeven , linux-m68k , Arnd Bergmann , Tejun Heo , Kees Cook , Tetsuo Handa , John Paul Adrian Glaubitz References: <924ec53c-2fd9-2e1c-bbb1-3fda49809be4@gmail.com> <87eed4v2dc.fsf@disp2133> <5929e116-fa61-b211-342a-c706dcb834ca@gmail.com> <87fsxjorgs.fsf@disp2133> <87h7hpbojt.fsf@disp2133> <20c787ec-4a3c-061c-c649-5bc3e7ef0464@gmail.com> <55bdad37-187b-e1f5-a359-c5206b20ff4d@gmail.com> Date: Wed, 23 Jun 2021 09:36:45 -0500 In-Reply-To: <55bdad37-187b-e1f5-a359-c5206b20ff4d@gmail.com> (Michael Schmitz's message of "Wed, 23 Jun 2021 17:26:22 +1200") Message-ID: <87sg18abr6.fsf@disp2133> User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/26.1 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain X-XM-SPF: eid=1lw3zp-00FFdy-0H;;;mid=<87sg18abr6.fsf@disp2133>;;;hst=in01.mta.xmission.com;;;ip=68.227.160.95;;;frm=ebiederm@xmission.com;;;spf=neutral X-XM-AID: U2FsdGVkX1+NbP08c6rBMLpVRuWsiul7P0EciH0CoAk= X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 68.227.160.95 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.2 (2018-09-13) on sa06.xmission.com X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.5 required=8.0 tests=ALL_TRUSTED,BAYES_50, DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE,T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG,XMSubLong autolearn=disabled version=3.4.2 X-Spam-Report: * -1.0 ALL_TRUSTED Passed through trusted hosts only via SMTP * 0.8 BAYES_50 BODY: Bayes spam probability is 40 to 60% * [score: 0.5000] * 0.7 XMSubLong Long Subject * 0.0 T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG BODY: No description available. * -0.0 DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE Not listed in DCC * [sa06 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1] X-Spam-DCC: XMission; sa06 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1 X-Spam-Combo: ;Michael Schmitz X-Spam-Relay-Country: X-Spam-Timing: total 1070 ms - load_scoreonly_sql: 0.06 (0.0%), signal_user_changed: 11 (1.0%), b_tie_ro: 9 (0.9%), parse: 0.96 (0.1%), extract_message_metadata: 2.8 (0.3%), get_uri_detail_list: 0.84 (0.1%), tests_pri_-1000: 4.4 (0.4%), tests_pri_-950: 1.19 (0.1%), tests_pri_-900: 1.05 (0.1%), tests_pri_-90: 567 (53.0%), check_bayes: 565 (52.8%), b_tokenize: 7 (0.7%), b_tok_get_all: 8 (0.7%), b_comp_prob: 2.0 (0.2%), b_tok_touch_all: 544 (50.9%), b_finish: 1.00 (0.1%), tests_pri_0: 458 (42.8%), check_dkim_signature: 0.79 (0.1%), check_dkim_adsp: 3.4 (0.3%), poll_dns_idle: 0.74 (0.1%), tests_pri_10: 2.4 (0.2%), tests_pri_500: 14 (1.3%), rewrite_mail: 0.00 (0.0%) Subject: Re: Kernel stack read with PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT and io_uring threads X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Sat, 08 Feb 2020 21:53:50 +0000) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in01.mta.xmission.com) Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Michael Schmitz writes: > Hi Eric, > > Am 23.06.2021 um 09:48 schrieb Michael Schmitz: >>> >>> The challenging ones are /proc/pid/syscall and seccomp which want to see >>> all of the system call arguments. I think every architecture always >>> saves the system call arguments unconditionally, so those cases are >>> probably not as interesting. But they certain look like they could be >>> trouble. >> >> Seccomp hasn't yet been implemented on m68k, though I'm working on that >> with Adrian. The sole secure_computing() call will happen in >> syscall_trace_enter(), so all system call arguments have been saved on >> the stack. >> >> Haven't looked at /proc/pid/syscall yet ... > > Not supported at present (no HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK for m68k). And the > syscall_get_arguments I wrote for seccomp support only copies the first five > data registers, which are always saved. Yes. It is looking like I can fix everything generically except for faking user space registers for io_uring threads. Eric