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Tue, 7 Sep 2021 10:11:25 +0000 (GMT) Received: from oc3016276355.ibm.com (unknown [9.145.9.165]) by d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Tue, 7 Sep 2021 10:11:25 +0000 (GMT) Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/3] s390x: KVM: accept STSI for CPU topology information To: David Hildenbrand , kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, borntraeger@de.ibm.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com, cohuck@redhat.com, thuth@redhat.com, imbrenda@linux.ibm.com, hca@linux.ibm.com, gor@linux.ibm.com References: <1627979206-32663-1-git-send-email-pmorel@linux.ibm.com> <1627979206-32663-2-git-send-email-pmorel@linux.ibm.com> From: Pierre Morel Message-ID: <92fcb116-8bc7-7524-c522-0be5b210029b@linux.ibm.com> Date: Tue, 7 Sep 2021 12:11:24 +0200 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/78.13.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 X-Proofpoint-GUID: isJoqA6GwM9P_9t0TAvb_UPf9i3hU48F X-Proofpoint-ORIG-GUID: KSNg3m-6XNnRbvu-OzwSH60lw9os9XS2 X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:6.0.391,18.0.790 definitions=2021-09-07_03:2021-09-03,2021-09-07 signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 malwarescore=0 adultscore=0 phishscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 spamscore=0 lowpriorityscore=0 suspectscore=0 mlxscore=0 clxscore=1015 priorityscore=1501 bulkscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2108310000 definitions=main-2109070067 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 9/6/21 8:14 PM, David Hildenbrand wrote: > On 01.09.21 11:43, Pierre Morel wrote: >> >> >> On 8/31/21 3:59 PM, David Hildenbrand wrote: >>> On 03.08.21 10:26, Pierre Morel wrote: >>>> STSI(15.1.x) gives information on the CPU configuration topology. >>>> Let's accept the interception of STSI with the function code 15 and >>>> let the userland part of the hypervisor handle it when userland >>>> support the CPU Topology facility. >>>> >>>> Signed-off-by: Pierre Morel >>>> --- >>>>    arch/s390/kvm/priv.c | 7 ++++++- >>>>    1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) >>>> >>>> diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/priv.c b/arch/s390/kvm/priv.c >>>> index 9928f785c677..8581b6881212 100644 >>>> --- a/arch/s390/kvm/priv.c >>>> +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/priv.c >>>> @@ -856,7 +856,8 @@ static int handle_stsi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) >>>>        if (vcpu->arch.sie_block->gpsw.mask & PSW_MASK_PSTATE) >>>>            return kvm_s390_inject_program_int(vcpu, PGM_PRIVILEGED_OP); >>>> -    if (fc > 3) { >>>> +    if ((fc > 3 && fc != 15) || >>>> +        (fc == 15 && !test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 11))) { >>>>            kvm_s390_set_psw_cc(vcpu, 3); >>>>            return 0; >>>>        } >>>> @@ -893,6 +894,10 @@ static int handle_stsi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) >>>>                goto out_no_data; >>>>            handle_stsi_3_2_2(vcpu, (void *) mem); >>>>            break; >>>> +    case 15: >>>> +        trace_kvm_s390_handle_stsi(vcpu, fc, sel1, sel2, operand2); >>>> +        insert_stsi_usr_data(vcpu, operand2, ar, fc, sel1, sel2); >>>> +        return -EREMOTE; >>>>        } >>>>        if (kvm_s390_pv_cpu_is_protected(vcpu)) { >>>>            memcpy((void *)sida_origin(vcpu->arch.sie_block), (void >>>> *)mem, >>>> >>> >>> Sorry, I'm a bit rusty on s390x kvm facility handling. >>> >>> >>> For test_kvm_facility() to succeed, the facility has to be in both: >>> >>> a) fac_mask: actually available on the HW and supported by KVM >>> (kvm_s390_fac_base via FACILITIES_KVM, kvm_s390_fac_ext via >>> FACILITIES_KVM_CPUMODEL) >>> >>> b) fac_list: enabled for a VM >>> >>> AFAIU, facility 11 is neither in FACILITIES_KVM nor >>> FACILITIES_KVM_CPUMODEL, and I remember it's a hypervisor-managed bit. >>> >>> So unless we unlock facility 11 in FACILITIES_KVM_CPUMODEL, will >>> test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 11) ever successfully trigger here? >>> >>> >>> I'm pretty sure I am messing something up :) >>> >> >> I think it is the same remark that Christian did as wanted me to use the >> arch/s390/tools/gen_facilities.c to activate the facility. >> >> The point is that CONFIGURATION_TOPOLOGY, STFL, 11, is already defined >> inside QEMU since full_GEN10_GA1, so the test_kvm_facility() will >> succeed with the next patch setting the facility 11 in the mask when >> getting the KVM_CAP_S390_CPU_TOPOLOGY from userland. > > Ok, I see ... > > QEMU knows the facility and as soon as we present it to QEMU, QEMU will > want to automatically enable it in the "host" model. > > However, we'd like QEMU to join in and handle some part of it. > > So indeed, handling it like KVM_CAP_S390_VECTOR_REGISTERS or > KVM_CAP_S390_RI looks like a reasonable approach. > >> >> But if we activate it in KVM via any of the FACILITIES_KVM_xxx in the >> gen_facilities.c we will activate it for the guest what ever userland >> hypervizor we have, including old QEMU which will generate an exception. >> >> >> In this circumstances we have the choice between: >> >> - use FACILITY_KVM and handle everything in kernel >> - use FACILITY_KVM and use an extra CAPABILITY to handle part in kernel >> to avoid guest crash and part in userland > > This sounds quite nice to me. Implement minimal kernel support and > indicate the facility via stfl to user space. > > In addition, add a new capability that intercepts to user space instead. > > > ... but I can understand that it might not be worth it. yes, since we need a CAPABILITY anyway I find it makes things more complicated. > > > This patch as it stands doesn't make any sense on its own. Either > document how it's supposed to work and why it is currently dead code, or > simply squash into the next patch (preferred IMHO). > Yes, you are right, I will squash it with the next patch. Thanks, Pierre -- Pierre Morel IBM Lab Boeblingen