Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18;
Date:   Thu, 30 Sep 2021 10:58:07 -0400
From:   "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
To:     Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan 
        <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, x86@kernel.org,
        Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
        Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com>,
        Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com>,
        Yehezkel Bernat <YehezkelShB@gmail.com>,
        "Rafael J . Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>,
        Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
        Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>,
        Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
        Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
        Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <knsathya@kernel.org>,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-usb@vger.kernel.org,
        virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/6] driver core: Add common support to skip probe for
 un-authorized devices
Message-ID: <20210930104924-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org>
References: <20210930010511.3387967-1-sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
 <20210930010511.3387967-3-sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
 <20210930065807-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org>
 <YVXBNJ431YIWwZdQ@kroah.com>
 <20210930144305.GA464826@rowland.harvard.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <20210930144305.GA464826@rowland.harvard.edu>
Precedence: bulk

On Thu, Sep 30, 2021 at 10:43:05AM -0400, Alan Stern wrote:
> I don't see any point in talking about "untrusted drivers".  If a 
> driver isn't trusted then it doesn't belong in your kernel.  Period.  
> When you load a driver into your kernel, you are implicitly trusting 
> it (aside from limitations imposed by security modules).

Trusting it to do what? Historically a ton of drivers did not
validate input from devices they drive. Most still don't.

> The code 
> it contains, the module_init code in particular, runs with full 
> superuser permissions.

-- 
MST