Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1758657AbWK1NFB (ORCPT ); Tue, 28 Nov 2006 08:05:01 -0500 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1758655AbWK1NFA (ORCPT ); Tue, 28 Nov 2006 08:05:00 -0500 Received: from taverner.CS.Berkeley.EDU ([128.32.168.222]:22159 "EHLO taverner.cs.berkeley.edu") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1758654AbWK1NE7 (ORCPT ); Tue, 28 Nov 2006 08:04:59 -0500 To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Path: not-for-mail From: daw@cs.berkeley.edu (David Wagner) Newsgroups: isaac.lists.linux-kernel Subject: Re: Entropy Pool Contents Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2006 12:58:05 +0000 (UTC) Organization: University of California, Berkeley Message-ID: References: <878xhw5esn.fsf@blp.benpfaff.org> <20061128121346.GB8499@khazad-dum.debian.net> Reply-To: daw-usenet@taverner.cs.berkeley.edu (David Wagner) NNTP-Posting-Host: taverner.cs.berkeley.edu X-Trace: taverner.cs.berkeley.edu 1164718685 25078 128.32.168.222 (28 Nov 2006 12:58:05 GMT) X-Complaints-To: news@taverner.cs.berkeley.edu NNTP-Posting-Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2006 12:58:05 +0000 (UTC) X-Newsreader: trn 4.0-test76 (Apr 2, 2001) Originator: daw@taverner.cs.berkeley.edu (David Wagner) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1634 Lines: 29 Continuing the tangent: Henrique de Moraes Holschuh wrote: >On Mon, 27 Nov 2006, Ben Pfaff wrote: >> daw@cs.berkeley.edu (David Wagner) writes: >> > Well, if you want to talk about really high-value keys like the scenarios >> > you mention, you probably shouldn't be using /dev/random, either; you >> > should be using a hardware security module with a built-in FIPS certified >> > hardware random number source. >> >> Is there such a thing? [...] > >There used to exist a battery of tests for this, but a FIPS revision removed >them. [...] The point I was making in my email was not about the use of FIPS randomness tests. The FIPS randomness tests are not very important. The point I was making was about the use of a hardware security module to store really high-value keys. If you have a really high-value key, that key should never be stored on a Linux server: standard advice is that it should be generated on a hardware security module (HSM) and never leave the HSM. If you are in charge of Verisign's root cert private key, you should never let this private key escape onto any general-purpose computer (including any Linux machine). The reason for this advice is that it's probably much harder to hack a HSM remotely than to hack a general-purpose computer (such as a Linux machine). Again, this is probably a tangent from anything related to Linux kernel development. - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/