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[23.128.96.18]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id g13si6488278ilf.35.2021.07.14.22.19.27; Wed, 14 Jul 2021 22:19:40 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=huawei.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S235081AbhGOFAu (ORCPT + 99 others); Thu, 15 Jul 2021 01:00:50 -0400 Received: from szxga01-in.huawei.com ([45.249.212.187]:7010 "EHLO szxga01-in.huawei.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229675AbhGOFAs (ORCPT ); Thu, 15 Jul 2021 01:00:48 -0400 Received: from dggemv711-chm.china.huawei.com (unknown [172.30.72.56]) by szxga01-in.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4GQMRd44MDzXtG2; Thu, 15 Jul 2021 12:52:13 +0800 (CST) Received: from dggpemm500015.china.huawei.com (7.185.36.181) by dggemv711-chm.china.huawei.com (10.1.198.66) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) id 15.1.2176.2; Thu, 15 Jul 2021 12:57:52 +0800 Received: from [10.174.179.224] (10.174.179.224) by dggpemm500015.china.huawei.com (7.185.36.181) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) id 15.1.2176.2; Thu, 15 Jul 2021 12:57:51 +0800 Subject: Re: [PATCH] Bluetooth: fix use-after-free error in lock_sock_nested() To: Luiz Augusto von Dentz CC: , Wei Yongjun , , , Marcel Holtmann , Johan Hedberg , "linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org" , "open list:NETWORKING [GENERAL]" , "Linux Kernel Mailing List" References: <20210714031733.1395549-1-bobo.shaobowang@huawei.com> From: "Wangshaobo (bobo)" Message-ID: Date: Thu, 15 Jul 2021 12:57:51 +0800 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/68.1.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Originating-IP: [10.174.179.224] X-ClientProxiedBy: dggems704-chm.china.huawei.com (10.3.19.181) To dggpemm500015.china.huawei.com (7.185.36.181) X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org 在 2021/7/15 5:50, Luiz Augusto von Dentz 写道: > Hi, > > On Tue, Jul 13, 2021 at 8:20 PM Wang ShaoBo wrote: >> use-after-free error in lock_sock_nested() is reported: >> >> [ 179.140137][ T3731] ===================================================== >> [ 179.142675][ T3731] BUG: KMSAN: use-after-free in lock_sock_nested+0x280/0x2c0 >> [ 179.145494][ T3731] CPU: 4 PID: 3731 Comm: kworker/4:2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ #54 >> [ 179.148432][ T3731] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 >> [ 179.151806][ T3731] Workqueue: events l2cap_chan_timeout >> [ 179.152730][ T3731] Call Trace: >> [ 179.153301][ T3731] dump_stack+0x24c/0x2e0 >> [ 179.154063][ T3731] kmsan_report+0xfb/0x1e0 >> [ 179.154855][ T3731] __msan_warning+0x5c/0xa0 >> [ 179.155579][ T3731] lock_sock_nested+0x280/0x2c0 >> [ 179.156436][ T3731] ? kmsan_get_metadata+0x116/0x180 >> [ 179.157257][ T3731] l2cap_sock_teardown_cb+0xb8/0x890 >> [ 179.158154][ T3731] ? __msan_metadata_ptr_for_load_8+0x10/0x20 >> [ 179.159141][ T3731] ? kmsan_get_metadata+0x116/0x180 >> [ 179.159994][ T3731] ? kmsan_get_shadow_origin_ptr+0x84/0xb0 >> [ 179.160959][ T3731] ? l2cap_sock_recv_cb+0x420/0x420 >> [ 179.161834][ T3731] l2cap_chan_del+0x3e1/0x1d50 >> [ 179.162608][ T3731] ? kmsan_get_metadata+0x116/0x180 >> [ 179.163435][ T3731] ? kmsan_get_shadow_origin_ptr+0x84/0xb0 >> [ 179.164406][ T3731] l2cap_chan_close+0xeea/0x1050 >> [ 179.165189][ T3731] ? kmsan_internal_unpoison_shadow+0x42/0x70 >> [ 179.166180][ T3731] l2cap_chan_timeout+0x1da/0x590 >> [ 179.167066][ T3731] ? __msan_metadata_ptr_for_load_8+0x10/0x20 >> [ 179.168023][ T3731] ? l2cap_chan_create+0x560/0x560 >> [ 179.168818][ T3731] process_one_work+0x121d/0x1ff0 >> [ 179.169598][ T3731] worker_thread+0x121b/0x2370 >> [ 179.170346][ T3731] kthread+0x4ef/0x610 >> [ 179.171010][ T3731] ? process_one_work+0x1ff0/0x1ff0 >> [ 179.171828][ T3731] ? kthread_blkcg+0x110/0x110 >> [ 179.172587][ T3731] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 >> [ 179.173348][ T3731] >> [ 179.173752][ T3731] Uninit was created at: >> [ 179.174409][ T3731] kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0x5c/0xf0 >> [ 179.175373][ T3731] kmsan_slab_free+0x76/0xc0 >> [ 179.176060][ T3731] kfree+0x3a5/0x1180 >> [ 179.176664][ T3731] __sk_destruct+0x8af/0xb80 >> [ 179.177375][ T3731] __sk_free+0x812/0x8c0 >> [ 179.178032][ T3731] sk_free+0x97/0x130 >> [ 179.178686][ T3731] l2cap_sock_release+0x3d5/0x4d0 >> [ 179.179457][ T3731] sock_close+0x150/0x450 >> [ 179.180117][ T3731] __fput+0x6bd/0xf00 >> [ 179.180787][ T3731] ____fput+0x37/0x40 >> [ 179.181481][ T3731] task_work_run+0x140/0x280 >> [ 179.182219][ T3731] do_exit+0xe51/0x3e60 >> [ 179.182930][ T3731] do_group_exit+0x20e/0x450 >> [ 179.183656][ T3731] get_signal+0x2dfb/0x38f0 >> [ 179.184344][ T3731] arch_do_signal_or_restart+0xaa/0xe10 >> [ 179.185266][ T3731] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x2d2/0x560 >> [ 179.186136][ T3731] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x35/0x60 >> [ 179.186984][ T3731] do_syscall_64+0xc5/0x140 >> [ 179.187681][ T3731] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae >> [ 179.188604][ T3731] ===================================================== >> >> In our case, there are two Thread A and B: >> >> Context: Thread A: Context: Thread B: >> >> l2cap_chan_timeout() __se_sys_shutdown() >> l2cap_chan_close() l2cap_sock_shutdown() >> l2cap_chan_del() l2cap_chan_close() >> l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() >> >> Once l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() excuted, this sock will be marked as SOCK_ZAPPED, >> and can be treated as killable in l2cap_sock_kill() if sock_orphan() has >> excuted, at this time we close sock through sock_close() which end to call >> l2cap_sock_kill() like Thread C: >> >> Context: Thread C: >> >> sock_close() >> l2cap_sock_release() >> sock_orphan() >> l2cap_sock_kill() #free sock if refcnt is 1 >> >> If C completed, Once A or B reaches l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() again, >> use-after-free happened. >> >> We should set chan->data to NULL if sock is freed, for telling teardown >> operation is not allowed in l2cap_sock_teardown_cb(), and also we should >> avoid killing an already killed socket in l2cap_sock_close_cb(). >> >> Signed-off-by: Wang ShaoBo >> --- >> net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- >> 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c >> index c99d65ef13b1..ddc6a692b237 100644 >> --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c >> +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c >> @@ -1215,14 +1215,18 @@ static int l2cap_sock_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, >> */ >> static void l2cap_sock_kill(struct sock *sk) >> { >> + struct l2cap_chan *chan; >> + >> if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED) || sk->sk_socket) >> return; >> >> BT_DBG("sk %p state %s", sk, state_to_string(sk->sk_state)); >> >> /* Kill poor orphan */ >> - >> - l2cap_chan_put(l2cap_pi(sk)->chan); >> + chan = l2cap_pi(sk)->chan; >> + l2cap_chan_put(chan); There is a problem here, the above sentence `l2cap_chan_put(chan)` should put after following sentence. >> + if (refcount_read(&sk->sk_refcnt) == 1) >> + chan->data = NULL; > Instead of checking if it is the last reference here, wouldn't it be > better to reset the chan->data to NULL on l2cap_sock_destruct? Hi, In my case it looks OK, this is the diff: diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c index f1b1edd0b697..32ef3328ab49 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c @@ -1500,6 +1500,9 @@ static void l2cap_sock_close_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)  {         struct sock *sk = chan->data; +       if (!sk) +               return; +         l2cap_sock_kill(sk);  } @@ -1508,6 +1511,9 @@ static void l2cap_sock_teardown_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err)         struct sock *sk = chan->data;         struct sock *parent; +       if (!sk) +               return; +         BT_DBG("chan %p state %s", chan, state_to_string(chan->state));         /* This callback can be called both for server (BT_LISTEN) @@ -1700,6 +1706,7 @@ static void l2cap_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk)         BT_DBG("sk %p", sk);         if (l2cap_pi(sk)->chan) +              l2cap_pi(sk)->chan->data = NULL;                  l2cap_chan_put(l2cap_pi(sk)->chan); But if it has potential risk if l2cap_sock_destruct() can not be excuted in time ? sk_free():         if (refcount_dec_and_test(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc)) //is possible this condition false ?               __sk_free(sk)   -> ... l2cap_sock_destruct()