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From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        stable@vger.kernel.org, Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
        syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
        Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 5.4 09/21] net: annotate data race around sk_ll_usec
Date:   Thu, 29 Jul 2021 15:54:16 +0200
Message-Id: <20210729135143.216287203@linuxfoundation.org>
In-Reply-To: <20210729135142.920143237@linuxfoundation.org>
References: <20210729135142.920143237@linuxfoundation.org>
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From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 0dbffbb5335a1e3aa6855e4ee317e25e669dd302 ]

sk_ll_usec is read locklessly from sk_can_busy_loop()
while another thread can change its value in sock_setsockopt()

This is correct but needs annotations.

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __skb_try_recv_datagram / sock_setsockopt

write to 0xffff88814eb5f904 of 4 bytes by task 14011 on cpu 0:
 sock_setsockopt+0x1287/0x2090 net/core/sock.c:1175
 __sys_setsockopt+0x14f/0x200 net/socket.c:2100
 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2115 [inline]
 __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2112 [inline]
 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x62/0x70 net/socket.c:2112
 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

read to 0xffff88814eb5f904 of 4 bytes by task 14001 on cpu 1:
 sk_can_busy_loop include/net/busy_poll.h:41 [inline]
 __skb_try_recv_datagram+0x14f/0x320 net/core/datagram.c:273
 unix_dgram_recvmsg+0x14c/0x870 net/unix/af_unix.c:2101
 unix_seqpacket_recvmsg+0x5a/0x70 net/unix/af_unix.c:2067
 ____sys_recvmsg+0x15d/0x310 include/linux/uio.h:244
 ___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2598 [inline]
 do_recvmmsg+0x35c/0x9f0 net/socket.c:2692
 __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2771 [inline]
 __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2794 [inline]
 __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2787 [inline]
 __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0xcf/0x150 net/socket.c:2787
 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

value changed: 0x00000000 -> 0x00000101

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 14001 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.13.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 include/net/busy_poll.h | 2 +-
 net/core/sock.c         | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/busy_poll.h b/include/net/busy_poll.h
index 86e028388bad..9899b9af7f22 100644
--- a/include/net/busy_poll.h
+++ b/include/net/busy_poll.h
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ static inline bool net_busy_loop_on(void)
 
 static inline bool sk_can_busy_loop(const struct sock *sk)
 {
-	return sk->sk_ll_usec && !signal_pending(current);
+	return READ_ONCE(sk->sk_ll_usec) && !signal_pending(current);
 }
 
 bool sk_busy_loop_end(void *p, unsigned long start_time);
diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c
index 68f84fac63e0..452883b28aba 100644
--- a/net/core/sock.c
+++ b/net/core/sock.c
@@ -1098,7 +1098,7 @@ set_rcvbuf:
 			if (val < 0)
 				ret = -EINVAL;
 			else
-				sk->sk_ll_usec = val;
+				WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_ll_usec, val);
 		}
 		break;
 #endif
-- 
2.30.2