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From:   cgel.zte@gmail.com
To:     kuba@kernel.org
Cc:     davem@davemloft.net, yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org, dsahern@kernel.org,
        netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        Yang Yang <yang.yang29@zte.com.cn>,
        Zeal Robot <zealci@zte.com.cn>
Subject: [PATCH net-next] net: ipv4: add capability check for net administration
Date:   Mon, 19 Jul 2021 18:43:28 -0700
Message-Id: <20210720014328.378868-1-yang.yang29@zte.com.cn>
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From: Yang Yang <yang.yang29@zte.com.cn>

Root in init user namespace can modify /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward
without CAP_NET_ADMIN, this doesn't follow the principle of
capabilities. For example, let's take a look at netdev_store(),
root can't modify netdev attribute without CAP_NET_ADMIN.
So let's keep the consistency of permission check logic.

Reported-by: Zeal Robot <zealci@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yang <yang.yang29@zte.com.cn>
---
 net/ipv4/devinet.c | 10 +++++++---
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/ipv4/devinet.c b/net/ipv4/devinet.c
index 73721a4448bd..6238ab2dd3d1 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/devinet.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/devinet.c
@@ -2424,11 +2424,15 @@ static int devinet_sysctl_forward(struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
 	int *valp = ctl->data;
 	int val = *valp;
 	loff_t pos = *ppos;
-	int ret = proc_dointvec(ctl, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+	struct net *net = ctl->extra2;
+	int ret;
 
-	if (write && *valp != val) {
-		struct net *net = ctl->extra2;
+	if (write && !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	ret = proc_dointvec(ctl, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
 
+	if (write && *valp != val) {
 		if (valp != &IPV4_DEVCONF_DFLT(net, FORWARDING)) {
 			if (!rtnl_trylock()) {
 				/* Restore the original values before restarting */
-- 
2.25.1