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Hallyn" , Andi Kleen , "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" , James Bottomley , Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum , Jim Cadden , linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH 0/3] Allow access to confidential computing secret area in SEV guests Date: Mon, 9 Aug 2021 19:01:54 +0000 Message-Id: <20210809190157.279332-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 X-Proofpoint-GUID: 2_POTc4eDedfA_kbZXChZhodWJSIokXz X-Proofpoint-ORIG-GUID: B8rkwtUXUfE5w291her3XjbeAw70QWrD Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Proofpoint-UnRewURL: 0 URL was un-rewritten MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:6.0.391,18.0.790 definitions=2021-08-09_07:2021-08-06,2021-08-09 signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 clxscore=1015 impostorscore=0 suspectscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 lowpriorityscore=0 malwarescore=0 adultscore=0 phishscore=0 mlxscore=0 spamscore=0 bulkscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2107140000 definitions=main-2108090131 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Confidential computing (coco) hardware such as AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted Virtualization) allows guest owners to inject secrets into the VMs memory without the host/hypervisor being able to read them. In SEV, secret injection is performed early in the VM launch process, before the guest starts running. OVMF already reserves designated area for secret injection (in its AmdSev package; see edk2 commit 01726b6d23d4 "OvmfPkg/AmdSev: Expose the Sev Secret area using a configuration table" [1]), but the secrets were not available in the guest kernel. The patch series copies the secrets from the EFI-provided memory to kernel reserved memory, and optionally exposes them to userspace via securityfs using a new sev_secret kernel module. The first patch in efi/libstub copies the secret area from the EFI memory to specially allocated memory; the second patch reserves that memory block; and the third patch introduces the new sev_secret module that exposes the content of the secret entries as securityfs files, and allows clearing out secrets with a file unlink interface. As a usage example, consider a guest performing computations on encrypted files. The Guest Owner provides the decryption key (= secret) using the secret injection mechanism. The guest application reads the secret from the sev_secret filesystem and proceeds to decrypt the files into memory and then performs the needed computations on the content. In this example, the host can't read the files from the disk image because they are encrypted. Host can't read the decryption key because it is passed using the secret injection mechanism (= secure channel). Host can't read the decrypted content from memory because it's a confidential (memory-encrypted) guest. This has been tested with AMD SEV guests, but the kernel side of handling the secret area has no SEV-specific dependencies, and therefore might be usable (perhaps with minor changes) for any confidential computing hardware that can publish the secret area via the standard EFI config table entry. Here is a simple example for usage of the sev_secret module in a guest to which a secret are with 4 secrets was injected during launch: # modprobe sev_secret # ls -la /sys/kernel/security/coco/sev_secret total 0 drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 . drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 .. -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 # xxd /sys/kernel/security/coco/sev_secret/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 00000000: 7468 6573 652d 6172 652d 7468 652d 6b61 these-are-the-ka 00000010: 7461 2d73 6563 7265 7473 0001 0203 0405 ta-secrets...... 00000020: 0607 .. # rm /sys/kernel/security/coco/sev_secret/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 # ls -la /sys/kernel/security/coco/sev_secret total 0 drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:55 . drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 .. -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 Previously sent as an RFC series [2]. [1] https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/01726b6d23d4 [2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20210628183431.953934-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/ Dov Murik (3): efi/libstub: Copy confidential computing secret area efi: Reserve confidential computing secret area virt: Add sev_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 1 + drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile | 2 +- drivers/firmware/efi/coco.c | 41 +++ drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 3 + drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile | 2 +- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/coco.c | 68 +++++ drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c | 2 + drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h | 2 + drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c | 2 + drivers/virt/Kconfig | 3 + drivers/virt/Makefile | 1 + drivers/virt/coco/sev_secret/Kconfig | 11 + drivers/virt/coco/sev_secret/Makefile | 2 + drivers/virt/coco/sev_secret/sev_secret.c | 313 ++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/efi.h | 9 + 15 files changed, 460 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/coco.c create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/coco.c create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/sev_secret/Kconfig create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/sev_secret/Makefile create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/sev_secret/sev_secret.c base-commit: 36a21d51725af2ce0700c6ebcb6b9594aac658a6 -- 2.25.1