Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18;
From:   Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
To:     linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org
Cc:     kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
        Nathan Tempelman <natet@google.com>,
        Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com>,
        Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>,
        Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
        Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com>,
        Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
        Varad Gautam <varad.gautam@suse.com>,
        Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
        David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
        Ricardo Koller <ricarkol@google.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
        "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Subject: [RFC 13/16] KVM: selftests: add support for creating SEV-SNP guests
Date:   Tue,  5 Oct 2021 18:44:56 -0500
Message-Id: <20211005234459.430873-14-michael.roth@amd.com>
In-Reply-To: <20211005234459.430873-1-michael.roth@amd.com>
References: <20211005234459.430873-1-michael.roth@amd.com>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Content-Type: text/plain
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-MS-Exchange-AntiSpam-MessageData-ChunkCount: 1
X-MS-Exchange-AntiSpam-MessageData-0: =?us-ascii?Q?2XjJuItbHKSbhvYuQEP5d23DESRji8cSsh5yeMz+o5H6g/2nms8r9TrVXhpJ?=
 =?us-ascii?Q?hx28H2il8SgI5hkU4k8PfZsRlDWcz2ZT/Mdc59arx9wCqQPeyrGltA+Kxyuz?=
 =?us-ascii?Q?Q1XuNUsdQazJCWRfnhDLJ8jvIDlLKmvydVyaF3bK3sobb1r9KikkqPPm/8Yp?=
 =?us-ascii?Q?Ci+NctPz/LPxacZCmFjbFBMSOAkEb+iRUcTWS2Upk3+ervSEIogYGH8r6fey?=
 =?us-ascii?Q?R+OnVDSSmGxRMab/lzk4eBCVekZtpS795NOKZHUbiMKo6FJrPYYayihNvXYY?=
 =?us-ascii?Q?A4OGgxlA6HlYNHhGlhMTz855WDKrrVgfeouBJ5k/QuIJWeQ/pYqALxTq8X4n?=
 =?us-ascii?Q?zhhyPuYVziXHm2rD7sjzOOzv2Glgac3Jdi0aKzES2LdrSbOTYw1Pli8XzH5z?=
 =?us-ascii?Q?RWqOOfRVSXoqs31baXU82APykHKk53CibFTQyxL2dYB7zyH9z4DDaYFHlF8b?=
 =?us-ascii?Q?dX/ha6Jc82U7hxkMGEUjb5PUsSZSh/P6ttUY38hxF9kfNHeLoqu7C57qZ2J/?=
 =?us-ascii?Q?1bEjaJCPYz+DcgSI133Q8BB6j192maXkHa1PZEgfR0O2Em/aRiqw49Ee5gYn?=
 =?us-ascii?Q?hLyP16iure7rptsJvVqin+v6eIcIRL+dYa+qSCYZpI1fyYqqrgBePIrDeRzN?=
 =?us-ascii?Q?65wUsDuOe2McnsMeHAyHGdnJjwZEwTYANYL/EZ/fMh268vBy+XEamN4U/K1l?=
 =?us-ascii?Q?wCAWryc7auaAlJAobbMV50KZZR+f7fRWRnkIC44P7KBmkDFTXlbygbhDlrhE?=
 =?us-ascii?Q?YpiJLI5u6bxTqHdWMt9YKOjxayGVOyoGMOZzUodVOP6k0+CtgM0hhZA4tJGX?=
 =?us-ascii?Q?LCfcsATy05tMOm9PLn9S57BP11rHPbGIJdTjlqBeZ1I+Nhy/zr4iIIMaxMNf?=
 =?us-ascii?Q?uBfbu66OPk4dWsVnORIrtS9ci+fpd9x/I45tZkJWAs5bYVlhk9KHhW4IFzsk?=
 =?us-ascii?Q?37ryBGfYOydErjZ9Ye/ZLiQYESmi9fd3eWM+Rrfy235+Bd22oah4bM4zEmEt?=
 =?us-ascii?Q?WuvzMr/f7JisM5IxSmAfMEq62y3NmQr1sMVAu7VHfqSCHT+e7YY2mqyULRjm?=
 =?us-ascii?Q?AwmMr5YzfZgIsRVzj8LQ05IwpXDGf2yCSPmmLGkf8ysxRDprxHaocnksTp7i?=
 =?us-ascii?Q?pep7Bt4QTrhSwp1xh/WvGbw/NrfS6UwVE+bERukpBOdC+4Y5Pl6kcNp4OYkh?=
 =?us-ascii?Q?Wr+41n/5PKUyRwALQM0cCvaco2V6UIGGQbpHkRNRoIRfVnHgs3URnrE1OHk/?=
 =?us-ascii?Q?0mCSwP3LAtr2GSz7E/cY64fKofjh6KumHagx6j5h+JOmfMy80nRjW7RRp1E4?=
 =?us-ascii?Q?wPK7BNaF+NwMX0HZqoxBvxN8?=
X-OriginatorOrg: amd.com
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Network-Message-Id: c16ed738-1981-428a-6ad0-08d9885a4483
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-AuthSource: CH2PR12MB4133.namprd12.prod.outlook.com
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-AuthAs: Internal
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-OriginalArrivalTime: 05 Oct 2021 23:45:53.0759
 (UTC)
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-FromEntityHeader: Hosted
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Id: 3dd8961f-e488-4e60-8e11-a82d994e183d
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-MailboxType: HOSTED
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-UserPrincipalName: z1lOS6WBwJ/hHoSKxIVD19B68fpDX+zF+dB8D02HeKi/2O+kS3JyGt7Fi7YK94iR7vQd4Kzf9JbITrtCie+aug==
X-MS-Exchange-Transport-CrossTenantHeadersStamped: CH2PR12MB3925
Precedence: bulk
List-ID: <linux-kernel.vger.kernel.org>
X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org

SEV-SNP uses an entirely different set of KVM_SEV_* ioctls to manage
guests. The needed vm_memcrypt callbacks are different as well. Address
these differences by extending the SEV library with a new set of
interfaces specific to creating/managing SEV-SNP guests.

These guests will still use a struct sev_vm under the covers, so some
existing sev_*() helpers are still applicable.

Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
---
 .../selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h        |  8 ++
 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c  | 77 ++++++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h
index d2f41b131ecc..f3e088c03bdd 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h
@@ -18,6 +18,10 @@
 #define SEV_POLICY_NO_DBG	(1UL << 0)
 #define SEV_POLICY_ES		(1UL << 2)
 
+#define SNP_POLICY_SMT		(1ULL << 16)
+#define SNP_POLICY_RSVD		(1ULL << 17)
+#define SNP_POLICY_DBG		(1ULL << 19)
+
 #define SEV_GUEST_ASSERT(sync, token, _cond) do {	\
 	if (!(_cond))					\
 		sev_guest_abort(sync, token, 0);	\
@@ -59,4 +63,8 @@ void sev_vm_launch(struct sev_vm *sev);
 void sev_vm_measure(struct sev_vm *sev, uint8_t *measurement);
 void sev_vm_launch_finish(struct sev_vm *sev);
 
+struct sev_vm *sev_snp_vm_create(uint64_t policy, uint64_t npages);
+void sev_snp_vm_free(struct sev_vm *sev);
+void sev_snp_vm_launch(struct sev_vm *sev);
+
 #endif /* SELFTEST_KVM_SEV_H */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c
index d01b0f637ced..939d7d5dff41 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ struct sev_vm {
 	int fd;
 	int enc_bit;
 	uint32_t sev_policy;
+	uint64_t snp_policy;
 };
 
 /* Helpers for coordinating between guests and test harness. */
@@ -119,6 +120,12 @@ void kvm_sev_ioctl(struct sev_vm *sev, int cmd, void *data)
 
 /* Local helpers. */
 
+static bool sev_snp_enabled(struct sev_vm *sev)
+{
+	/* RSVD is always 1 for SNP guests. */
+	return sev->snp_policy & SNP_POLICY_RSVD;
+}
+
 static void
 sev_register_user_range(struct sev_vm *sev, void *hva, uint64_t size)
 {
@@ -147,6 +154,21 @@ sev_encrypt_phy_range(struct sev_vm *sev, vm_paddr_t gpa, uint64_t size)
 	kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, &ksev_update_data);
 }
 
+static void
+sev_snp_encrypt_phy_range(struct sev_vm *sev, vm_paddr_t gpa, uint64_t size)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_update update_data = {0};
+
+	pr_debug("encrypt_phy_range: addr: 0x%lx, size: %lu\n", gpa, size);
+
+	update_data.uaddr = (__u64)addr_gpa2hva(sev->vm, gpa);
+	update_data.start_gfn = gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+	update_data.len = size;
+	update_data.page_type = KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL;
+
+	kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE, &update_data);
+}
+
 static void sev_encrypt(struct sev_vm *sev)
 {
 	struct sparsebit *enc_phy_pages;
@@ -171,9 +193,14 @@ static void sev_encrypt(struct sev_vm *sev)
 		if (pg_cnt <= 0)
 			pg_cnt = 1;
 
-		sev_encrypt_phy_range(sev,
-				      gpa_start + pg * vm_get_page_size(vm),
-				      pg_cnt * vm_get_page_size(vm));
+		if (sev_snp_enabled(sev))
+			sev_snp_encrypt_phy_range(sev,
+						  gpa_start + pg * vm_get_page_size(vm),
+						  pg_cnt * vm_get_page_size(vm));
+		else
+			sev_encrypt_phy_range(sev,
+					      gpa_start + pg * vm_get_page_size(vm),
+					      pg_cnt * vm_get_page_size(vm));
 		pg += pg_cnt;
 	}
 
@@ -308,3 +335,47 @@ void sev_vm_launch_finish(struct sev_vm *sev)
 	TEST_ASSERT(ksev_status.state == SEV_GSTATE_RUNNING,
 		    "Unexpected guest state: %d", ksev_status.state);
 }
+
+/* SEV-SNP VM implementation. */
+
+struct sev_vm *sev_snp_vm_create(uint64_t policy, uint64_t npages)
+{
+	struct kvm_snp_init init = {0};
+	struct sev_vm *sev;
+	struct kvm_vm *vm;
+
+	vm = vm_create(VM_MODE_DEFAULT, 0, O_RDWR);
+	sev = sev_common_create(vm);
+	if (!sev)
+		return NULL;
+	sev->snp_policy = policy | SNP_POLICY_RSVD;
+
+	kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_SNP_INIT, &init);
+	vm_set_memory_encryption(vm, true, true, sev->enc_bit);
+	vm_userspace_mem_region_add(vm, VM_MEM_SRC_ANONYMOUS, 0, 0, npages, 0);
+	sev_register_user_range(sev, addr_gpa2hva(vm, 0), npages * vm_get_page_size(vm));
+
+	pr_info("SEV-SNP guest created, policy: 0x%lx, size: %lu KB\n",
+		sev->snp_policy, npages * vm_get_page_size(vm) / 1024);
+
+	return sev;
+}
+
+void sev_snp_vm_free(struct sev_vm *sev)
+{
+	kvm_vm_free(sev->vm);
+	sev_common_free(sev);
+}
+
+void sev_snp_vm_launch(struct sev_vm *sev)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start launch_start = {0};
+	struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_update launch_finish = {0};
+
+	launch_start.policy = sev->snp_policy;
+	kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START, &launch_start);
+
+	sev_encrypt(sev);
+
+	kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH, &launch_finish);
+}
-- 
2.25.1