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[23.128.96.18]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id l27si11574844edc.201.2021.06.28.11.18.53; Mon, 28 Jun 2021 11:19:17 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=k20201202 header.b="SHkl/p/G"; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S234444AbhF1O3t (ORCPT + 99 others); Mon, 28 Jun 2021 10:29:49 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:54380 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S233317AbhF1OX4 (ORCPT ); Mon, 28 Jun 2021 10:23:56 -0400 Received: by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 81FDB61990; Mon, 28 Jun 2021 14:20:23 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1624890024; bh=vkswk7UbOZ3+JsU+pqXCR6lirRP7QuJ+DcBMYyBrDnE=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=SHkl/p/GmBY2PyfYfhPluG2g01VTQzg0L4UPjI3DV/NQi958aCe2iokt1QbxCGZj+ /cWrkOC3a4O1qIud8hZK4h7t6T+RWwUhhBoX1ztRW2p6Zmi76t+y0WHybt621hAd/y gW9MEyyXOLg37eGWE2xaM6b8j1XJWGRu6FEg0qe8SSKntGs5Zc+bkWMSbH67sKLP9e B1AlIjekR+yQlUrmvsFsPl+LA9xWC16jU+13JssM9nOyfCOkObUoA0hvO4cbentbpf w/FJaOEtL4u7S8Wc1guOXb4IqhB+E6dhGZJekBx4M3h/1CQ7yq8P9zjq3RPtVBXGls sBr/mPok4Lr8Q== From: Sasha Levin To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Eric Snowberg , James Bottomley , David Howells , Jarkko Sakkinen , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 5.12 109/110] integrity: Load mokx variables into the blacklist keyring Date: Mon, 28 Jun 2021 10:18:27 -0400 Message-Id: <20210628141828.31757-110-sashal@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.30.2 In-Reply-To: <20210628141828.31757-1-sashal@kernel.org> References: <20210628141828.31757-1-sashal@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-KernelTest-Patch: http://kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.12.14-rc1.gz X-KernelTest-Tree: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git X-KernelTest-Branch: linux-5.12.y X-KernelTest-Patches: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git X-KernelTest-Version: 5.12.14-rc1 X-KernelTest-Deadline: 2021-06-30T14:18+00:00 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: Ignore Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Eric Snowberg [ Upstream commit ebd9c2ae369a45bdd9f8615484db09be58fc242b ] During boot the Secure Boot Forbidden Signature Database, dbx, is loaded into the blacklist keyring. Systems booted with shim have an equivalent Forbidden Signature Database called mokx. Currently mokx is only used by shim and grub, the contents are ignored by the kernel. Add the ability to load mokx into the blacklist keyring during boot. Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg Suggested-by: James Bottomley Signed-off-by: David Howells Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c33c8e3839a41e9654f41cc92c7231104931b1d7.camel@HansenPartnership.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210122181054.32635-5-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v5 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161428674320.677100.12637282414018170743.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161433313205.902181.2502803393898221637.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161529607422.163428.13530426573612578854.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3 Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c index ee4b4c666854..f290f78c3f30 100644 --- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c @@ -132,8 +132,9 @@ static int __init load_moklist_certs(void) static int __init load_uefi_certs(void) { efi_guid_t secure_var = EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID; - void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL; - unsigned long dbsize = 0, dbxsize = 0; + efi_guid_t mok_var = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID; + void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL, *mokx = NULL; + unsigned long dbsize = 0, dbxsize = 0, mokxsize = 0; efi_status_t status; int rc = 0; @@ -175,6 +176,21 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void) kfree(dbx); } + mokx = get_cert_list(L"MokListXRT", &mok_var, &mokxsize, &status); + if (!mokx) { + if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND) + pr_debug("mokx variable wasn't found\n"); + else + pr_info("Couldn't get mokx list\n"); + } else { + rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:MokListXRT", + mokx, mokxsize, + get_handler_for_dbx); + if (rc) + pr_err("Couldn't parse mokx signatures %d\n", rc); + kfree(mokx); + } + /* Load the MokListRT certs */ rc = load_moklist_certs(); -- 2.30.2