Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18;
MIME-Version: 1.0
References: <20210624152515.1844133-1-omosnace@redhat.com>
In-Reply-To: <20210624152515.1844133-1-omosnace@redhat.com>
From:   Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Date:   Fri, 23 Jul 2021 10:39:40 +0200
Message-ID: <CAFqZXNtb-VdL9f8Ntg3RLZtP0x-7ZgEP1D0qL9fWCM7SPWcHXQ@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] userfaultfd: open userfaultfds with O_RDONLY
To:     Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc:     Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
        Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@google.com>,
        Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
        Linux Security Module list 
        <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
        SElinux list <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
        Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        "Robert O'Callahan" <roc@ocallahan.org>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
Precedence: bulk

On Thu, Jun 24, 2021 at 5:25 PM Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> Since userfaultfd doesn't implement a write operation, it is more
> appropriate to open it read-only.
>
> When userfaultfds are opened read-write like it is now, and such fd is
> passed from one process to another, SELinux will check both read and
> write permissions for the target process, even though it can't actually
> do any write operation on the fd later.
>
> Inspired by the following bug report, which has hit the SELinux scenario
> described above:
> https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1974559
>
> Reported-by: Robert O'Callahan <roc@ocallahan.org>
> Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
> Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
> ---
>
> I marked this as RFC, because I'm not sure if this has any unwanted side
> effects. I only ran this patch through selinux-testsuite, which has a
> simple userfaultfd subtest, and a reproducer from the Bugzilla report.
>
> Please tell me whether this makes sense and/or if it passes any
> userfaultfd tests you guys might have.
>
>  fs/userfaultfd.c | 4 ++--
>  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/userfaultfd.c b/fs/userfaultfd.c
> index 14f92285d04f..24e14c36068f 100644
> --- a/fs/userfaultfd.c
> +++ b/fs/userfaultfd.c
> @@ -986,7 +986,7 @@ static int resolve_userfault_fork(struct userfaultfd_ctx *new,
>         int fd;
>
>         fd = anon_inode_getfd_secure("[userfaultfd]", &userfaultfd_fops, new,
> -                       O_RDWR | (new->flags & UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS), inode);
> +                       O_RDONLY | (new->flags & UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS), inode);
>         if (fd < 0)
>                 return fd;
>
> @@ -2088,7 +2088,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(userfaultfd, int, flags)
>         mmgrab(ctx->mm);
>
>         fd = anon_inode_getfd_secure("[userfaultfd]", &userfaultfd_fops, ctx,
> -                       O_RDWR | (flags & UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS), NULL);
> +                       O_RDONLY | (flags & UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS), NULL);
>         if (fd < 0) {
>                 mmdrop(ctx->mm);
>                 kmem_cache_free(userfaultfd_ctx_cachep, ctx);
> --
> 2.31.1

Ping? Any comments on this patch?

-- 
Ondrej Mosnacek
Software Engineer, Linux Security - SELinux kernel
Red Hat, Inc.