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From:   "Fabio M. De Francesco" <fmdefrancesco@gmail.com>
To:     Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
        "Joel Fernandes (Google)" <joel@joelfernandes.org>,
        Vineeth Pillai <Vineeth.Pillai@microsoft.com>,
        "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>,
        linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc:     "Fabio M. De Francesco" <fmdefrancesco@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH] admin-guide/hw-vuln: Rephrase a section of core-scheduling.rst
Date:   Wed, 21 Jul 2021 21:02:50 +0200
Message-Id: <20210721190250.26095-1-fmdefrancesco@gmail.com>
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Rephrase the "For MDS" section in core-scheduling.rst for the purpose of
making it clearer what is meant by "kernel memory is still considered
untrusted".

Suggested-by: Vineeth Pillai <Vineeth.Pillai@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fabio M. De Francesco <fmdefrancesco@gmail.com>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst | 9 +++++----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst
index 7b410aef9c5c..e6b5ceb219ec 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst
@@ -181,10 +181,11 @@ Open cross-HT issues that core scheduling does not solve
 --------------------------------------------------------
 1. For MDS
 ~~~~~~~~~~
-Core scheduling cannot protect against MDS attacks between an HT running in
-user mode and another running in kernel mode. Even though both HTs run tasks
-which trust each other, kernel memory is still considered untrusted. Such
-attacks are possible for any combination of sibling CPU modes (host or guest mode).
+Core scheduling cannot protect against MDS attacks between the siblings running in
+user mode and the others running in kernel mode. Even though all siblings run tasks
+which trust each other, when the kernel is executing code on behalf of a task, it
+cannot trust the code running in the sibling. Such attacks are possible for any
+combination of sibling CPU modes (host or guest mode).
 
 2. For L1TF
 ~~~~~~~~~~~
-- 
2.32.0